Deray v. City of Colo. Springs
| Decision Date | 19 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 11-cv-02639-MSK-CBS |
| Parties | SHERRY L. DERAY, as heir and next of kin of John R. Winkler (deceased), Plaintiff, v. CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO; RICHARD MYERS; RONALD SHEPPARD; CARLOS SANDOVAL; and JOHN HAVENAR, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Honorable Marcia S. Krieger
THIS MATTER comes before the Court pursuant to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (# 35), Ms. Deray's response (# 36), and the Defendants' response (# 37).
The facts of this matter are mostly undisputed. Defendants Sandoval and Havenar are Colorado Springs Police Officers. On October 12, 2010, they contacted Ms. DeRay, attempting to locate her son, Mr. Winkler, in order to execute an arrest warrant. Ms. DeRay advised that Mr. Winkler might be found at an apartment complex on Vindicator Drive. She further advised the officers that Mr. Winkler suffered from a mood disorder, anxiety, and depression; that he had attempted suicide twice in the prior January; and that she had had a heated conversation with him a few days earlier in which "he told her that he hated her and that he wanted to kill himself."
Officers Sandoval and Havenar went to the Vindicator Drive address and discovered Mr. Winkler outside, talking to another individual. At this juncture, the parties' factual contentions differ.
According to the Defendants, Officer Sandoval approached Mr. Winkler, told him to place his hands behind his back, and attempted to place him in handcuffs. Before Officer Sandoval was able to place the second handcuff on Mr. Winkler, however, Mr. Winkler began to move forward towards an open field. Believing that Mr. Winkler was attempting to escape, Officer Sandoval performed a "armbar takedown" of Mr. Winkler. Officer Sandoval testified that "in the process [of the takedown] I believed he was going to resist," and thus, attempted to perform "a knee strike towards his shoulder area." The strike missed, but when Mr. Winkler went down to the ground, he did not resist and complied with Officer Sandoval's instructions. Officer Sandoval states that he "controlled [Mr. Winkler's] right arm by placing . . . my left knee in the small of his back and my right knee towards the shoulder blade area of his right shoulder." Officer Havenar took control of Mr. Winkler's right arm, and the officers completed the task of handcuffing Mr. Winker.
Ms. Deray relies entirely on the deposition testimony of Tyler Tubbs, the person to whom Mr. Winkler was talking when the officers arrived. She asserts that the officers grabbed Mr. Winkler and "slammed hi[s]" chest and face down onto the trunk of a car the men were standing near, then "kicked [him] in the back of his knee," causing him to fall to the ground, and then "forcefully pushed . . . his head and face [onto] the ground." Mr. Tubbs' initial description of the events did not include descriptions of any other acts of physical force by the officers, but upon cross-examination at his deposition, he added that "I saw them kick him once or twice more when he was on the ground," after Mr. Winkler had already been handcuffed.
What happened thereafter is undisputed. Officer Havenar walked Mr. Winkler over to the unmarked patrol car, placed him in the right front passenger seat, and seatbelted him. Officer Havenar took a seat in the left rear passenger seat, and Officer Sandoval drove the car towards the Colorado Springs Criminal Justice Center via Interstate 25. During the drive, Mr. Winkler began to cry and talk about the warrant against him. Officer Sandoval observed Mr. Winkler repeatedly bending forward at the waist, an action he believed was an attempt by Mr. Winkler to wipe his face or his nose on the computer installed on the dashboard of the vehicle. By the time the vehicle was on the Interstate, Mr. Winkler began talking about how "he doesn't like his life, that he's a loser," that he wanted to die, and so on.
