Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co.

• Decision Date: 03 November 1999
• Docket Number: No. A081330.,A081330.
• Citation: 76 Cal.App.4th 33,90 Cal.Rptr.2d 15
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Al DESCHENE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PINOLE POINT STEEL COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.

90 Cal.Rptr.2d 15

76 Cal.App.4th 33

Al DESCHENE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PINOLE POINT STEEL COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.

No. A081330.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4.

November 3, 1999.

As Modified November 29, 1999.

Vincent M. Spohn, Napa, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Charles S. Birenbaum, Karen L. Mathes, Robert Spagat, Thelen, Reid & Priest, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Respondent.

POCHE, J.

Plaintiff, Al Deschene, appeals from a judgment entered in favor of defendant, Pinole Point Steel Company (hereafter PPS), his former employer, after PPS prevailed on its motion for summary judgment. Deschene appeals from the judgment contending that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to PPS and in denying his motion for new trial.¹

Background

Deschene filed a complaint on June 27, 1996, seeking damages for wrongful termination on theories of breach of contract and of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as well as termination violative of public policy and of statutory prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of medical condition and as retaliation for giving testimony in a deposition. Deschene alleged that he began his employment with PPS on March 18, 1980. On March 24, 1995, he gave deposition testimony in a lawsuit brought by a former employee of PPS, Jerald Gatton, for injuries Gatton contended were a result of asbestos exposure. (Gatton v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., (Oct. 20, 1997) A073577 [nonpub. opn.].)²

It was undisputed that Deschene was fired by PPS in late June 1995. In the course of that year he received three reprimands. On April 18, 1995, he received a reprimand for allegedly violating attendance policy. On April 27, 1995, he received a reprimand for what was characterized as "carelessness, loss of material and failure to follow instructions." Deschene conceded that he failed on that day to follow instructions from his supervisor Moyles to "close the snubber rolls" which resulted in a shut-down on the production line.

In a termination reprimand dated June 26, 1995, Deschene was said to have committed two "recent incidents of misconduct and insubordination directed at his immediate supervisor, Jim Moyles, the foreman .... The first event occurred on May 12, 1995[,] when Mr. Moyles attempted to counsel Mr. Deschene on performance deficiencies. Mr. Deschene blew up at Mr. Moyles and angrily yelled that Moyles was a `spineless, gutless faggot.' ... [O]n June 20, 1995, Mr. Deschene became uncontrollable with his supervisor. For no legitimate reason, Mr. Deschene left his work station and intercepted Mr. Moyles on the shop floor.... Mr. Deschene was angry and agitated. At one point, [he] .... shook his finger in Mr. Moyles' face in a threatening manner. Mr. Moyles instructed Mr. Deschene to return to work, and Deschene refused. Mr. Moyles warned Deschene to be careful of what he said. Ignoring both the instruction to return to work and the warning, Deschene said to Moyles, `You cocksucker.'"

Deschene denied that he "blew up" at Moyles on May 12 and that he called his supervisor a "spineless, gutless faggot." Characterizing defendant's version of events on June 20 as a "complete fabrication," Deschene denied he had ever left his work station, or been told to return to work, or that he had called Moyles a "cocksucker."

It was further undisputed that Deschene, who was a member of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers and subject to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), grieved his termination reprimand on the basis that he was fired because of his health and age in violation of nondiscrimination provisions contained within the CBA. The matter was eventually set for arbitration to begin in mid-May of 1996, but plaintiff withdrew his request for arbitration on May 10.

Discussion

A motion for summary judgment must be granted when all the papers submitted by the moving party establish there are no triable issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 69, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 360.) If the moving party demonstrates either that one or more elements of the plaintiffs cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action, the moving party has met his burden to show the cause of action has no merit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (n)(1).) The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a triable issue of fact exists either as to the cause of action or as to the defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2).) The plaintiff may not rely on the allegations or denials in his pleadings, but must instead set forth the specific facts which show that there is a triable issue of material fact either as to the cause of action or to the defense. (Ibid.; Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 456, 464 & fn. 4, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 936 P.2d 70.)

On appeal we apply the same principles; however, as an appellate court we conduct an independent review of the trial court's resolution of questions of law. (Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 72, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 960 P.2d 1046.) Because our review is de novo if summary judgment was proper, even if granted for an incorrect reason, we affirm. (Barkley v. City of Blue Lake (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 309, 313, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 679.)

The trial court's order granting summary judgment filed on December 30, 1997, concluded that Deschene had "failed to dispute that all of the causes of action alleged in the complaint are governed by a collective bargaining agreement, and are therefore preempted by section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185." It further found that Deschene had "failed to dispute that his termination was not in violation of public policy arising out of the Gatton testimony and his medical condition."

Preemption by Federal Statute

Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) provides in pertinent part: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." (29 U.S.C. § 185(a).)

In order to ensure that the terms in collective bargaining agreements (CBA) will be construed to have the same meaning under state and federal law and from state to state, the section has been held to require that federal law preempts state law with respect to the interpretation of the terms of a CBA. (Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co. (1962) 369 U.S. 95, 103-104, 82 S.Ct. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 [whether the terms of a CBA implicitly prohibited a strike]; Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985) 471 U.S. 202, 218, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 [state remedy for bad faith handling of disability benefits preempted because the duty which was allegedly breached would require interpreting the term of the CBA relating to handling of disability benefit claims].)

The limits of section 301 of the LMRA preemption were set out in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc. (1988) 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410. In that case an employee subject to a CBA claiming injury filed a claim for worker's compensation; the company, maintaining her claim was false, terminated her employment. (At p. 401, 108 S.Ct 1877.) The employee sued the company alleging retaliatory discharge for having availed herself of her worker's compensation rights under Illinois law. (Id. at p. 402, 108 S.Ct. 1877.) The federal district court dismissed her claim on the basis that it was inextricably linked with the provisions of the CBA and to allow it to proceed would interfere with the provisions in the CBA calling for arbitration of grievances for "any dispute" between an employer and employee. (Ibid.) The court was emphatic that "interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements remains firmly in the arbitral realm; judges can determine questions of state law involving labor-management relations only if such questions do not require construing collective-bargaining agreements." (Id. at p. 411, 108 S.Ct. 1877.)

However, the court concluded that in this instance the state law claim raised by the employee was not preempted. It looked at the elements of a claim for retaliatory discharge in Illinois: (1) a discharge; and, (2) the employer's motive to deter an employee's exercise of statutorily granted worker's compensation rights. The defense to such a claim is for the employer to show it had a nondiscriminatory motive for the firing. Each of the elements and the defense involved purely factual questions and therefore could be resolved without requiring a court to interpret any term in the CBA. (Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., supra, 486 U.S. at p. 407, 108 S.Ct. 1877.) Therefore the state law remedy was independent of the CBA for the purposes of preemption by section 301 of the LMRA. (Lingle, at p. 407, 108 S.Ct. 1877.)

In reaching this result the court expressly rejected the reasoning of the district court which had concluded that any claim of retaliatory discharge would entail inquiry into the "just cause for termination" provision of the CBA which was an issue for arbitration. (Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., supra, 486 U.S. at p. 408, 108 S.Ct. 1877.) The district court had found that such an inquiry "implicates the same analysis of the facts as would an inquiry under the just cause provisions" of the CBA. (Ibid.) Agreeing that there would indeed be a common set of facts involved in both an arbitration and in the judicial action the court still found that circumstance insufficient to trigger preemption. Indeed, the court noted "that the mere fact that a broad contractual protection...