Derrington v. United States

Decision Date21 February 1985
Docket NumberNo. 80-166.,No. 80-458.,No. 80-1155.,80-166.,80-458.,80-1155.
Citation488 A.2d 1314
PartiesAndre C. DERRINGTON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. Stanley M. GRAYSON, Jr., Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Mark Carlin, Washington, D.C., for appellant A.C. Derrington.

Gregory B. Macaulay, Washington, D.C., for appellant S.M. Grayson.

Craig N. Moore, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., with whom Stanley S. Harris, U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., at the time the brief was filed, and Michael W. Farrell, Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., and David W. Stanley, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on brief, for appellee.

Before PRYOR, Chief Judge, and NEBEKER and ROGERS, Associate Judges.

ROGERS, Associate Judge:

In these consolidated appeals, each appellant appeals his conviction by a jury of first-degree murder while armed (D.C.Code §§ 22-2401, — 3202 (1981)), first-degree felony murder (in the course of two robberies), while armed (D.C.Code §§ 22-2401, — 3202 (1981)), two counts of armed robbery (D.C. Code §§ 22-2901, — 3202 (1981)). Appellant Grayson also appeals his conviction of possession of a prohibited weapon (D.C.Code § 22-3214(a) (1981), and appellant Derrington appeals the denial of his motion for a new trial or, alternatively, to vacate the judgment.1 Grayson contends that his warrantless arrest violated the Fourth Amendment and that certain evidence was obtained in violation of his Miranda2 rights under the Fifth Amendment. According the appropriate weight to the trial court's findings, we affirm the trial court's ruling that exigent circumstances justified Grayson's warrantless arrest. However, upon a review of the record, we hold that Grayson's Miranda rights were not "scrupulously honored" as required by Michigan v. Mosley,3 and hence the trial court's failure to suppress his statements was error. Nevertheless, in accordance with the decision of this court to apply the Chapman4 standard to Miranda violations, we hold the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of Grayson's pre-arrest admissions, other corroborating testimony and incriminating physical evidence. Turning to Derrington's claims that the verdict may not have been unanimous, that prejudicial inadmissible hearsay and improperly admitted "other crimes" evidence denied him a fair trial, and that the trial court erred in denying without a hearing his motion for a new trial or, alternatively, to vacate his sentence, we find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we affirm appellants' convictions except for one count of armed robbery which merged with the conviction for felony murder, Whalen v. United States,5 and remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate those convictions and to resentence appellants accordingly. Brown v. United States, 464 A.2d 120, 125-26 n. 7 (D.C.1983).

I.

Carl Metheny was robbed and murdered by three men on Wednesday, February 28, 1979, around 7:30 p.m. when he and his wife were approaching their car in an underground garage. Mrs. Metheny had seen the three men standing outside of Mr. Metheny's liquor store at 17th & I Streets, N.W. shortly before she and her husband went to the garage. When they saw the men in the garage, Mr. Metheny assisted his wife into the car and put his attache case in the car. As he walked toward the driver's side, he was shot in the head with a shotgun held by a man wearing glasses and a trench coat, and died shortly thereafter. The men fled after the gunman took Mr. Metheny's attache case and Mrs. Metheny's purse.

The following afternoon the police received a call from a man who advised that his son, Ronnie Melson, knew about the killing. Later that evening Ronnie Melson told Detective Green of the homicide branch that several people were involved in planning the armed robbery, including one whom he knew as "June," who carried a sawed-off shotgun in a gym bag. Melson told Green what he knew about appellants' planning of the robbery, and that "June" had told him that morning what had happened, including the fact he had shot a man, and also showed Melson a lot of money from the robbery; Melson thought it was about eight hundred dollars. After Melson identified "June" as appellant Grayson from a photo array and told the police where he lived, Detective Green and other police officers arrested Grayson in his mother's apartment. They also seized his sawed-off shotgun, gym bag, coat, and eyeglasses as well as money on his bureau. About thirty minutes later, Detective Green and his partner spoke with Grayson in the homicide office and obtained oral and written statements from him. Green proceeded early the next morning to interview another acquaintance of Melson named Johnny Holland, who had originally planned to join in the robbery, and William Wright at whose apartment Derrington was living. Holland was arrested, and gave a statement to the police about his involvement with appellants in planning the robbery, and about what Grayson had told him over the telephone on the day after the shooting and robbery. Wright told Detective Green about the activities of appellants and two others at his apartment on the day of the crimes, but denied he was personally involved; he turned over Mr. Metheny's attache case, a paper bag like the one Mr. Metheny used for the liquor store's receipts, and some of the robbery money. Appellant Derrington's fingerprints were found on the paper bag, and he was arrested later the same day.

