Desherlia v. Alpha Beta Co., 87-6045

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: Before JAMES R. BROWNING, HUG and BEEZER
• Citation: 852 F.2d 571
• Parties: Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. Laura J. DESHERLIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALPHA BETA COMPANY and Joe Banando, Defendants-Appellees.
• Docket Number: No. 87-6045,87-6045
• Decision Date: 29 April 1988

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852 F.2d 571 Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. Laura J. DESHERLIA, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ALPHA BETA COMPANY and Joe Banando, Defendants-Appellees. No. 87-6045. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Submitted April 29, 1988. ^*
Decided July 7, 1988.

Before JAMES R. BROWNING, HUG and BEEZER, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM ^**

Laura J. DeSherlia appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Alpha Beta Co. and Joe Banando, an Alpha Beta manager, in her suit for breach of a settlement agreement reached after she filed a grievance. Because we conclude (1) that section 301 of the Labor Management and Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a), preempts her state tort cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and (2) that DeSherlia's action is time-barred, we affirm.

FACTS

DeSherlia was hired by Alpha Beta in 1978 as a part-time checker for its Lennox store. DeSherlia is a member of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 905 (Union), which has a collective-bargaining agreement with Alpha Beta. During all relevant times, DeSherlia's employment was covered by the collective-bargaining agreement. The agreement provided that all disputes and controversies of any kind or character existing between the parties be settled by grievance and arbitration and that the ultimate resolution of any such grievance would be final and binding on the parties.

In 1981, DeSherlia was transferred to Store No. 239 in Lomita. She became General Merchandise Department Head of the Lomita store. On October 1, 1984, DeSherlia's supervisor, Joe Banando, terminated DeSherlia's employment contract because she had allegedly violated company procedure regarding the handling of office mail and because her performance was not acceptable. DeSherlia contends that she was terminated in retaliation for her refusal to submit to Banando's sexual harassment.

Pursuant to procedures set forth in the collective-bargaining agreement, DeSherlia filed a grievance with the Union regarding her termination. Negotiations were subsequently held at an arbitration meeting between DeSherlia, the Union, and Alpha Beta. The grievance was settled on April 18, 1985. The terms of the written settlement and release executed by DeSherlia, the Union, and Alpha Beta, required that, inter alia, DeSherlia would be reinstated to employment with full seniority effective April 22, 1985, and that she would release Alpha Beta from all claims, demands, and liabilities of any kind up to the date of the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement did not contain any condition that Alpha Beta would not reinstate DeSherlia in Store No. 239, where Banando worked. DeSherlia nonetheless contends that Alpha Beta reassured her at the settlement agreement meeting that she would not be reinstated in Store No. 239. On May 13, 1985, she returned to Store No. 239, where she worked until June 24, 1985 before being transferred to another Alpha Beta Store.

On February 28, 1986, DeSherlia filed a complaint for unlawful employment discrimination pursuant to Cal.Gov't Code Sec. 12940(a), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981, and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e (Title VII) in California State Superior Court. On April 24, 1986, Alpha Beta removed the action to federal district court. DeSherlia sought leave to amend her complaint to state five causes of action: (1) employment discrimination under Cal.Gov't Code Sec. 12940(a); (2) breach of contract, i.e., that Alpha Beta breached the settlement and release agreement; (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by violating the settlement agreement; (4) fraud and deceit in the execution of the settlement agreement; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress by assigning DeSherlia to work under Banando in violation of the settlement agreement. The district court granted the leave to amend, but remanded the first cause of action for employment discrimination under Cal.Gov't Code Sec. 12940(a) to state court. The court retained jurisdiction over the remaining four causes of action.

On May 12, 1987, the district court granted Alpha Beta's motion for summary judgment. The district court reasoned that the four causes of action "are based on the alleged breach of an agreement settling a union grievance pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement and are therefore preempted by section 301 of the [LMRA]." The district court further concluded that the applicable six-month statute of limitations for section 301 claims barred DeSherlia's action. DeSherlia timely appeals only the issue of whether her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is preempted by section 301.

ANALYSIS

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Scott Machinists Automotive Trades Dist. Lodge, 827 F.2d 589, 591 (9th Cir.1987); Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir.1986). Whether preemption was proper is a question of subject-matter jurisdiction that we also review de novo. Stallcop v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 820 F.2d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 504 (1987).

A. Section 301 Preemption

DeSherlia maintains that section 301 of the LMRA does not preempt her state tort cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. She contends that adjudication of her emotional distress claim does not require interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement. Accordingly, she argues that the district court erred in not remanding her emotional distress claim to state court. We disagree.

Section 301 provides:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties....

29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a). The preemptive force of section 301 "is so 'extraordinary' that it 'converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.' " Caterpillar, Inc.

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v. Williams, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2430 (1987) (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1547 (1987)); see also Utility Workers of America v. Souther California Edison, Nos. 87-5674, 87-5702, slip op. 5133, 5137 (9th Cir. May 4, 1988).

To determine preemption of a tort claim, our inquiry is whether the state tort action as applied here "confers nonnegotiable state-law rights on employers or employees independent of any right established by contract, or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract." Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985). In Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S....