DeShon v. Bettendorf Community School Dist.

• Decision Date: 17 October 1979
• Docket Number: No. 63170,63170
• Citation: 284 N.W.2d 329
• Parties: 21 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 644, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,646 Margaret DeSHON, Appellant, v. BETTENDORF COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT and Board of Education of the Bettendorf Community School District, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 329

284 N.W.2d 329

21 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 644,

22 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,646

Margaret DeSHON, Appellant, v. BETTENDORF COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT and Board of Education of the Bettendorf Community School District, Appellees.

No. 63170.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 17, 1979.

James L. Sayre, of Dreher, Wilson, Adams & Jensen, Des Moines, for appellant.

Donald L. Sitz, of Lane & Waterman, Davenport, for appellees.

Considered by REES, P. J., and HARRIS, McCORMICK, ALLBEE and McGIVERIN, JJ.

REES, Presiding Justice.

We are confronted in this appeal with issues, both statutory and constitutional, arising from the nonrenewal of a nonprobationary teacher's contract under section 279.13, et seq., The Code 1977, due to the teacher's having attained the age of 65 years. Following a hearing the board of education of the Bettendorf Community School District (hereinafter "board") concluded that their mandatory retirement policy, number 403.1 which required the retirement of all employees on the first day of July following the employee's 65th birthday, constituted "just cause" under § 279.15 to terminate the contract of Margaret DeShon, who had taught in the school district for some 19 years.

Mrs. DeShon then made a timely appeal of the board's decision to an adjudicator, pursuant to § 279.17, who affirmed the board's decision on August 16, 1978. As was her prerogative under § 279.18, Mrs. DeShon rejected the adjudicator's decision and petitioned the district court for review of the decisions of the school board and the adjudicator. The district court affirmed the termination of the petitioner, from which ruling Mrs. DeShon appeals. We affirm.

The following issues are presented for review:

(1) Does the mandatory retirement policy of the school board provide an adequate basis for finding "just cause" for termination under § 279.15?

(2) Were the decisions of the school board and the adjudicator unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion?

(3) Is the school district's mandatory retirement policy violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 6, of the Iowa Constitution?

I. We set forth recently the scope of our review from a ruling of the district court in the § 279.18 context in Board of Education of Fort Madison Community School District v. Youel, 282 N.W.2d 677 (Iowa 1979). Our review, like that of the district court, is limited to the grounds listed in that section. In Youel we said: "(W)e review the record in the manner specified in § 279.18 and make anew the judicial determinations specified in that section." Youel, 282 N.W.2d at 679.

Initially, we note that the aforementioned issues correlate most closely with subsections (1) and (7) of § 279.18; subsection (1) involving alleged violations of statutory and constitutional provisions, and subsection (7) permitting review of allegedly arbitrary terminations or actions.

Before discussing our resolution of the issues, we further note that should we find there to have been "just cause" for the termination of Mrs. DeShon's employment, such a conclusion obviates any need for discussion of whether the board's action was arbitrary or capricious.

II. We must first determine whether the grounds asserted by the board for the termination of Mrs. DeShon's contract constitute "just cause" within the meaning of § 279.15, which provides in relevant part: "The notification and recommendation to terminate shall contain a short and plain statement of the reasons, which shall be for just cause, why the recommendation is being made."

The notice sent to Mrs. DeShon by the superintendent of schools stated that the district's mandatory retirement policy was the basis for recommending that her contract be not renewed. The evidence at the hearing before the board was to "be limited to the specific reasons stated in the superintendent's notice of recommendation of termination." Section 279.16. Thus the sole determination for the board was whether the attainment of their mandatory retirement age constituted "just cause".

Following testimony by the superintendent of schools that the mandatory retirement policy was necessary for administrative planning to plan recruitment, to maintain a mixture of younger and more experienced teachers, to permit staff reductions during times of declining enrollment and to generally promote a high performance level the board concluded that "just cause" for the termination of plaintiff's employment did exist. At no time was the individual competence of Mrs. DeShon brought into question; the record indicates her performance to have been most satisfactory. Our function, as the final arbiter of questions of statutory construction, is to determine whether the board acted within the permissible scope of § 279.15 in finding "just cause" on these facts.

