DeSoto v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 08 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 8:20-cv-2551-KKM-TGW |
| Parties | ADRIAN DESOTO, Plaintiff, v. GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Adrian DeSoto sued his former employer Geico General Insurance Company, alleging that GEICO violated the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and Florida law. GEICO moves for summary judgment on each of DeSoto's claims. Because GEICO did not deny DeSoto any FMLA benefits and he cannot rebut GEICO's neutral reasons for its adverse actions against him, GEICO is entitled to summary judgment.
GEICO operates a regional office in Lakeland, Florida, that handles its bodily injury claims for the State. (Doc. 39-7 at 4.) The office is divided into three separate levels:
Telephone Claims Representative (TCR) I, which investigates coverage and liability; TCR II, which handles soft tissue injuries and the Continuing Unit (CU), which adjusts claims with injuries, fatalities, or litigation. (Id.; Doc. 43 at 1-2.) Within each level, "adjusters" are grouped on teams headed by "supervisors" who report to "managers" who, in turn, are accountable to a single "director." (Doc. 39-7 at 4; Doc. 39-4 at 5.)
From 2013 to 2020, Adrian DeSoto worked at GEICO's Lakeland office. (Doc. 39-2 at 5; Doc. 39-23.) GEICO first hired DeSoto as a TCR I insurance adjuster. (Doc. 39-2 at 5.) DeSoto received three promotions-TCR II adjuster, CU adjuster, TCR I supervisor-before receiving his fourth and final promotion to "TCR II Supervisor" in May 2019. (Id. at 5-6.) His responsibilities as a TCR II Supervisor included overseeing a team of TCR I adjusters and assisting them with investigating and evaluating claims. (Id. at 14-15.)
Desoto reported directly to four different managers during his time as a TCR II Supervisor. (Id. at 8-9.) Alison Johnson took the position in March 2020 and managed DeSoto through the decision to terminate him in October 2020. (Id.) Each of DeSoto's managers reported to Elizabeth Hedge, the office's director. (Id. at 8.)
Due to multiple personal medical issues, Desoto was approved for intermittent FMLA leave between July 2019 and October 2020. (Id. at 21-22.) During his intermittent-leave period, DeSoto faced three challenges at work.
First, in March 2020, DeSoto returned from a stint of FMLA leave and discovered that Barry Stemle (also a TCR II Supervisor) transferred multiple claims from DeSoto's adjusters to his own adjusters. (Id. at 26.) The following month, DeSoto learned that Jaime Lamar (another TCR II Supervisor) did the same thing. (Id. at 25-26.) To address the situation, DeSoto filed internal complaints against both Stemle and Lamar. (Id. at 25.) The resulting internal investigation ended favorably for DeSoto. Stemle and Lamar each received "documented conversation[s]" about their conduct, and the claims were returned to DeSoto's adjusters. (Doc. 39-6 at 3.) Neither DeSoto's pay nor his metrics were impacted in any way. (Id.)
Second, in May 2020, DeSoto asked Johnson (his manager) to notify him if a CU Supervisor position came open while he was once again out on FMLA leave. (Doc. 39-2 at 29-30.) She agreed to do so if she saw one. (Doc. 39-4 at 14-15.) When DeSoto returned in early July, he learned that there had been a CU Supervisor opening while he was away-but Johnson never notified him. (Doc. 39-2 at 30.) When he inquired about it, Johnson explained that she did not know about the job posting because she did not get an email about it. (Id.; Doc. 39-4 at 15.) At times, the CU department would notify managers about job postings but did not email about this position. (Doc. 39-9 at 2.) And by the time DeSoto learned about the opening after returning from leave, he was unable to apply for it. (Doc. 39-2 at 30-31.) From November 2019 to August 2020, DeSoto unsuccessfully applied four separate times for the CU Supervisor position. Each time the hiring officials determined he was not the best-qualified candidate despite his managers (including Johnson) repeatedly recommending him. (Doc. 39-11; Doc. 39-12; Doc. 39-13; Doc. 39-14; Doc. 39-15.)
