Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, C0-85-1331

• Citation: 379 N.W.2d 139
• Decision Date: 17 December 1985
• Docket Number: No. C0-85-1331,C0-85-1331
• Parties: In re the Marriage of Stuart DESJARLAIT, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Irene DESJARLAIT, Respondent.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota

Page 139

379 N.W.2d 139

In re the Marriage of Stuart DESJARLAIT, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Irene DESJARLAIT, Respondent.

No. C0-85-1331.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Dec. 17, 1985.

Review Denied January 31, 1986.

Syllabus by the Court

1. When a member of the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians voluntarily invokes state court jurisdiction by filing a dissolution petition in state court and the tribal code relinquishes jurisdiction over domestic matters to the state courts, the state court has subject matter jurisdiction to resolve child custody issues.

2. Principles of full faith and credit and comity do not require state courts to recognize a tribal custody order when the tribal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and did not afford the parties due process.

Harold R. Finn, Jr., Walker, for appellant.

Mark L. Rodgers, Bemidji, for respondent.

Considered and decided by PARKER, P.J., and FORSBERG and NIERENGARTEN, JJ., with oral argument waived.

OPINION

FORSBERG, Judge.

Stuart Desjarlait appeals the custody award of the Beltrami County Court. We affirm.

FACTS

Irene Desjarlait and Stuart Desjarlait are the parents of Corey and Kristie. All four are enrolled members of the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians. Corey was born in 1977, and Kristie was born in 1979. The trial court found that from the time Corey and Kristie were born up until Stuart and Irene were married in June 1981, Irene had sole and exclusive custody of the two children and was the sole caretaker. Prior to the marriage, Irene and the children resided in Redby, Minnesota. After the marriage, Irene, Stuart, and the children resided on the Red Lake Indian Reservation.

The Red Lake Tribal Court became involved with the parties as a result of several criminal convictions in the tribal court. The tribal court convicted Stuart for non-support, disobedience to the tribal court, and "child care." Irene was convicted for disorderly conduct, "child care," and disobedience to the trial court. As a result of these convictions, the tribal court issued three custody orders. On June 19, 1984, the tribal court awarded Stuart temporary custody for a period of ninety days, subject to the weekend visitation rights of Irene. On August 24, 1984, the tribal court revoked Irene's visitation rights because the tribal court became aware that she was not "fulfilling" her visitation privileges. Finally, on September 13, 1984, the tribal court awarded Stuart temporary custody, and granted Irene visitation rights on Wednesday evenings for three hours.

Subsequent to the tribal court's order of June 19th but prior to the order of August 24th, Stuart initiated a dissolution action in Beltrami County Court. At the time the petition was filed, both parties and the children resided on the Red Lake Indian Reservation. In the petition, Stuart sought "permanent care, custody and control" of Corey and Kristie, subject to reasonable visitation rights for Irene. Stuart also sought child support from Irene. Issues of property division were eliminated by stipulation of the parties prior to trial.

In late September 1984, after the tribal court awarded Stuart custody, Stuart and the children moved to New Mexico. Irene did not freely agree to the move, but the trial court was aware of the move and consented to it.

Trial commenced on October 30, 1984. At the time the trial began and up until sometime in December, Corey and Kristie remained in New Mexico. On December 12, the trial court granted Irene visitation from December 12 until December 26.

On December 18, the second day of trial, Stuart moved for a dismissal of child custody, support, and visitation matters because of the Indian Child Welfare Act, which Stuart argued vested exclusive jurisdiction over custody matters involving Indian children in the Red Lake Tribal Court. The trial court denied Stuart's motion, ruling that the Indian Child Welfare Act was inapplicable.

On December 26, 1984, the trial court awarded Irene temporary custody until February 1, 1985. By this time the children had returned from New Mexico. Also on December 26, while visiting her mother at Red Lake, Irene was served with the tribal court's custody order of September 13, 1984 granting Stuart temporary custody. Several hours thereafter, Irene and the children moved off the reservation for purposes of avoiding tribal court jurisdiction. By January 2, 1985, Irene and the children were living in Bemidji. On January 5, 1985, the trial court issued an order denying Stuart visitation from January 2 until February 1 "because adequate arrangements have not been made to assure that the children will not be removed to the Red Lake Indian Reservation during [Stuart's] exercise of his visitation privileges."

