Desai v. Charter Commc'ns, LLC, Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-459-DJH
Decision Date | 29 March 2019 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-459-DJH |
Citation | 381 F.Supp.3d 774 |
Parties | Kruti DESAI et al., Plaintiffs, v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
Thomas E. Carroll, Lance W. Turner, Carroll & Turner, PSC, Monticello, KY, for Plaintiffs.
Culver V. Halliday, Stephen P. McCallister, Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC, Louisville, KY, John C. O'Quinn, Kasdin M. Mitchell, Patrick F. Philbin, Tracie L. Bryant, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, DC, Laura M. Jordan, R. Nelson Williams, Thompson Coburn LLP, St. Louis, MO, Kasdin Miller, for Defendant.
Plaintiffs Kruti Desai, Melanie Fink, Belinda Gale Parkerson, Jeremy Parkerson, Daniel Popp, and Carolyn Vincent alleged that their former employer, Charter Communications, LLC, falsely accused them of theft after their employment was terminated. (Docket No. 7) Following a weeklong trial, a jury agreed, finding Charter liable for defamation per se. (D.N. 168) Charter has moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. (D.N. 183) In the alternative, it seeks reduction of the damage award. For the reasons explained below, the Court will reduce the punitive damages and deny Charter's motion in all other respects.
The Court previously summarized the facts of this case as follows:
(D.N. 129, PageID # 2710-11 (internal citations and footnote omitted))
The case was tried solely on a theory of defamation per se. At the close of Plaintiffs' case, Charter moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that "Printer-gate" could not constitute defamation per se because it had no "objectively understood definition" (D.N. 148-1, PageID # 3243) and was not defamatory on its face (id. , PageID # 3243-45); that Plaintiffs had no proof of damages to support a claim of defamation per quod (id. , PageID # 3245-47); and that any inference arising from "Printer-gate" was true because the term referred to "an incident involving the unauthorized removal of company printers from Charter's premises." The Court denied that motion and later granted Plaintiffs' motion for judgment as a matter of law on Charter's truth defense, concluding that there was insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiffs' actions constituted criminal theft. (D.N. 175, PageID # 4091-92) The jury ultimately found Charter liable, awarding each plaintiff $ 350,000 in compensatory damages and $ 1 million in punitive damages. (D.N. 168) The Court entered judgment for Plaintiffs in accordance with the jury's verdict (D.N. 179), and Charter timely sought relief under Rules 50 and 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (D.N. 183)
Charter renews its Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether the term "Printer-gate" can constitute defamation per se. (D.N. 183-1, PageID # 4372-86; see D.N. 148) It further argues that it is entitled to a new trial on the grounds that it should have been allowed to present the defenses of truth and qualified privilege; that James Eversole's testimony was admitted in error; and that the jury was required to find malice by clear and convincing evidence in order to award punitive damages. (See D.N. 183-1, PageID # 4386-4404)
Because this is a diversity case, Kentucky law governs the Court's Rule 50 analysis. See Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. , 912 F.3d 348, 360 (6th Cir. 2018) .
Under Kentucky law,
Ventas, Inc. v. HCP, Inc. , 647 F.3d 291, 314 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Morales v. Am. Honda Motor Co. , 151 F.3d 500, 506 (6th Cir. 1998) ); see also Toler v. Süd-Chemie, Inc. , 458 S.W.3d 276, 285 (Ky. 2014) (citations omitted).
There is likewise a high bar for relief under Rule 59 :
[the Sixth Circuit] ha[s] interpreted Rule 59 to mean that "a new trial is warranted when a jury has reached a ‘seriously erroneous result’ as evidenced by: (1) the verdict being against the weight of the evidence; (2) the damages being excessive; or (3) the trial being unfair to the moving party in some fashion, i.e., the proceedings being influenced by prejudice or bias."
Mosby-Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. , 883 F.3d 595, 606 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Holmes v. City of Massillon, Ohio , 78 F.3d 1041, 1045-46 (6th Cir. 1996) ). Charter has not demonstrated that either remedy is warranted here.
As it has on numerous prior occasions, Charter argues that the term "Printer-gate" cannot constitute defamation per se. Charter first asserts that there was no evidence to support a finding that Simms's presentation imputed criminal conduct to Plaintiffs. (D.N. 183-1, PageID # 4372-76) It further contends that the Court, not the jury, should have determined whether defamation per se occurred. (Id. , PageID # 4376-86) Neither argument is persuasive.
(Id. , PageID # 3677-78 (emphasis added)) Thus, both Little and Eversole provided testimony supporting the jury's verdict.4
Charter next asserts that Little's testimony cannot support...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Degolia v. Kenton Cnty.
... ... KENTON COUNTY et al., Defendants CIVIL ACTION No. 2:17-CV-226 (WOB-CJS) United States ... Arthur Dogswell, LLC , 603 F.3d 308, 311 (6th Cir. 2010). "[R]ather, ... ...
-
Chatterjee v. CBS Corp.
...S.W.3d 276, 284 (Ky.2014). As a pleading matter, the fair-report privilege is treated as a defense. See Desai v. Charter Commc'ns, LLC, 381 F. Supp. 3d 774, 790-91 (W.D. Ky. 2019); Toler, 458 S.W.3d at 284 (referring to qualified privilege as a "defense"); Columbia Sussex Corp. v. Hay, 627 ......
-
Pitt v. Twp. of Lee
...will defeat the plaintiff's or prosecution's claim, even if all theallegations in the complaint are true." Desai v. Charter Commc'ns, LLC, 381 F. Supp. 3d 774, 791 (W.D. Ky. 2019) (quoting Affirmative Defense, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)). "The burden of proving an affirmative de......
-
Simpson v. Xerox Educ. Servs., LLC
...to provide any excuse for the delay [in seeking leave to amend pleadings] is largely dispositive." Desai v. Charter Commc'ns, LLC, 381 F. Supp. 3d 774, 793-94 (W.D. Ky. 2019). Because Simpson has not established good cause to amend, the Court does not reach the Defendants' futility argument......