At some point, Officer Havenar observed Mr. Winkler fidgeting in his seat, behavior that Officer Havenar stated was common with individuals who were handcuffed behind their backs as they attempted to find a comfortable sitting position. Officer Havenar observed Mr. Winkler place his finger on the release button for his seat belt. Officer Havenar instructed him not to unbuckle the belt, but Mr. Winkler ignored the instruction, and, in a single movement, rotated his body so that his back (and his cuffed hands) faced the passenger's side door. Within the span of a few seconds, the passenger's side door opened and Mr. Winkler fell out, onto the highway. Officer Sandoval braked, bringing the car to a stop. Mr. Winkler got up from the pavement and began running westward, but was struck by an oncoming car and was killed.
Ms. DeRay, in her capacity as representative of Mr. Winkler's estate, commenced this action (# 1) alleging two claims for relief: (i) a claim for common-law negligence, apparently asserted against all Defendants; and (ii) a claim invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against allDefendants, apparently arising under the 4th, 8th, and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution.1
The Defendants move (# 35) for summary judgment on these claims.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure facilitates the entry of a judgment only if no trial is necessary. See White v. York Intern. Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1995). Summary adjudication is authorized when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Substantive law governs what facts are material and what issues must be determined. It also specifies the elements that must be proved for a given claim or defense, sets the standard of proof and identifies the party with the burden of proof. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Kaiser Francis Oil Co. v. Producer's Gas Co., 870 F.2d 563, 565 (10th Cir. 1989). A factual dispute is "genuine" and summary judgment is precluded if the evidence presented in support of and opposition to the motion is so contradictory that, if presented at trial, a judgment could enter for either party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. When considering a summary judgment motion, a court views all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, thereby favoring the right to a trial. See Garrett v. Hewlett Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 2002).
If the movant has the burden of proof on a claim or defense, the movant must establish every element of its claim or defense by sufficient, competent evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Once the moving party has met its burden, to avoid summary judgment the responding party must present sufficient, competent, contradictory evidence to establish a genuine factual dispute. See Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1991); Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th Cir. 1999). If there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact, a trial is required. If there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, no trial is required. The court then applies the law to the undisputed facts and enters judgment.
If the moving party does not have the burden of proof at trial, it must point to an absence of sufficient evidence to establish the claim or defense that the non-movant is obligated to prove. If the respondent comes forward with sufficient competent evidence to establish a prima facie claim or defense, a trial is required. If the respondent fails to produce sufficient competent evidence to establish its claim or defense, then the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
The parties appear to agree that Ms. DeRay is alleging two separate strands of claims under § 1983: (i) claims arising out of the events of Mr. Winkler's initial arrest (i.e. a claim of excessive force against Officers Sandoval and Havenar), and (ii) substantive due process claims associated with the transportation of Mr. Winkler. The Court addresses each strand in turn. 1. Excessive force during arrest
The 4th Amendment protects persons against "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const., 4th Am. That protection ensures that police officers may not use an excessive amount offorce when effecting an arrest. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The sole question is whether the amount of force used by police was "objectively reasonable" under all the circumstances Id. at 396. The Court does not inquire into the subjective intent or motivation of the officer in administering the force, and it examines the apparent need for the use of force based on the circumstances as they appeared to officers on the scene, not through a post-hoc review of the situation in hindsight. Id. at 396-97. Among the factors that the Court reviews in determining the objectively-reasonable amount of force permissible in a situation are: (i) the severity of the crime for which the arrest is being made; (ii) whether the suspect poses and immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and (iii) whether the suspect is actively resisting. Id at 396; Morris v. Noe, 672 F.3d 1185, 1195 (10th Cir. 2012).
Construing the evidence - notably the testimony of Mr. Tubbs - in the light most favorable to Ms. DeRay, Officers Sandoval and Havenar arguably applied an excessive amount of force to Mr. Winkler when: (i) they "slammed" his chest and head on the trunk of the car when initially attempting to handcuff him; and when (ii) they "kicked him once or twice" while he was on the ground and handcuffed.
The Court finds that the alleged "slamming" of Mr. Winkler's body against the trunk of the car was an objectively reasonable use of force. In this respect, the first and third Graham factors tip largely in Mr....
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