Desha v. La. State Bd. of Nursing
| Decision Date | 18 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION Case No. 3:15-00021-JWD-RLB |
| Parties | CORNELIUS JEROME DESHA, Plaintiff, v. LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF NURSING, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Request for a Preliminary Injunction ("Injunctive Request"), (Doc. 20), partly supported by the Motion to Proceed with Preliminary Injunction Without Plaintiff's Presence ("Motion to Proceed"), (Doc. 30), and counted by the Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction ("Opposition"), (Doc. 29). Having considered the Parties' arguments, in light of Plaintiff's failure to provide sufficient support to satisfy the four elements for obtaining injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65,1 this Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff's Request for a Preliminary Injunction, (Doc. 20), and Motion to Proceed with Preliminary Injunction without Plaintiff's Presence, (Doc. 30).
On July 21, 2009, Mr. Cornelius Jerome Desha ("Plaintiff" or "Desha") applied to be a licensed nurse with the Louisiana State Board of Nursing ("Board" or "Defendant"). (Doc. 29-2 at 7.) He had been previously licensed in California as a registered nurse. (Id.) There, after obtaining his license without apparent hitch, he had been arrested for and found guilty of public intoxication and was arrested for and plead guilty to driving under the influence. (Id.) These arrests and pleas had remained upon his record, never expunged by a California court. (See Doc. 16 at 2-3.)
In the application for his Louisiana nursing license, Plaintiff was asked: "Have you been issued a citation or summons for, or has/have warrant(s) been issued against you related to, or have you been arrested, charged with, arraigned, indicted, convicted of, pled guilty/'no contest'/'nolo contender'/'best interest of' or any similar plea to; or been sentenced for any criminal offense, including all misdemeanors and felonies in any state or other jurisdiction?" (Id.) This question explicitly emphasizes its breadth in the a note: "Even though an arrest or conviction has been pardoned, expunged, dismissed, deferred, or diverted, and even if your civil rights have been restored, you must answer 'YES' and mail certified court documents of incidents/arrest together with a signed letter or explanation." (Id. (emphasis added).) While Plaintiff disclosed several instances, including the intoxication-related charges, he apparently did not disclose his arrest for grand theft and obtaining property by false pretenses, for being under the influence of a controlled substance, for burglary, for evading a peace officer, for driving at an unsafe speed, and for inflicting corporal injury on his spouse or cohabitant. (Id. at 8.) After uncovering these omissions, Defendant attempted to enter into a consent order with Plaintiff, "which would have imposed certain conditions upon . . . [his] license." (Doc. 29 at 2n.5.) Once Plaintiff rejected this conditional offer,2 a formal hearing was commenced on March 31, 2015, and Plaintiff was denied a license to practice as a registered nurse in the Bayou State pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes § 37:921. (Doc. 29-2 at 9.) As Plaintiff and Defendant agree, Defendant's ultimate action—the denial of Plaintiff's application for a nursing license in Louisiana—was thus predicated on Plaintiff's self-evident omissions. (Id.; Doc. 16 at 3.)
As required by federal law, Defendant reported this "adverse action" to the Healthcare Integrity and Protection Data Bank ("HIPDB") through Nursys, "a national database of nurse licensure, discipline, and practice privileges for Registered Nurses and Licensed Practical Nurses." (Doc. 29 at 1-2.) When Plaintiff subsequently sought to obtain employment as a registered nurse in his current home state of California, he was stymied by this report, Nursys described to him by one possible employer "as the primary site for checking on nurses in California." (Doc. 20 at 1.) Similar events have occurred, so that Defendant's reporting of this information has made "it impossible for . . . Plaintiff to find work as a [registered nurse]" despite an ongoing "active job search." (Doc. 1 at 2.)
On January 22, 2015, Plaintiff filed his complaint. (Doc. 1.) On that same day, he docketed the Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, (Doc. 3), which was granted on February 3, 2015, (Doc. 4). A scheduling order was sent out on February 6, 2015, (Doc. 6), and Defendant responded with the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint Pursuant to FRCP Rule 12(b)(6), (Doc. 8). Plaintiff responded with the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Proceed with Complaint Pursuant to FCRP Rule 12(b)(6), (Doc. 16). On May 13, 2015, Defendant filed a motion tostrike this memorandum. (Doc. 17.) The Injunctive Request came on June 30, 2015, (Doc. 20), and netted the Opposition on July 24, 2015, (Doc. 29). On August 6, 2015, Plaintiff asked for permission for this Court to hold a hearing on any and all outstanding motions in his absence, (Doc. 30), and in light of his absence, this Court converted the motion hearing to a status conference, (Doc. 32). Though Plaintiff was ordered to provide a number at which he could be reached and though he was called by the Courtroom Deputy, he never provided a number or returned a call. (Doc. 34.) Through December 18, 2015, he has filed and said nothing since August 6, 2015, (Doc. 30).
Plaintiff essentially argues that Defendant's report to HIPDB consists of "lies," "untrue accusation," and "illegal information" that have made it impossible for him to find employment as a registered nurse. (Doc. 20 at 1; see also Doc. 1 at 2.) Thus, he sues Defendant for violation of federal statutory law (including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and a specific state statute and for defamation (and/or slander). (Doc. 29 at 3-4; see also, e.g., Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 16 at 1.)3 Because of these purportedly unquestionable legal conclusions, in addition to his suffering of an irreparable harm, favorable balance of equities, and the public interest, Plaintiff contends that a preliminary injunction must issue.
As a factual mater, Plaintiff claims to have responded accurately to Defendant's licensing questions, having told them "I reported all my convictions." (Doc. 16 at 2.) Indeed, according tohim, he sent "copies of [all] letters to . . . [Defendant], informing . . . [it] that I had merely misread the question and had no intent to defraud them." (Id. at 3.) Conceding the existence of "the oversight on the initial application," Plaintiff maintains that he "delivered to them every document with written signed explanations as they had requested," being wholly "forthcoming, honest and truthful" and dealing "in good faith and all veracity." (Id.) In an addendum to this sixteenth filing, he repeats— "Plaintiff agrees that arrests were not reported on the original application"—and clarifies: "It is unacceptable and libelous . . . to claim fraud and deceit when the application was fully complete at the time of the final hearing." (Id. at 5.)
In response, Defendant contests every factor necessary for the grant of a preliminary injunction. First, it stresses that federal law required it to report any adverse action, with liability only attaching if it knowingly transmitted false information. (Doc. 29 at 3-4.) Because it simply acted in accordance with the explicit commands of federal law, Plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits is less than the law requires for an injunction to issue. (Id. at 4 -5.) His Title VII claims have no merit, because Defendant is not an entity covered by this law. (Id. at 5-6.) Finally, with defamation requiring a statement's proven "falsity" and "malice, actual or implied," among its five requirements, Plaintiff's odds of success are small, as he "has submitted no evidence to establish" either of these two essential elements. (Id. at 6-7.) Second, Defendant points out that Plaintiff's harm, i.e. his inability to find "full time, gainful employment," "can easily be quantified in monetary terms," (Id. at 7), as he himself has already twice done so, (Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 16 at 4). Third, Defendant emphasizes that it acted pursuant to a federal statute requiring it to report certain "final adverse actions," which included "any negative action" like a license's denial, regardless of whether the decision "is the subject of a pending appeal." (Doc. 29 at 8-9.) Consequently, an order like the Plaintiff seeks will force Defendant to act incontravention of explicit federal regulations. (Id. at 9.) Fourth, based on this same law, the public interest would be ill-served "[i]f Plaintiff's requested . . . is granted, and Plaintiff is not ultimately successful on the merits of his suit," for there will necessarily be "a period of time in which the public would not be informed of a reportable incident." (Id. at 9-10.) In its view, "[i]t would be a disservice to Plaintiff's potential employers and the public to allow significant information about Plaintiff to be wrongly suppressed for a period of time." (Id. at 10.) Having asked for monetary relief totaling more than $800,000, "[s]hould the Plaintiff prevail in the underlying litigation, this Court will be able to render meaningful relief, and thus, a preliminary injunction is not appropriate." (Id.) To wit, the key reason for awarding such unusual relief has been neutered by Plaintiff's own attestations: "The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo during litigation to allow the court to render meaningful relief." (Id.)
Any plaintiff must establish four elements to secure a preliminary injunction: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is...
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