DeRichelieu v. Johns Hopkins Univ.
| Decision Date | 23 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ELH-21-1953 |
| Parties | LONDYN C. SMITH DERICHELIEU Plaintiff, v. JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Londyn C. Smith DeRichelieu, [1] the self-represented plaintiff, filed suit on August 3, 2021, against defendant Johns Hopkins University (the “University” or “JHU”), her former employer. ECF 1. She alleges discrimination on the basis of race, color, and sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (“FEPA”), Md. Code , § 20-601 et seq. of the State Government Article (“S.G.”). Id.[2] DeRichelieu subsequently filed a supplement to ECF 1 containing two documents: the Charge of Discrimination (“Charge”) she filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and her EEOC Dismissal and Notice of Rights. ECF 5. I shall refer to ECF 1 and ECF 5 together as the “Complaint.”
On September 7, 2021, defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. ECF 12. The motion is supported by a memorandum (ECF 12-1, collectively the “Motion”) and two exhibits. ECF 12-2; ECF 12-3.[3]
By Notice dated September 7, 2021 (ECF 14), plaintiff was informed of her right to respond in opposition to the Motion due within 28 days. Id. at 1. Plaintiff was also informed in the Notice, as follows: “If you do not file a timely written response…the Court may dismiss the case or enter a judgment against you without further opportunity to present written argument.” Id.
DeRichelieu did not respond to the Motion by the relevant deadline. Accordingly, the Court issued an Order on November 2, 2021 granting her until December 2, 2021, to respond to the Motion. ECF 15. She was also warned that if she did not submit a response, I would assume she does not oppose the Motion. Id.
As of this date, no responsive pleading to the Motion has been filed by plaintiff. See Docket. Therefore, I assume the Motion is unopposed. Nevertheless, in Muhammad v. Maryland, ELH-11-3761, 2012 WL 987309, *1 n.3 (D. Md. Mar. 20, 2012), I explained: Indeed, in Muhammad, the Court rejected meritless arguments advanced by the defense, despite the plaintiff's failure to oppose them. Therefore, I will consider the merits of defendant's arguments, even though the Motion is unopposed by the pro se plaintiff.
No hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, I shall construe the Motion as a motion to dismiss and grant it in part.
I briefly summarize the factual allegations in the Complaint. Plaintiff identifies as “African American (Black) and female (transgender, born male).” ECF 1, ¶ 6. On or about September 10, 2018, plaintiff was hired for the position of “Research Coordinator II” at the University's School of Public Health. Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff's manager was Danielle German, who is “white and female (born female).” Id. ¶ 7.
During the course of plaintiff's employment, she “frequently confided” in German “about her own trauma, harassment and discrimination that she had faced as a black, transgender woman.” Id. ¶ 17. As a result, plaintiff alleges, German understood that plaintiff was “extremely sensitive and vulnerable and was relying on Mrs. German and her coworkers for support.” Id. ¶ 18.
As early as October 2019, plaintiff complained to German “that she was being targeted and harassed by Iya Dammons of Safe Haven, a transgender community partner with whom Plaintiff had worked.” Id. ¶ 10. Nevertheless, Dammons “was invited to a Community Advisory Board (CAB) meeting in December, 2019 attended by Plaintiff where Ms. Dammons verbally assaulted Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 11. The University allegedly took “no actions to protect” plaintiff after this incident. Id. ¶ 12.
On or about March 10, 2020, plaintiff was suspended for “actions related to Ms. Dammons and Safe Haven that were inconsistent with her job requirements.” Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff asserts that the actions related to her suspension did not occur while she was at work, or in her official capacity. ECF 1, ¶¶ 13, 14. In response, plaintiff informed the University that “she felt that she was being targeted for her race and her sex/transgender status.” Id. ¶ 16.
Plaintiff was terminated on March 18, 2020. Id. ¶ 19. She asserts that the University maintained a progressive disciplinary policy, requiring notice and investigation of improper behavior before suspension or termination, but that the University did not engage in this policy before terminating plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 15, 19. Further, plaintiff alleges that “[w]hite cisgendered employees who violated” JHU policies were handled according to this policy, rather than suspended and terminated as she was. Id. ¶ 20.
DeRichelieu alleges in the Complaint that “[o]n or about July 9, 2020, Plaintiff filed her Charge of Discrimination with the” EEOC. Id. ¶ 21. This occurred approximately 113 days after plaintiff's termination on May 18, 2020. However, plaintiff has included her Charge with the Complaint. See ECF 5 at 2. This document reflects a signature date of January 24, 2021. Id. And, that is some 312 days after May 18, 2020. On May 5, 2021, the EEOC notified plaintiff that it was closing its file as to the Charge because it “was not timely filed with the EEOC.” Id. at 1.
Additional facts are included, infra.
As noted, the Motion is styled as a “Motion to Dismiss Or, In the Alternative, For Summary Judgment.” ECF 12. A motion styled in the alternative implicates the court's discretion under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Kensington Vol. Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty., 788 F.Supp.2d 431, 436-37 (D. Md. 2011).
Ordinarily, a court “is not to consider matters outside the pleadings or resolve factual disputes when ruling on a motion to dismiss.” Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, 510 F.3d 442, 450 (4th Cir. 2007). However, under Rule 12(b)(6), a court, in its discretion, may consider matters outside of the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(d). If the court does so, “the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56, ” and “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). But, when the movant expressly captions its motion “in the alternative” as one for summary judgment, and submits matters outside the pleadings for the court's consideration, the parties are deemed to be on notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may occur; the court “does not have an obligation to notify parties of the obvious.” Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 1998).[5]
A district judge has “complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept the submission of any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and rely on it, thereby converting the motion, or to reject it or simply not consider it.” 5C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1366 (3d ed. 2018). But, this discretion “should be exercised with great caution and attention to the parties' procedural rights.” Id. In general, courts are guided by whether consideration of extraneous material “is likely to facilitate the disposition of the action, ” and “whether discovery prior to the utilization of the summary judgment procedure” is necessary. Id.
Here, defendant has submitted a JHU payroll record indicating that plaintiff was terminated from her employment with the University on March 19, 2020 (ECF 12-3), as well as an Affidavit from a University employee attesting to the record. ECF 12-2. However, DeRichelieu already alleges in her Complaint that she was terminated on March 18, 2020. ECF 1, ¶ 19.[6] Therefore, the exhibits do not offer the Court any information necessary to the disposition of the case. I will construe the Motion as a motion to dismiss.
A defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Weil, 918 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 2019); In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). That rule provides that a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendants with “fair notice” of the claims and the “grounds” for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
To survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 684 (2009) ...
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