Desmond v. Yale-New Haven Hosp.

• Decision Date: 03 May 2022
• Docket Number: AC 44182,AC 44180,AC 44181
• Parties: SANDHYA DESMOND v. YALE-NEW HAVEN HOSPITAL, INC., ET AL.
• Court: Appellate Court of Connecticut

SANDHYA DESMOND
v.
YALE-NEW HAVEN HOSPITAL, INC., ET AL.

Nos. AC 44180, AC 44181, AC 44182

Court of Appeals of Connecticut

May 3, 2022

Argued January 20, 2022

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgments of the trial court dismissing the substitute complaints in three cases she had filed against her former employer, the defendant hospital, as barred by the exclusivity provision (§ 31-284 (a)) of the Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.). The plaintiff had been employed by the defendant when she suffered an injury for which she sought workers' compensation benefits, and the defendant accepted the claim. The plaintiff filed functionally identical substitute complaints in each of the three actions, alleging, inter alia, that the defendant had engaged in retaliatory and discriminatory conduct against her in violation of statute (§ 31-290a) as a result of her having sought workers' compensation benefits. The trial court granted the defendant's motions to strike all three complaints, determining that they did not allege employment discrimination claims pursuant to § 31-290a but, rather, bad faith processing of a workers' compensation claim, which was barred by § 31-284 (a). Held that the trial court properly struck the complaints as being barred by § 31-284 (a), as the plaintiff failed to allege any adverse employment action by the defendant, none of its alleged behavior related to or had any effect on her employment status, she admitted in her complaints that the defendant's behavior did not arise out of or in the course of her employment, and, despite her attempt to recast her claims as alleging employment discrimination, she alleged nothing more than bad faith processing of her workers' compensation claim.

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, statutory theft, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where the court, Nazzaro, J., granted the defendants' motion to strike; thereafter, the court denied the plaintiff's request for leave to amend her substitute complaint; subsequently, the court, Ecker, J., granted the defendants' motion for judgment and rendered judgment of dismissal, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court, Sheldon, Keller and Bright, Js., which reversed the judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings; thereafter, the court, Young, J., consolidated the case with two separate actions the plaintiff had brought alleging discriminatory and retaliatory conduct by the named defendant in connection with her claim for workers' compensation benefits and transferred the cases to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket; subsequently, the court, Bellis, J., granted the named defendant's motions to strike and for judgments of dismissal, from which the plaintiff filed separate appeals with this court, which consolidated the appeals. Affirmed.

Eric M. Desmond, for the appellant (plaintiff).

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Phyllis M. Pari, for the appellee (named defendant).

Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Norcott, Js.

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OPINION

ALVORD, J.

In these consolidated actions, the plaintiff, Sandhya Desmond, a former employee of the defendant Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc., ^[1] appeals from the judgments of the trial court rendered following the granting of the defendant's motions to strike her complaints. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court incorrectly construed her claims as alleging bad faith processing of a workers' compensation claim rather than as claims made pursuant to General Statutes §31-290a and, therefore, erred in determining that her claims were barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. We disagree and, therefore, affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We begin with the relevant portions of the lengthy procedural history of these actions, which is set forth in part in this court's decision in Desmond v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc., 138 Conn.App. 93, 50 A.3d 910, cert, denied, 307 Conn. 942, 58 A.3d 258 (2012) {Desmond I). "[T]he plaintiff was an employee of the [defendant]. On December 30, 2004, she was injured in the course of her employment. According to the plaintiff, she suffered a spill-related fall while at work and subsequently was diagnosed with bilateral, acute posttraumatic carpal tunnel injuries. Her physicians have advised her that, absent medical treatment, she permanently will be unable to use her hands.

"Subsequently, she filed a workers' compensation claim with regard to her injury, and the [self-insured defendant] accepted the claim. On March 6, 2008, she filed a federal action in United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, in which she alleged various claims under state law and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. On March 23, 2009, the District Court granted the [defendant's] motion to dismiss as to the plaintiffs state law claims, allowing the action to proceed only on her claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act.^[2]

"On May 20, 2010, the plaintiff filed in the Superior Court the operative complaint [of the first appeal] .... [That] complaint contained ten counts, alleging . . . workers' compensation fraud, statutory negligence, breach of contract, unfair and deceptive acts and practices in violation of [the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes 42-110a et seq.] and delay in the delivery of benefits under the act in violation of the plaintiff's state constitutional right to due process. The complaint alleged that the [defendant] had made various filings with the workers' compensation commission (commission) in a bad faith and fraudulent attempt to delay treatment. The complaint alleged that these bad faith attempts to delay treatment caused the plaintiff's condition to worsen, as

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she did not receive necessary treatment." (Footnote added.) Id., 95-96.

Following the defendant's filing of a motion to dismiss, the court, relying on our Supreme Court's decision in DeOliveira v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 487, 870 A.2d 1066 (2005) (holding that causes of action alleging bad faith processing of workers' compensation claim are barred by exclusivity provision of act), dismissed the action on the ground "that the plaintiff's claims did not allege conduct that was sufficiently egregious to remove the claims from the exclusive jurisdiction of the commission."^[3] Desmond I, supra, 138 Conn.App. 96. The plaintiff thereafter appealed to this court. Id.

On appeal in Desmond I, this court held that, despite the labels the plaintiff placed on her claims, "[a]pplying the rule articulated in DeOliveira to the facts of [the] case, it is clear that the plaintiff's claimed injuries, allegedly caused by the [defendant's] bad faith delays in medical treatment, arose out of and in the course of the workers' compensation claims process. Therefore, we conclude that the plaintiffs alleged injuries fall within the jurisdiction of the commission and that, accordingly, the court properly granted the [defendant's] motion to dismiss." Id., 102. Accordingly, this court in Desmond I affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's action. See id., 105.

Following our decision in Desmond I, the plaintiff, in August, 2013, brought a new action (2013 action) against the defendant. This court, in Desmond v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc., 181 Conn.App. 201, 185 A.3d 665, cert, denied, 330 Conn. 902, 191 A.3d 1001 (2018) (Desmond II), set forth additional procedural history related to the 2013 action. "On October 3, 2013, the plaintiff filed her [first] amended complaint . . . wherein she again set forth ten counts against the [defendant], claiming statutory theft, common-law fraud, violation of CUTPA, breach of contract and statutory negligence. The [defendant] moved to strike all of the plaintiff's claims on the ground, inter alia, that they are barred by the exclusivity provision of the act, and thus that the trial court had no jurisdiction over them. The plaintiff filed an objection, arguing, inter alia, that her claims were not barred by the exclusivity of the act. . . .

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