At the trial, following the denial of Grayson's pretrial motion to suppress, the government presented evidence which included Detective Green's testimony about Grayson's statements after his arrest6 and the physical evidence seized from his bedroom. Neither appellant testified. Derrington presented an alibi defense through three friends who claimed that he was at a pool hall at the time of the crimes. Grayson did not present any evidence in his defense.

II. Appellant Grayson

Grayson filed a pretrial motion to suppress all the fruits of his allegedly illegal warrantless arrest and the subsequent search of his dwelling, including any and all statements obtained by the police which were fruits of the illegal arrest or obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. He also sought to suppress as the fruits of his allegedly illegally obtained statements, the coat he had worn on the night of the crimes, a police photograph of the blister in the webbing of his hand, William Wright's testimony, and the items seized at his apartment.

A.

"It is a `basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 588-89, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 1381, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (the Fourth Amendment further bars police from making a warrantless, nonconsensual entry for purposes of a routine felony arrest) (citing Dorman v. United States, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 313, 435 F.2d 385 (1970) (en banc)). However, there is an exception to the warrant requirement where exigent circumstances are present. Payton, supra, 445 U.S. at 590, 100 S.Ct. at 1382; Dorman, supra, 140 U.S.App. D.C. at 319, 435 F.2d at 391; United States v. Minick, 455 A.2d 874 (D.C.) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 111, 78 L.Ed.2d 112 (1983). The Dorman criteria for determining whether there are exigent circumstances are well settled. As summarized in United States v. Lindsay, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 105, 110, 506 F.2d 166, 171 (1974), they are: (1) a grave offense is involved, particularly a crime of violence; (2) the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) a clear showing of probable cause; (4) a strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the dwelling; (5) the likelihood of escape if not swiftly apprehended; (6) a peaceful entry as opposed to a "breaking"; and (7) the time of entry (night or day). The trial court concluded there were exigent circumstances. We must accept the trial court's factual determinations absent clear error. Minick, supra, 455 A.2d at 876 (citing Brooks v. United States, 367 A.2d 1297, 1302 (D.C.1976)). Applying the analysis of Minick, supra, 455 A.2d at 876,7 and Dorman, supra, 140 U.S.App. D.C. at 320-21, 435 F.2d at 392-93 to determine whether the police actions can be upheld, we conclude the trial court carefully considered the seriousness of the intrusion and, in view of the evidence presented at the pretrial hearing, we find no reversible error in its conclusion that the warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances.

All but one of the Dorman factors are easily disposed of here. The offense involved was clearly a grave one. The police could reasonably have believed Grayson would be armed since Melson told them Grayson had the shotgun with him at home and would take it with him if he left his home. There was also a clear showing of probable cause since Melson, as a citizen reporting criminal activity,8 provided the police with substantial evidence that Grayson had committed the crimes. Detective Green testified that several of the facts Melson related would have been known only by someone with firsthand knowledge or by someone who had spoken with the actual perpetrator. Under the totality of circumstances test of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), we hold there was a clear showing of probable cause. The record supports the trial court's finding that the police had strong reason to believe that Grayson was in the dwelling at the time. Although Detective Green could not remember how Melson knew Grayson was home, Green testified he was positive that Melson told him that Grayson was there at that time, and he was also sure he asked Melson how he knew and was satisfied with the answer. Finally, the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
81 cases
  • GUADALUPE v. U.S.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • January 31, 1991
    ...depends on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 226, 93 S.Ct. at 2047; Kelly, supra note 2, 580 A.2d at 1288; Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d 1314, 1325 (D.C. 1985), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1738, 100 L.Ed.2d 201 (1988). Other than the very fact of a second stop, th......
  • Womack v. US
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • March 14, 1996
    ...exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless and non-consensual entry into suspect's home to effect an arrest); Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d 1314, 1322-23 (D.C.1985) (same), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1738, 100 L.Ed.2d 201 9 In Terry, an officer observed three individ......
  • State v. Worley
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • April 11, 1988
    ...over areas occupied by a child in the parent's home. E.g., United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir.1978); Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d 1314 (D.C.Cir.1985); State v. Jones, 193 Conn. 70, 475 A.2d 1087 (1984); Preston v. State, 444 So.2d 939 (Fla.1984); Williams v. State, 166 G......
  • Ruffin v. U.S.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • April 16, 1987
    ...the seizure.22 See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 183, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); Derrington, supra note 21, 488 A.2d at 1330. Where probable cause already exists, a carefully tailored search and seizure to prevent the destruction of readily destroyed e......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT