Des Moines Independent Community School Dist. v. Department of Job Service, 85-312

Citation376 N.W.2d 605
Decision Date13 November 1985
Docket NumberNo. 85-312,85-312
Parties28 Ed. Law Rep. 888 DES MOINES INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF JOB SERVICE, and James H. Sorenson, Appellees.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa

Edgar H. Bittle and Patricia J. Martin of Ahlers, Cooney, Dorweiler, Haynie, Smith & Allbee, Des Moines, for appellant.

Walter F. Maley, Blair H. Dewey, Joseph L. Bervid and Deborah A. Dubik, Des Moines, for appellees.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C.J., and UHLENHOPP, McCORMICK, SCHULTZ, and WOLLE, JJ.

SCHULTZ, Justice.

The Des Moines Independent Community School District (school district) appeals from a district court judgment on judicial review which affirmed an agency ruling allowing unemployment benefits to a former employee. On appeal, the school district asserts that James H. Sorenson (claimant), a substitute teacher, was ineligible for benefits because he voluntarily quit his employment and he failed to accept suitable work offered to him. We reverse the decision of the district court and hold that claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits because he voluntarily left his work without good cause attributable to his employer.

Claimant was employed by the Federal Service in the third quarter of 1982. Thereafter, he had his name placed on substitute teacher lists at three schools in the Des Moines area, including the school district in this case. Claimant accepted one assignment from the school district and additional assignments from the other two schools during the fourth quarter of 1982. He did not accept any teaching assignments from the school district in either the first or second quarters of 1983. However, claimant accepted substitute teacher assignments from both of the other schools in the first quarter of 1983 and from one of the two other schools in the second quarter.

At the conclusion of the 1982-83 academic year, the school district sent a letter to claimant indicating that the school district would have substitute teaching available to him for the following term. The school district's policy is that a teacher is retained on the substitute list if the first letter it sends is not returned. In August 1983 a second letter was sent to claimant requesting that he confirm if he wished to have continued employment with the school district. Claimant did not return the letter or notify the school district because he assumed that his failure to contact the school district would be indicative of the fact that he was no longer available to substitute teach.

Claimant freely admits that he was not available to continue his employment with the school district for the 1983-84 term. On June 1, 1983, claimant moved from Altoona to Cedar Rapids because of financial reasons. He owned a house in Cedar Rapids which he rented, but the renters later moved out. Claimant testified he could not afford to pay both the rent in Altoona and the house payments on his house in Cedar Rapids. After the move claimant was employed for a short time as a substitute teacher with the Cedar Rapids School District.

Claimant filed an initial claim for unemployment insurance benefits effective October 16, 1983. Initially, a department of job service claims deputy determined that claimant was entitled to benefits. The school district appealed this decision on the grounds that claimant voluntarily quit. On that appeal the hearing officer concluded that claimant was entitled to benefits because: (1) claimant's election not to report for further possible assignment with the school district was not a voluntary quit; and (2) claimant was justified in not accepting suitable work because he no longer resided in the area where the job was offered. Thereafter, the agency's appeal board adopted the hearing officer's findings in a 2-1 decision. On judicial review, the district court determined there was substantial evidence in the record, when reviewed as a whole, to support the agency's decision that claimant was entitled to benefits.

We believe the outcome of this appeal on judicial review depends on whether the claimant voluntarily quit his employment. A claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits when "the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer. Iowa Code § 96.5(1). The term "left work" has been construed to mean "if he has become unemployed." McCarthy v. Iowa Employment Security Commission, 247 Iowa 760, 764, 76 N.W.2d 201, 204 (1956). While the burden of proof is on the claimant to show his entitlement to unemployment compensation, the employer has the burden of proving that a claimant quit his job without cause attributable to the employer. Taylor v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 362 N.W.2d 534, 541 (Iowa 1985).

The school district asserts that it has met this burden of proof because it offered claimant continued employment for the following academic year as a substitute teacher. The school district points to undisputed evidence that it sent a letter to claimant at the end of the 1982-83 school term notifying him that he had continued employment for the next term. Additionally, the school district notes that the same information was contained in a letter it sent him in August in which it requested he notify the school district if he wanted to be included on the 1983-84 substitute teacher list. The school district argues that by his failure to return this second letter and decision to move to Cedar Rapids claimant made himself unavailable for work which constitutes a voluntary quit.

In its finding of fact the agency determined that the claimant did not receive the second letter, but no mention was made of the first letter. In a statement made by claimant at his fact-finding interview he admitted that "I received a letter from Des Moines School requesting notice of my availability, however I did not return it because I was no longer living there and therefore not available to them." In light of this admission it is undisputed that claimant was aware the school district had made him an offer of continued employment as a substitute teacher for the 1983-84 term. The question that then arises is whether claimant's failure to accept this offer constitutes a voluntary quit pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.5(1).

The agency relied upon two administrative rules to negate the school district's allegation that claimant voluntarily quit his employment. These rules provide that certain separations from employment are not to be considered voluntarily quits because, in those cases, good cause for quitting is attributable to the employer. 370 IAC 4.26 (1983). The two rules are:

The claimant was employed on a temporary basis for assignment to spot jobs or causal labor work and fulfilled the contract of hire when each of the jobs was completed. An election not to report for further possible assignment to work shall not be construed as a voluntary leaving of employment.

370 IAC 4.26(19) (1983).

The claimant was hired for a specific period of time and completed the contract of hire by working until the specific period of time had elapsed.

370 IAC 4.26(22) (1983).

We cannot agree with the agency's conclusion that these rules are applicable to substitute teacher employment. We recognize that administrative rules have the force of law and are presumed valid. Richards v. Iowa Department of Revenue, 360 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Iowa 1985). But, because we decide that the agency incorrectly applied its rules to the substitute teacher in this case, we need not decide the validity of these two rules. We give administrative agencies a reasonable range of informed discretion in the interpretation and application of their own administrative rules. Meads v. Iowa Department of Social Services, 366 N.W.2d 555, 558 (Iowa 1985). However, we are not bound by the agency's interpretation. It is our duty to determine matters of law which includes the interpretation of a statute or an agency rule which interprets such a statute. Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 321 N.W.2d 6, 10 (Iowa 1982). We do not give deference to an agency's interpretation of its own rules if that interpretation is plainly inconsistent with its rules. Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 337 N.W.2d 470, 475 (Iowa 1983).

The substitute teacher in this case was not involved in a conventional employer-employee relationship. He applied to the school district for employment, entered into an employment contract and was placed on a substitute teacher list for the academic term. Thereafter, when the school district needed a substitute teacher it called one of the listed substitutes. If the substitute was available and accepts the invitation to teach, the substitute was given a teaching assignment for a particular period of time. One court described the relationship as follows:

Substitute teaching is by its nature inherently indefinite depending as it does on the occurrence of unforeseen vacancies in the teaching faculty; however, the employment possibilities of a substitute teacher remains reasonably assured so long as the claimant intends to do the work and the district expects to offer the work as it becomes available.

Guth v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 81 Pa.Cmwlth. 79, 473 A.2d 228, 231 (1984).

The legislature and the agency have treated school district employees differently than other employees. Unemployment benefits are not paid to teachers during the period between successive academic years or terms. Iowa Code § 96.4(5)(b). There is a special provision for substitute teachers in the agency rules which define whether a claimant is available for work and eligible for benefits. The rule is set out in pertinent part as follows:

Substitute teachers. The question of eligibility of a substitute teacher is subjective in nature and must be determined on an individual case basis. The substitute teacher is considered an instructional employee and is subject to the same limitations as other...

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  • Norland v. Iowa Dept. of Job Service
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    ...we owe an agency only limited deference on matters of law, including statutory interpretation. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist. v. Department of Job Serv., 376 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Iowa 1985); see also Brumley v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 292 N.W.2d 126, 128 (Iowa 1980); Iowa R.App.P. 4.......
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