Dershowitz v. Ford Motor Co., 6
| Decision Date | 03 April 1950 |
| Docket Number | No. 6,6 |
| Citation | 41 N.W.2d 900,327 Mich. 386 |
| Parties | DERSHOWITZ v. FORD MOTOR CO. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
David J. Cohen Detroit, for plaintiff and appellant. Louis Rosenzweig, Detroit, of counsel.
Willaim T. Gossett, Dearborn, for defendant and appellee. E. C. Starkey and Joseph A. O'Reilly, Dearborn, of counsel.
Before the Entire Bench.
Plaintiff's declaration alleged the following: that in 1929 he was employed by defendant as a machine operator; that one of defendant's officials requested him, while so employed, to keep watch on his fellow employees for the purpose of detecting work shirkers and tool thieves among them; that the official stated that he realized that this was not what plaintiff was employed for and that it might involve some risk for him, but that the company took good care of those who did it favors; that plaintiff complied with such request; that his fellow employees became suspicious of and unfriendly toward him; that on September 14, 1929, while walking a short distance from his machine, some axles fell upon him from an overhead conveyor, causing him injuries from which he still suffered; that defendant considered the occurrence 'peculiar' and, until 1935, furnished plaintiff with all necessary hospital and medical care, paid him full wages whether working or not and in other ways showed him appreciation for the favor he had rendered; that in 1935 defendant offered either to pay plaintiff a large sum of money in settlement of his rights against defendant or, in lieu thereof, to furnish him employment as long as he desired it, together with all necessary medical and hospital care, appliances and treatments; that plaintiff accepted the latter alternative and that defendant fulfilled its agreement accordingly until 1946, but thereafter refused to furnish plaintiff with care and treatment or to pay his further expenses in connection with or occasioned by his injuries; that he claimed damages in the sum of $2,500 in accord with an attached bill of particulars showing expenditures by him in that amount during the years 1946, 1947, 1948, and 1949 for medical and hospital care, treatments, etc.
Defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that both plaintiff and defendant were subject to the workmen's compensation act, that plaintiff's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment, that the workmen's compensation commission had exclusive jurisdiction of the matter and that, therefore, the court was without jurisdiction. From the court's order dismissing, plaintiff appeals, claiming that his injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment.
When both the employer and employee are subject to the workmen's compensation act and plaintiff's injury arises out of and in the course of his employment, the workmen's compensation commission has exclusive jurisdiction to the exclusion of that of the circuit court. This was true in 1929, C.L.1929, § 8410, as it is today, C.L.1948, § 411.4, Stat.Ann.1949 Cum.Supp. § 17.144. See Osborne v. Van Dyke, 311 Mich. 86, 18 N.W.2d 374; Morris v. Ford Motor Co., 320 Mich. 372, 31 N.W.2d 89.
To state a cause of action plaintiff's declaration needed to allege facts showing that at the time the injury occurred he was not doing anything connected with his employment and that there was no causal connection between the latter and his injury. His declaration did not disclose his purpose in walking down the aisle near his machine at the time the axles fell. It is not prerequisite to a holding that injury arose out of and in the course of his employment to find that he was actually operating his machine at the time. Whether he was walking toward the machine for the purpose of operating it or was walking for the purpose of doing something else connected with his work or for the purpose of ministering to his own hunger, thirst, or personal comfort, his action in any such event was such as has been held to be beneficial to the employer, incident to and within the ambit of his employment, and conclusive of the proposition that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. See Amicucci v. Ford...
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