On April 24, 1985, the Beltrami County Court granted Irene the custody of Corey and Kristie, and awarded Stuart reasonable visitation. The trial court further awarded Irene child support and spousal maintenance. Stuart appeals, arguing that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to decide the custody matters and that comity and a need for uniform public policy require the trial court to give full faith and credit to the custody orders of the tribal court.

ISSUES

1. Did the county court have subject matter jurisdiction over child custody matters between the parties and their children who at one time resided on the Red Lake Indian Reservation when the tribal code relinquished jurisdiction over domestic matters to the state courts and Stuart voluntarily invoked state court jurisdiction?

2. Do the principles of full faith and credit and comity require the trial court to honor the child custody orders of the tribal court?

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

An appellate court is not bound by the ultimate legal conclusions of a trial court. See Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 354 (Minn.1977). Thus, this court must determine whether the trial court correctly applied applicable law. See A.J. Chromy Construction Co. v. Commercial Mechanical Services, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Minn.1977).

I

Stuart Desjarlait argues that the state cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction because: (1) state jurisdiction would be contrary to the established right of Indian tribes to regulate their internal and social relations; (2) state jurisdiction would result in a decrease of the authority of the Red Lake Tribal Court; (3) state jurisdiction would be contrary to the philosophy underlying the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 518A.01-.25 (1984); and (4) state jurisdiction would undermine the public policy expressed in the Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act, 1985 Minn.Laws ch. 111, §§ 1-8.

1. Stuart Desjarlait's first argument is that the state courts of Minnesota do not have jurisdiction to resolve child custody matters when the parties and their children are enrolled members of the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians and have resided on the Red Lake Indian Reservation. Stuart asserts that states have no authority to govern Indians within the boundaries of an Indian reservation. The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized this principle, and has stated that "the State of Minnesota has no authority to govern the affairs of persons within the territorial boundaries of the Red Lake reservation except as specifically authorized to do so by Congress." Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. State, 311 Minn. 241, 247, 248 N.W.2d 722, 726 (1976) (emphasis in original). See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 1085, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978) (although Indian tribes are subject to ultimate federal control, they nonetheless remain a "separate people" and possess the power to regulate their internal and social relations); State v. Porter, 348 N.W.2d 411, 412 (Minn.Ct.App.1984) (Minnesota has no civil or criminal jurisdiction over Indians residing on an Indian reservation absent an express grant of jurisdiction from Congress).

While the above principle is well established, an aspect of this case makes application of the general rule inappropriate. Stuart voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of the county court when he filed his petition for dissolution. Moreover, in the petition, Stuart expressly sought child custody and child support. Nowhere in the petition did Stuart even suggest that the county court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

In deciding a similar case in which a custody dispute arose between a husband and wife who were both enrolled members of the Blackfeet Tribe, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "by voluntarily invoking the state court's jurisdiction for divorce purposes, the [parties] clearly submitted the question of their children's custody to the judgment of the Montana state courts." United States ex rel. Cobell v. Cobell, 503 F.2d 790, 795 (9th Cir.1974) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999, 95 S.Ct. 2396, 44 L.Ed.2d 666 (1975). See also In re Bertelson, 617 P.2d 121, 125 (Mont.1980) (court noted that the parties voluntarily invoked state court jurisdiction to dissolve their marriage). Thus, we conclude that by voluntarily invoking the county court's jurisdiction for divorce purposes, Stuart clearly submitted the question of custody to the county court. In addition, Irene and the children have resided off the reservation since December 26, 1984, thereby submitting themselves to the authority of the state courts. See Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. State, 311 Minn. 241, 247, 248 N.W.2d 722, 726 (1976).

2. Stuart's second argument is that to permit the state to have jurisdiction decreases the authority of the Red Lake Tribal Court and leads to conflicting adjudications affecting the custody of children. Stuart claims that the Supreme Court decision of Fisher v. District Court controls on the custody issue before this court. In Fisher, the Court considered a custody issue that arose in the context of an adoption proceeding. Fisher v. District Court...