Dernac v. Pacific Coast Coal Co.
| Decision Date | 03 March 1920 |
| Docket Number | 15680. |
| Citation | 188 P. 15,110 Wash. 138 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | DERNAC v. PACIFIC COAST COAL CO. |
Department 1.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Calvin S. Hall, Judge.
Action by Isabella Dernac against the Pacific Coast Coal Company. From a judgment for plaintiff defendant appeals. Reversed.
Farrell Kane & Stratton, of Seattle, for appellant.
Tucker & Hyland, of Seattle, for respondent.
The appellant was the owner of a mine slope located in the town of Black Diamond, King county. The slope had a pitch of about 20 degrees and came to the surface on an open and vacated tract, which was a favorite place for the children of the neighborhood to play upon. The outlet was protected by a house of timber, covered on the sides and top and with a heavy wire screen or mesh drawn across the face of the slope to enable the free passage of air into the slope. A small door in the screen permitted of entrance. This door had been left unlocked and unfastened for some time before the incident giving rise to this lawsuit. Joe Dernac, a boy then of the age of 14 years and 9 months, was, with his playmates kicking a football near the entrance. The ball having rolled into the slope, Dernac and some of his companions entered for the purpose of recovering it. Dernac was in the lead and when those following him had reached the inner door, nearly 200 feet from the entrance, they missed him, and after procuring assistance they found his body at a point 336 feet from the entrance, where he had been overcome by 'black damp.' This action was begun by his mother to recover damages for his death. Judgment having been returned in her favor, the mining company appeals.
Upon the trial of the case the respondent requested but one instruction, based upon section 7408, Rem. Code, found on page 121, Laws of 1890, and which reads:
'You are instructed that it is the law of this state that any person or persons, company or corporation, who shall dig sink, excavate, or cause the same to be done, or, being the owner or owners or being in possession or under lease or contract to dig any shaft, excavation, or hole to be used for mining or otherwise, while digging, sinking, or excavating or after ceasing work upon or abandoning the same, shall erect or cause to be erected good and substantial fences or other safeguards and keep the same in good repair around said works or shafts sufficiently to securely safeguard against danger to persons or animals from falling into said shaft or excavation.'
Counsel for respondent frankly state that they base their entire right of recovery upon this statute, saying in their brief: 'It is true that counsel for plaintiff told the jury and the court that he would rest plaintiff's case on the statute.' It is the contention of the appellant that the statute has no application to the facts as they exist. The issue is thus a simple one, and calls only for an examination and interpretation of the statute.
In making such interpretation it is proper to have in mind the evils which the passage of the statute were intended to remedy. Unguarded excavations on private property were a source of danger, and unless some warning of their existence or safeguards were afforded they were constant menaces to the lives and limbs of persons using the property and unaware of their existence. This is especially true in mining districts and on this account the statute was passed in this state and similar statutes have been passed in other states where mining operations are carried on. In view of the language of this statute and the dangerous results which were sought to be prevented, it cannot be said that the statute means, when it says that the guards are for the purpose of preventing the 'falling' of persons into excavations, that thereby tunnels and slopes should have been so guarded that no one could walk into them. It might have been that the Legislature could have made it...
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Roth v. Bell
...for a child's wrongful death. United States v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 500 F.2d 637, 639 (9th Cir. 1974); Dernac v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 110 Wash. 138, 188 P. 15 (1920), and Whittlesey v. Seattle, 94 Wash. 645, 163 P. 193 (1917), do not support the contention that the legislature's pu......
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Morgan v. Department of Social Sec.
... ... other.' Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., ... 301 U.S. 495, 526, 57 S.Ct. 868, 880, 81 L.Ed ... contained in the act. Dernac v. Pacific Coast Coal ... Co., 110 Wash. 138, 188 P. 15 ... ...
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Ochampaugh v. City of Seattle, 45492
...it. The purpose of the law was to prevent an involuntary entrance into a "shaft, excavation or hole." Dernac v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 110 Wash. 138, 140-41, 188 P. 15, 16 (1920). In denying recovery, the court stressed the fact that the boy entered the slope through his own voluntary That......
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U.S. v. Burlington Northern, Inc.
...is to be read narrowly as to who may sue, and a plaintiff must bring itself within the terms of the statute. Dernac v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 110 Wash. 138, 188 P. 15, 17 (1920); Whittlesey v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash. 645, 163 P. 193, 195 (1917); see Boeing Airplane Co. v. Perry, 322 F.2d......