DeSpain v. Johnston
| Decision Date | 11 May 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-2418,82-2418 |
| Citation | 731 F.2d 1171 |
| Parties | Joseph DeSPAIN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees Cross-Appellants, v. Marlin JOHNSTON, et al., Defendants-Appellants Cross-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
James C. Todd, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for Johnston et al.
David Crump, Atty., Legal Foundation of America, Houston, Tex., for amicus Gulf & Great Plains.
Harry H. Walsh, Huntsville, Tex., for Joseph Despain.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before WISDOM, REAVLEY and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges.
Joseph and Gail DeSpain instituted this action in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the procedures used to investigate and record alleged incidents of child abuse in Texas. 1 The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, damages for alleged violation of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, declaratory relief, that Secs. 34.05, 34.06, and 34.07 of the Texas Family Code are unconstitutional, and attorneys' fees. The defendants, a child welfare worker, her supervisor, and the Director of the Texas Department of Human Resources, maintain on appeal that the district court erred in ordering the removal of labels used to classify complaints of child abuse in the Texas state computer system. 2 The plaintiffs, parents accused of child abuse and their minor children, contend that the district court erred in failing to find that due process requires prior notice and a hearing before a state court may issue an order directing parents accused of child abuse to cooperate with a state investigation of the accusation. We express no opinion on these questions, because we find that the district court should have abstained under the principles enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 1971, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669, and its progeny. 3 Accordingly, we vacate the district court's judgment on the merits of the case and its award of attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs, 4 and remand the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the complaint.
The series of events that led to this lawsuit began on March 6, 1980. On that date, the Child Welfare Unit of the Texas Department of Human Resources in Huntsville, Texas, received the first of two complaints alleging that the plaintiffs, Joseph and Gail DeSpain, were abusing their children. The DeSpains were registered students at Sam Houston University, owner of the plaintiffs' apartment. The complainant alleged that the DeSpains were spanking their young children for no reason and were shouting to them "I hate you and wish you would go to hell."
Jackie Williamson, an employee of the Huntsville office of the Texas Department of Human Resources and a defendant in this case, investigated the complaint. She met with the DeSpains, observed the children, and gathered information on the family. On March 10, 1980, the DeSpains called Williamson; they were upset that Williamson would not tell them who made the complaint. The following day Mrs. DeSpain reported to Williamson that the matter was an issue in the dean's office and in the Housing Department of the University. On April 9, 1980, Williamson reported to Mrs. DeSpain that the case was closed for lack of evidence of child abuse. 5
On June 9, 1980, the Child Welfare Unit received a second allegation of child abuse from a different complainant. The unidentified complainant stated that he heard children screaming and noises that sounded as though the children were being thrown against the wall. Williamson attempted unsuccessfully to conduct an investigation into this complaint. On her initial visit to the DeSpains, she did not find anyone at home. She left a note requesting that the DeSpains come to her office the following morning. Joseph DeSpain communicated with Williamson and informed her that he would meet with her in the afternoon. Instead, he and his family left town for several days. On June 13, 1980, Williamson found the DeSpains at home, but they refused to speak with her or to cooperate with the investigation. They retained a lawyer who met with Williamson and stated that the DeSpains would not consent to the investigation unless they first could defend against the accusations in court.
On June 25, 1980, Williamson obtained an ex parte order from the Walker County Court directing the DeSpains to cooperate with the investigation. The DeSpains continued to refuse to cooperate. On June 27, 1980, the DeSpains sought and obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order from the federal district court for the Southern District of Texas enjoining the enforcement of the state court order requiring the DeSpains to cooperate with the state investigation. There is no evidence in the record that the plaintiffs ever attempted to dissolve the state court order. Thereafter, the defendants sought a non-ex parte order from the state court.
On July 18, 1980, the federal district court extended the temporary restraining order pending a hearing on the merits in the state court. On September 25, 1980, because of the lapse of time since the alleged incident, 6 the state court denied the defendants' request for a second order to cooperate.
In January 1982, the federal district court conducted a trial on the merits of the case, having retained jurisdiction pending the outcome in the state court. The district court found that the state employees had acted reasonably and in good faith in attempting to investigate the complaint based on a regulatory scheme that they reasonably believed was valid. Accordingly, the court denied the DeSpains' prayer for damages under section 1983. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1979). The court also dismissed the DeSpains' due process challenges to the Texas Family Code. The district court found, however, that certain regulations directing that labels be placed on the records of alleged child abusers maintained in CANRIS violated their right to privacy. The court held that two of the labels--"reason to believe" that child abuse has occurred and "alleged perpetrator"--could not be used in the state record-keeping system absent a judicial determination that child abuse had occurred.
Before reaching the merits, the district court considered and rejected the defendants' contention that it should abstain from hearing the case. The district judge stated that he had "properly abstained from examining the merits ... while the state court proceeding was pending", but that the case was properly before the federal court after the state court proceeding had concluded. Memorandum and Order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, 2 Record 218, 220. The district court awarded the plaintiffs $25,000 in attorneys' fees and $1,747.60 in expenses.
We disagree with the district court's decision. The application of the Younger abstention doctrine requires a careful balancing of state and national interests within the context of the general principles underlying the doctrine. After undertaking this analysis, we find that the district court should have abstained in the first instance when the DeSpains sought a temporary restraining order. The judgment of the district court therefore must be vacated.
Under the broad proscriptions of Younger v. Harris and its companion cases, a federal district court presumptively must abstain from granting either injunctive 7 or declaratory relief 8 when state criminal actions or certain categories of state civil proceedings 9 are pending against the federal plaintiff at the time that federal action is commenced. This doctrine, alternately called abstention or nonintervention, is based on considerations of equity, comity, and federalism. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45, 91 S.Ct. at 750-751.
The concept of equity reflects "the traditional reluctance of courts of equity, even within a unitary system, to interfere with a criminal prosecution". Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 1975, 420 U.S. 592, 605, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 1208, 43 L.Ed.2d 482. Thus, if a state criminal prosecution is pending when the federal complaint is filed 10 or is instituted before any action of substance has commenced in the federal proceeding, 11 the federal court should dismiss an action seeking equitable relief. Equitable concerns do not mandate federal restraint in the ordinary state civil proceedings, although these concerns are relevant to cases such as the one at bar in which the civil proceeding is similar to a criminal proceeding. In such cases, the principles of comity and federalism, in conjunction with equitable concerns, may require federal abstention. Id. 420 U.S. at 604-05, 95 S.Ct. at 1208.
The notion of comity, "that is, a proper respect for state functions", reflects "a recognition ... that the entire country is made up of a union of separate state governments, and continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways". Younger, 401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. at 750. Comity, untempered by other concerns, counsels against federal intervention in state court proceedings, whether civil or criminal, pending or threatened. This construction goes too far, however, if it gives inadequate attention to the federal interests.
The third consideration underlying Younger, the principle of federalism, tempers the doctrine of comity and envisions a balancing of state and federal interests to determine the proper roles of the state and federal courts. Judicial perception of what constitutes the proper view of American federalism has shifted from time to time from a Madisonian or Hamiltonian view to a Jeffersonian view and to other views in between. The current Supreme Court position on "Our Federalism" binding inferior courts is stated in Younger:
"The concept [of Our Federalism] ... represent[s] ... a system in which there is sensitivity...
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