Desiree C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 4:17-CV-05101-RHW

• Decision Date: 21 September 2018
• Docket Number: No. 4:17-CV-05101-RHW,4:17-CV-05101-RHW
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Washington
• Parties: DESIREE C., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

DESIREE C., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

No. 4:17-CV-05101-RHW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

September 21, 2018

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, ECF Nos. 12 & 13. Plaintiff brings this action seeking judicial review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), of the Commissioner's final decision, which denied her application for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II and her application for Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 401-434, 1381-1383F. After reviewing the administrative record and briefs filed by the parties, the Court is now fully informed. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Jurisdiction

Plaintiff filed her application for Disability Insurance Benefits and her application for Supplemental Security Income on August 1, 2013. AR 242-51. Her alleged onset date of disability is January 1, 2010. AR 242, 246. Plaintiff's applications were initially denied on November 25, 2013, AR 171-87, and on reconsideration on February 7, 2014, AR 190-99.

A hearing with Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Ilene Sloan occurred on September 17, 2015. AR 35-75. On November 4, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff ineligible for disability benefits. AR 17-28. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on May 19, 2017, AR 1-3, making the ALJ's ruling the "final decision" of the Commissioner.

Plaintiff timely filed the present action challenging the denial of benefits, on July 18, 2017. ECF No. 3. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims are properly before this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. Sequential Evaluation Process

The Social Security Act defines disability as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant shall be determined to beunder a disability only if the claimant's impairments are of such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering claimant's age, education, and work experience, engage in any other substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) & 416.920(a)(4); Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006).

Step one inquires whether the claimant is presently engaged in "substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b) & 416.920(b). Substantial gainful activity is defined as significant physical or mental activities done or usually done for profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572 & 416.972. If the claimant is engaged in substantial activity, he or she is not entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571 & 416.920(b). If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two.

Step two asks whether the claimant has a severe impairment, or combination of impairments, that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) & 416.920(c). A severe impairment is one that has lasted or is expected to last for at least twelve months, and must be proven by objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508-09 & 416.908-09. If the claimant does not have a severe impairment, or combination ofimpairments, the disability claim is denied, and no further evaluative steps are required. Otherwise, the evaluation proceeds to the third step.

Step three involves a determination of whether any of the claimant's severe impairments "meets or equals" one of the listed impairments acknowledged by the Commissioner to be sufficiently severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526 & 416.920(d), 416.925, 416.926; 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P. App. 1 ("the Listings"). If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is per se disabled and qualifies for benefits. Id. If the claimant is not per se disabled, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step.

Step four examines whether the claimant's residual functional capacity enables the claimant to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f) & 416.920(e)-(f). If the claimant can still perform past relevant work, the claimant is not entitled to disability benefits and the inquiry ends. Id.

Step five shifts the burden to the Commissioner to prove that the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy, taking into account the claimant's age, education, and work experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(f), 404.1520(g), 404.1560(c) & 416.912(f), 416.920(g), 416.960(c). To meet this burden, the Commissioner must establish that (1) the claimant is capable of performing other work; and (2) such work exists in "significant numbers in thenational economy." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c)(2); 416.960(c)(2); Beltran v. Astrue, 676 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2012).

III. Standard of Review

A district court's review of a final decision of the Commissioner is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review under § 405(g) is limited, and the Commissioner's decision will be disturbed "only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error." Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1144, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing § 405(g)). Substantial evidence means "more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, "a reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence." Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989)).

In reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992). If the evidence in the record "is susceptible to more than one rationalinterpretation, [the court] must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record." Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9^th Cir. 2002) (if the "evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision, the conclusion must be upheld"). Moreover, a district court "may not reverse an ALJ's decision on account of an error that is harmless." Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111. An error is harmless "where it is inconsequential to the [ALJ's] ultimate nondisability determination." Id. at 1115. The burden of showing that an error is harmful generally falls upon the party appealing the ALJ's decision. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409-10 (2009).

IV. Statement of Facts

The facts of the case are set forth in detail in the transcript of proceedings and only briefly summarized here. Plaintiff was 22 years old at the alleged date of onset. AR 26, 242, 246. She has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English. AR 21, 26. Plaintiff has past work as a fast food worker. AR 26.

V. The ALJ's Findings

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not under a disability within the meaning of the Act from January 1, 2010, through the date of the ALJ's decision. AR 17, 27, 28.

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2010 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.). AR 19.

At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: bipolar II; generalized anxiety disorder; lumbar spondylosis; and obesity (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)). AR 19.

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. AR 20.

At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform light work, except: she can frequently climb ramps and stairs but occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; she can frequently balance and stoop; she has an unlimited ability to kneel, crouch, and crawl; she must avoid concentrated exposure to vibration and fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor ventilation; she must avoid concentrated exposure to hazards; she is able to understand, remember, and carry out simple tasks; she cannot perform tandem tasks or tasks involving cooperative team effort; she is able to have occasional, superficial contact with coworkers; she can have no contact with the general public; there should be no requirement to read detailed or complex instructions or write reports and no requirement to do detailed or complex math calculations (e.g.teller or cashier); she is able to work in an environment defined in the Selected Characteristics of Occupations and defined in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational Titles as very quiet to moderate. AR 21-22.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff in unable to perform her past relevant work. AR 26.

At step five, the ALJ found, in light of her age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in...