Derrickson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. DKC 95-3296.,CIV. A. DKC 95-3296.
• Citation: 84 F.Supp.2d 679
• Parties: Reginald DERRICKSON, et al. v. CIRCUIT CITY STORES, INC.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Page 679

84 F.Supp.2d 679

Reginald DERRICKSON, et al. v. CIRCUIT CITY STORES, INC.

No. CIV. A. DKC 95-3296.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

February 1, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Warren K. Kaplan, The Washington Lawyers' Committee, Washington, DC, Joseph M. Sellers, Cohen, Milstein, et al., Washington, DC, Therese K. Francese, Howrey & Simon, Washington DC, Terry L. Sullivan, Howrey & Simon, Washington, DC, LaShanda D. Branch, Howrey & Simon, Washington, DC, Marlin Hamilton Smith Dohlman, Howrey & Simon, Washington, DC, Margaret M. Vierbuchen, Howrey & Simon, Washington, DC, Brian H. Corcoran, Howrey & Simon, Washington, DC, for Reginald Derrickson, Mohmed Ibrahim, Maxine James, Artis Kendall, Harold Moore, Stanley Sims.

Warren K. Kaplan, The Washington Lawyers' Committee, Washington, DC, Joseph M. Sellers, Cohen, Milstein, et al., Washington, DC, Patricia G. Butler, Howrey and Simon, Washington, DC, Matthew McManus Wolf, Howrey & Simon, Washington, DC, William R. O'Brien, Howrey & Simon, Washington, DC, Therese K. Francese, Howrey & Simon, Washington DC, David S. Wachen, Baker & Hostetler, LLP, Washington, DC, Marlin Hamilton Smith Dohlman, Howrey & Simon, Washington, DC, for Demeka Johnson.

John Arthur Pirko Law Office, Glen Allen, VA, David E. Nagle, LeClair Ryan, Richmond, VA, Kelvin L. Newsome, LeClair Ryan, Richmond, VA, Sharon Maitland Moon, LeClair Ryan, Richmond, VA, Deborah Swindells Donovan, LeClair Ryan, Richmond, VA, Joseph D. McCluskey, DeClair Ryan, Richmond, VA, for Circuit City Stores, Inc.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHASANOW, District Judge.

Plaintiffs bring this suit against their former employer, Circuit City, Inc., for alleged employment discrimination on the basis of race. In Count I, all six Plaintiffs (Derrickson, Ibrahim, Kendall, Moore, Sims and James) bring a claim for employment discrimination in violation of § 1981 for failure to promote, wrongful termination and/or retaliation. Plaintiffs Derrickson (Count II) and Ibrahim (Count III) further claim that Defendant violated Title VII in its conduct. Defendant moves for summary judgment on all claims on procedural grounds and on the merits. Defendant also moves to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs' expert. The issues have been fully briefed, and a hearing was held on Defendant's motions on Friday, January 7, 2000. There are six individual motions for summary judgment pending; however, those motions have been consolidated for the purpose of this memorandum because the legal issues raised in each motion substantially overlap one another. For the reasons set forth more fully below, the court shall GRANT the motions IN PART and DENY the motions IN PART.

I. Scope of Section 1981

A. Claims Stemming from At-Will Employment

As an initial matter, Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on all § 1981 claims because § 1981 does not encompass at-will employment contracts. This argument is without merit as the Fourth Circuit has already decided this issue in Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 165 F.3d 1015, 1018-19 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Having concluded that an at-will employment relationship is contractual, we hold that such relationships may therefore serve as predicate contracts for § 1981 claims."). Defendant relies upon Hawkins v. Pepsico, Inc., 10 F.Supp.2d 548 (M.D.N.C.1998) which reached the opposite result before the decision in Spriggs. It is contrary to basic legal principles to assert that this court should follow Hawkins, not Spriggs, on the basis that "this issue will be revisited by the Fourth Circuit when it considers the appeal in Hawkins." Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims of Maxine James 11, n.9. Spriggs is currently the law in the Fourth Circuit, and this court will properly follow the mandate of the Court of Appeals that at-will employment contracts may create claims under § 1981.

B. Retaliation Claims

Defendant also raises the argument that retaliation claims are not cognizable under § 1981. In 1989, the Supreme Court ruled in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), that § 1981's protections extend only to the formation of contracts, not "breach of the terms of the contract or imposition of discriminatory working conditions." Id. at 177, 109 S.Ct. 2363. However, following Patterson, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 substantially broadened the language and scope of § 1981 to include "the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." § 1981(b). Congress made clear that the amendments include claims of retaliation: "Section 210 would overrule Patterson by adding at the conclusion of section 1981 a new subsection (b) .... The list set forth in subsection (b) is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. In the context of employment discrimination, for example, this would include, but not be limited to, claims of harassment, discharge, demotion, promotion, transfer, retaliation, and hiring." H.R.REP. No. 102-40(I), at 92, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 630; see also Andrews v. Lakeshore Rehab. Hosp., 140 F.3d 1405, 1412 (11th Cir.1998) (finding cognizable retaliation claim under § 1981); Carney v. American Univ., 151 F.3d 1090, 1094-95 (D.C.Cir.1998) (assuming without deciding that retaliation claim may proceed under § 1981); Settle v. Baltimore County, 34 F.Supp.2d 969, 984 (D.Md. 1999) (Davis, J.) (same). Following this history, the court will allow Plaintiffs to proceed with claims of retaliation under § 1981.

II. Standard of Review

It is well established that a motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In other words, if there clearly exist factual issues "that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party," then summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir.1987); Morrison v. Nissan Motor Co., 601 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir.1979); Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 181 F.2d 390, 394 (4th Cir.1950). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Pulliam, 810 F.2d at 1286 (citing Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir.1979)).

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of and construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Tinsley v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 155 F.3d 435, 437 (4th Cir. 1998). A party who bears the burden of proof on a particular claim must factually support each element of his or her claim. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element ... necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Thus, on those issues on which the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to confront the motion for summary judgment with an affidavit or other similar evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In Celotex, the Supreme Court stated:

In cases like the instant one, where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file." Such a motion, whether or not accompanied by affidavits, will be "made and supported as provided in this rule," and Rule 56(e) therefore requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. However, "`a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a fact issue.'" Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 958-59 (4th Cir.1984) (quoting Seago v. North Carolina Theatres, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 627, 632 (E.D.N.C.1966), aff'd, 388 F.2d 987 (4th Cir.1967)). There must be "sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted).

Courts must take special care when considering a motion for summary judgment in an employment discrimination case because "motive often is the critical issue." Ballinger v. North Carolina Agric. Extension Serv., 815 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th Cir. 1987) ("[S]ummary judgment is seldom appropriate in cases wherein particular states of mind are decisive as elements of [a] claim or defense." (quoting Smith, 597 F.2d at 414)). In Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville Railroad Co., 760 F.2d 633 (5th Cir.1985), the Fifth Circuit cautioned:

[S]ummary judgment is an inappropriate tool for resolving claims of employment discrimination, which involve nebulous questions of motivation and intent. Often motivation and intent can only be proved through circumstantial evidence; determinations regarding motivation and intent depend on complicated inferences from the evidence and are therefore peculiarly within the province of the fact-finder.

Id. at 640-41 (citations omitted). It is with this caution in mind that the court addresses Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

III. Timeliness of Claims

Defendant objects to the timeliness of many of Plaintiffs' claims. In response, Plaintiffs...