Derepkowski v. Smith-Lee Co., Inc.

Decision Date05 February 1974
Docket NumberNo. 73-C-204.,73-C-204.
Citation371 F. Supp. 1071
PartiesArthur J. DEREPKOWSKI, an Individual, Plaintiff, v. SMITH-LEE CO., INC., a corporation, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

William H. Kilberg, Sol. of Labor by Alan M. Serwer, Chicago, Ill., David B. Bukey, U. S. Atty., Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiff.

Cummings & Parker by Richard C. Cummings, Lowville, N. Y., for defendant.

DECISION and ORDER

MYRON L. GORDON, District Judge.

This matter is before me on cross-motions for summary judgment. The parties have stipulated as to the material facts.

The defendant employer, Smith-Lee Co., Inc., transferred its Milwaukee operations to Oneida, New York, and paid seniority-based severance benefits to all of its Milwaukee employees who were terminated at the time of such transfer.

The plaintiff, Arthur Derepkowski, who was an employee on military leave of absence at the time of the transfer of operations, made timely application for reinstatement after his military service. Mr. Derepkowski was offered a position at the defendant's new Oneida, New York, operation, but he was not offered severance pay, which totaled $250.00. The plaintiff claims that under the provisions of § 9 of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.App. § 459(c), he is entitled to the same seniority-based benefits which were received by all of the Smith-Lee Company's other Milwaukee employees who were terminated during his absence.

Section 9 of the Miltary Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.App. § 459, provides that if a person leaves a position to perform military service, and, thereafter, as a veteran, makes timely application for employment:

"(b) Reemployment rights
"(A) . . . .
"(B) if such position was in the employ of a private employer, such person shall—
"(i) if still qualified to perform the duties of such position, be restored . . . to a position of like seniority, status, and pay; . . . unless the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so; (emphasis added).

The statute also states that:

"(c) Service considered as furlough or leave of absence (1) Any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the provisions of paragraph . . . (B) of subsection (b) shall be considered as having been on furlough or leave of absence during his period of training and service in the armed forces, shall be so restored without loss of seniority, (and) shall be entitled to participate in insurance or other benefits offered by the employer pursuant to established rules and practices relating to employees on furlough or leave of absence in effect with the employer at the time such person was inducted into such forces. . . ." (emphasis added).

Finally, § 9(c)(2) provides:

"It is declared to be the sense of Congress that any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the provisions of paragraph . . . (B) of subsection (b) should be so restored in such manner as to give him such status in his employment as he would have enjoyed if he had continued in such employment continuously from the time of his entering the armed forces until the time of his restoration to such employment." (emphasis added).

Smith-Lee claims that the statute does not require the payment of the requested severance benefits because § 9(b)(2)(B) first requires restoration to a position before any other lost...

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2 cases
  • Milhauser v. Minco Prods., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
    • 2 Marzo 2012
    ...a possible position of reemployment, it can sometimes be a required position of reemployment. For example, in Derepkowski v. Smith–Lee Co., Inc., 371 F.Supp. 1071 (E.D.Wis.1974), the court found that an employer may not place a returning servicemember in an available employment position whe......
  • Milhauser v. Minco Prods., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • 5 Diciembre 2012
    ...that the employee would have had if his employment not been interrupted by military service. See, e.g., Derepkowski v. Smith–Lee Co., 371 F.Supp. 1071 (E.D.Wis.1974). Milhauser also contends that even if USERRA permits termination to be a valid reemployment position, it only does so if the ......
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