DeRosa v. Rambosk
| Decision Date | 11 August 2010 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:08-cv-806-FtM-29SPC |
| Citation | 732 F.Supp.2d 1285 |
| Parties | James T. DeROSA; Kathleen DeRosa; Louis J. DeRosa; Mary Elizabeth DeRosa, Plaintiffs, v. Kevin RAMBOSK, Shaun M. George and Andrew W. Orcutt, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Colleen J. Macalister, Law Office of Colleen J. Macalister, Naples, FL, for Plaintiffs.
Adriana Mihaela Jisa, Jason Lee Scarberry, Purdy, Jolly, Giuffreda & Barranco, PA, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court on the following motions for summary judgment: (1) Defendant Sheriff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 35); (2) Defendant Shaun M. George's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Counts V-VIII, IX, X, XIII, and XIV (Doc. # 36); and (3) Defendant Andrew E. Orcutt's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts XX-XXIII (Doc. # 37), all filed on March 3, 2010. Plaintiffs filed Amended Responses (Docs. # 57-59) on April 23, 2010. The parties also filed affidavits, depositions, and other exhibits in support of their respective briefs.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is "genuine" if there is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" if it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id. The moving party bears the burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and/or affidavits which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (11th Cir.2004).
To avoid the entry of summary judgment, a party faced with a properly supported summary judgment motion must come forward with extrinsic evidence, i.e., affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and/or admissions, which is sufficient to establish the existence of the essential elements to that party's case, and the elements on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir.1999). If there is a conflict in the evidence, "courts are required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (internal quotation and citation omitted). "In qualified immunity cases, this usually means adopting ... the plaintiff's version of the facts." Id.
Plaintiffs James DeRosa (James), Kathleen DeRosa (Kathleen), Louis J. DeRosa (Louis), and Mary Elizabeth DeRosa (Mary) filed a twenty-three (23) count Complaint (Doc. # 1) 1 against DefendantsKevin Rambosk 2, in his capacity as Sheriff of Collier County, Deputy Shaun M. George (Deputy George), and Sargent Andrew Orcutt (Sgt. Orcutt). The first eight counts set forth federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, while the next fifteen counts set forth state law claims. The following summary judgment facts are either undisputed by the parties or the facts as viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, as the non-moving parties:
On or about October 16, 2004, James DeRosa was driving a Chevrolet Yukon in which Kathleen, Mary, and Louis were passengers. (Doc. # 57, p. 2.) Louis was sitting in the front passenger seat, while both women were sitting in the back seat. While James was driving on Randall Blvd. in Collier County, Florida, at about 6:45 p.m., he engaged his high beams for a short period of time. ( Id. at p. 3.) At that time, Deputy George, in full uniform and driving a marked Collier County Sheriff's Office vehicle with proper insignia and lighting, was driving in the opposite direction on Randall Blvd. Deputy George made a u-turn, activated the lights and sirens of his patrol vehicle, and made a traffic stop of plaintiffs' vehicle. ( Id.)
Deputy George approached the vehicle and asked James for his driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. ( Id.) Plaintiffs described Deputy George as being very agitated, shaking, and nervously putting his hand on his gun. Because James was wearing gym shorts and was driving Kathleen's vehicle, he had trouble locating the appropriate documents. James asked Kathleen if she had his wallet, and she responded she did not. James then started looking for the documents in the vehicle, and asked Kathleen where she kept them. As Kathleen started to reply, Deputy George told her to shut up. ( Id.) As James continued to look, Deputy George told Kathleen on two more occasions to shut up when she attempted to speak to James about the location of the documents. ( Id. at 3-4.) Kathleen then told Deputy George, "You know, you really need to work on your community service skills," and said nothing more to him during the remainder of the traffic stop. ( Id. at 4.)
Mary, also in the back seat, was upset and was "rambling" and "grumbling" to Kathleen about being stopped by a police officer. ( Id.) Mary rambled and grumbled during the entire traffic stop, and Kathleen tried to keep her quiet and calm. ( Id.)