Third, on August 14, 2020, while DeSoto was out on FMLA leave, a claim file assigned to one of DeSoto's adjusters (who was also out on FMLA leave) was the subject of attorney-led settlement discussions. (Doc. 39-4 at 16; Doc. 39-7 at 12-13.) The file required immediate attention the day of the settlement conference. (Doc. 39-4 at 16.) Because DeSoto and his adjuster were both absent, Johnson transferred the claim file to another supervisor who worked with one of that supervisor's own adjusters to complete the necessary work and facilitate settlement of the claim. (Doc. 39-4 at 16-17.) Two weeks later, DeSoto filed an internal complaint against Johnson for transferring the claim file while he was out on FMLA leave. He claimed Johnson deviated from "standard operating procedures" when she transferred the file. (Doc. 39-2 at 32.) Johnson was not disciplined, however, because she had discretion to transfer the file to ensure that the work was timely completed. (Doc. 39-4 at 17-18; Doc. 39-7 at 12-13.)
On July 9, 2020, Johnson was notified that an insured complained that a $10,000 payment for a claim was incorrectly attributed to her policy when she was not involved at all in the underlying accident. (Doc. 39-4 at 20; Doc. 39-7 at 11.) DeSoto mistakenly approved payment on the claim because he mixed-up two insureds with similar names. (Doc. 39-2 at 13; Doc. 39-4 at 21.) The result was $10,000 of "extracontractual exposure" for GEICO-an uncommon and serious error. (Doc. 39-4 at 19; Doc. 39-7 at 18; Doc. 39-20 at 8-9.)
On July 9, 2020, Johnson requested that DeSoto thoroughly review the claim file and provide a "claim statement" explaining why the claim was improperly handled. (Doc. 39-4 at 21-22.) The next day, DeSoto gave Johnson a brief statement. (Doc. 39-2 at 39.) Johnson determined that the statement was not detailed enough to give her a full understanding of DeSoto's version of events. (Doc. 39-4 at 22.) So, on August 20, Johnson asked DeSoto to provide a more detailed statement, which he provided. (Doc. 39-2 at 39.)
After reviewing DeSoto's revised statement, Johnson issued DeSoto a written warning on August 24 based on her assessment that his errors led to the extracontractual payment. (Doc. 39-4 at 24; Doc. 39-21.) The warning stated that DeSoto's failure to properly investigate the claim violated GEICO's Claims Code of Conduct and advised him that further errors violating the warning could lead to his termination. (Doc. 39-21.)
GEICO's compliance team then conducted an audit into a sample of DeSoto's claims to ensure he was complying with the warning, a procedure typical in the case of extracontractual exposure. (Doc. 39-7 at 16-17.) Based on the audit results, Johnson concluded that he violated the terms of DeSoto's warning. (Doc. 39-7 at 21.) Specifically, on September 2, 2020, DeSoto reviewed a time sensitive claim file-but his review failed to address a surgery identified in the file or to provide appropriate guidance to his adjusters to handle the claim with urgency. (Doc. 39-23 at 3.) The audit concluded that these errors subjected GEICO to significant excess monetary exposure. (Id.) Therefore, on October 7, 2020, GEICO terminated DeSoto for violating the terms of his warning. (Doc. 39-2 at 20.)
DeSoto brought three claims against GEICO: an FMLA interference claim; an FMLA retaliation claim; and a claim under Florida's Private Whistleblower's Act (FWA), § 448.101, Fla. Stat. (Doc. 1.) Following discovery, GEICO filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 26.) When the Magistrate Judge granted additional discovery to DeSoto, the Court denied GEICO's original summary judgment motion as moot. (Doc. 35; Doc. 36.) GEICO again moves for summary judgment. (Doc. 38.) Desoto opposes the motion, (Doc. 42), and GEICO replies in support of it, (Doc. 44).
Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. ClV. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment when the nonmoving party "fail[s] to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant always bears the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those parts of the record that demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Clark v. Coats 8c Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991).
When that burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to prove that there is a genuine issue of fact that precludes summary judgment. Id. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings" and point to evidence of a real issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quotation omitted). "A mere 'scintilla' of evidence" does not suffice; "there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for [the nonmovant]." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted). In reviewing the identified portions of the record, the Court draws all legitimate inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. See Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1263 (11th Cir. 2020).
The FMLA provides "eligible employee [s]" twelve workweeks of leave during any twelve-month period to accommodate a ...
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