The plaintiff contends we should construe the "just cause" language of § 279.15 no differently from the manner in which we have construed the "just cause" terminology of § 279.27. In Johnston v. Marion Independent School District, 275 N.W.2d 215, 216 (Iowa 1979), we held that the age of a teacher alone was not "good cause" under § 279.24, The Code 1973 (now § 279.27, The Code 1979), for a midyear termination, limiting "good cause" in that context to reasons attributable to the teacher's conduct. In response, the board contends that § 279.13, et seq., provides an orderly means of implementing its policy on mandatory retirement, claiming support for its policy from § 97B.45, The Code 1977 (the Iowa Public Employee's Retirement System chapter), which states that a member's normal retirement age shall be 65 years, and further provides that "notwithstanding the provisions of this section and section 97B.46, an employer may adopt policies which prescribe retirement at an age not less than sixty-five years." Such a statutory authorization, it contends, must be equated with "just cause" for an end of the school year termination under § 279.13, et seq. We find merit in the board's position.

Were we to find Johnston dispositive and fully equate "just cause" of § 279.15 with "just cause" under § 279.27, we would be ignoring a line of cases in which we have recognized the different purposes underlying the distinct termination procedures established in chapter 279. See Youel, 282 N.W.2d at 680; Briggs v. Board of Directors of the Hinton Comm. School Dist., 282 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Iowa 1979); Hagarty v. Dysart-Geneseo Comm. School Dist., 282 N.W.2d 92 (Iowa 1979); Hartman v. Merged Area VI Comm. College, 270 N.W.2d 822, 828-29 (Iowa 1978); Ramey v. Des Moines Area Comm. College, 216 N.W.2d 345, 348 (Iowa 1974); Miner v. Lovilia Ind. School Dist., 212 Iowa 973, 979, 234 N.W. 817, 819 (1931). These differences were elaborated upon in Ramey, 216 N.W.2d at 348:

Section 279.24 provides for the summary discharge of teachers for "incompetency, inattention to duty, partiality, or any good cause." It presupposes an inability of the teacher to complete teaching services. Section 279.13 (automatic continuation) has a completely different purpose. Its aim is to provide for a comparative permanence in teaching positions, unless either of the parties decide and notify the other of a termination. Its aim is to allow both the school and teacher time to plan ahead if there is to be an end of the employment. It was drafted with ordinary school years in mind.

A similar discussion in found in Hartman, 270 N.W.2d at 828-29.

These varying purposes have caused us to recently hold that the "just cause" termination standard under § 279.15 includes "legitimate reasons relating to the district's personnel and budgetary requirements", Youel, 282 N.W.2d at 680; See also Hagarty, 282 N.W.2d at 97, as well as the teacher conduct grounds which are shared with § 279.27. Thus while declining enrollment or economic necessity, because of their predictability, do not constitute "good cause" for termination under § 279.24, See Hartman, they may provide "just causes" for termination pursuant to § 279.15, See Hagarty. Therefore, our prior determination in Johnston is not dispositive. We must decide whether reaching the school district's mandatory retirement age is a legitimate reason "relating to the school district's personnel and budgetary requirements."

In the light of the legislative support for the school board's policy found in § 97B.45 covering all employees of the state and its subdivisions, and establishing the normal retirement age to be 65 years, and the rationale for such a policy as evidenced by the aforementioned testimony of the superintendent of schools, we conclude that there existed just cause for the termination of Mrs. DeShon's contract under § 279.15. The policy is clearly interrelated with the personnel needs of the school district. The statutorily authorized policy and the procedure prescribed in § 279.13, et seq., combine to provide a means of contract termination which allows both the school district and the teacher to plan for their future needs while incorporating the safeguards of the review procedure. An opinion consistent with our result is found in (19...