Deputy George took the registration and proof of insurance (James could not find his driver's license), went back to his patrol vehicle, checked whether James had a valid Florida driver's license, determined that he did, and wrote a traffic citation for failure to dim headlights, in violation of Florida Statute § 316.238. ( Id.) Deputy George returned to the plaintiffs' vehicle and handed James the citation book to sign, but no pen. ( Id.) James signed the citation in pencil, and gave the ticket book back to Deputy George. ( Id.) Deputy George gave James a copy of the ticket and his registration and proof of insurance. Deputy George returned to his own vehicle, and James pulled away from the shoulder and continued down the road.3( Id. at 5.)
Deputy George immediately began a new pursuit of plaintiffs' vehicle, with his lights and sirens activated. Deputy George radioed his dispatcher that he was going to arrest the woman in the back of the vehicle for obstruction and that the vehicle was pulling away from him. Plaintiffs did not know why Deputy George wanted to pull them over again, but were afraid because Deputy George was acting aggressively, was shaking and jittery, and was swerving on the road behind them. James refused to pull over, and continued to drive the vehicle at a speed of 45-50 miles per hour. James asked Kathleen to call 911 for help, which she did. (Doc. # 38-2, p. 32.) Kathleen reported to the 911 operator that they were being pursued by a Collier County Deputy, they were afraid to stop on the dark road, they would pull over at a specific gas station about two miles ahead, and stated that she would like to see lots of other officers there. ( Id. at pp. 33-35.) The 911 operator advised Kathleen to pull over immediately, and that it was against the law not to do so. Deputy George contacted his supervisor, Sgt. Orcutt, and informed Sgt. Orcutt that he was involved in a vehicle pursuit, and gave the location, speed, and traffic conditions. Sgt. Orcutt authorized Deputy George to continue the low-speed pursuit of plaintiffs' vehicle. (Doc. # 36, p. 5.) Sometime during the pursuit, Deputy George learned that someone in the vehicle had called 911 and reported they were afraid of him.
James pulled the vehicle into the gas station as promised. Deputy George arrived, got out of his patrol car with his taser drawn, and ordered James out of the vehicle. James complied, and was handcuffed and placed in the back of Deputy George's patrol car. Deputy George asked another deputy to arrest Kathleen. That deputy asked Kathleen to step out of the vehicle, and she complied. Deputy George then approached Kathleen, grabbed her by the arm, and dragged her over to his patrol car, jammed her against the hood, handcuffed her, shoved her back into the car hood, and forcefully placed her in the back of another officer's patrol car. ( Id. at p. 6.)
Mary had gotten out of the vehicle and was sitting at a picnic table at the gas station. An officer arrested her at the table, handcuffed and placed her into the back of the patrol car with Kathleen. Louis had also gotten out of the vehicle and asked permission to take the vehicle after the arrest of James and Kathleen. Louis was ultimately arrested for obstructing an officer, handcuffed, and placed in the back of the car with James. (Doc. # 57, p. 8.)
James was arrested for fleeing and eluding in violation of Florida Statute § 316.1935(1); resisting a law enforcement officer without violence in violation of Florida Statute § 843.02; and refusal to accept and sign a citation in violation of Florida Statute 318.14. James was issued citations for failing to dim headlights, failing toexhibit driver's license, and fleeing. James was denied bond as a flight risk. All criminal charges against James were subsequently dismissed by the State Attorney's Office, he pled guilty to refusal to sign, and was found guilty of not dimming his headlights.
Kathleen was arrested for resisting an officer without violence, in violation of Florida Statute § 843.02. The criminal charge was subsequently dismissed by the State Attorney's Office.
Mary was arrested for resisting an officer without violence, in violation of Florida Statute § 843.02. The criminal charge was subsequently dismissed by the State Attorney's Office.
Louis was arrested for obstructing an officer. No charges were ever filed against Louis.
Counts V through VIII of the Complaint allege,...
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