Despain v. Louisville Metro. Gov't
Decision Date | 19 August 2021 |
Docket Number | Civil Action 3:14-CV-P602-CHB |
Parties | MICHAEL RAY DESPAIN Plaintiff, v. LOUISVILLE METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Louisville Metro Police Department (“LMPD”) Officer Dale Henzley (“Henzley”), and 24 Officers of the Special Weapons and Tactics (“SWAT”) Team (collectively “SWAT Defendants”). [R. 139] Plaintiff Michael Ray DeSpain filed a Response. [R. 161] Henzley and SWAT Defendants filed a Reply. [R. 163] Fully briefed, this matter is ripe for decision. For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
This is a pro se prisoner civil-rights action. Plaintiff brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the Defendants alleging violations of his constitutional rights arising out of the execution of a search warrant at Plaintiff's home on September 18, 2013. [R. 1] Upon review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court by Memorandum Opinion and Order filed January 28, 2015, allowed the following claims to proceed: failure-to-train claim against the Louisville Metro Government; individual-capacity claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution against Defendants Stewart, Nobles, Browning Hyche, Henzley, McKnight, Mattingly, James, Casse, Judah Bates, and the 25 Unknown SWAT Team members for illegal search and seizure, excessive property damage, excessive force, intentional destruction of physical evidence, and refusal of EMS medical treatment; and an individual-capacity claim against Defendant Stewart for falsifying his investigation report. [R. 8]
On January 28, 2015, the Court entered its Service and Scheduling Order setting the pretrial discovery deadline for June 10, 2015. [R.10, p. 2] In the Order, the Court advised Plaintiff of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) and instructed him that he had “120 days from the date of [the] Memorandum Opinion and Order within which to move to amend his Complaint to name specific Defendants or show good cause for his failure to do so.” [R. 8, p. 10] The Court also noted that “[t]his Order shall in no way constitute a determination that Plaintiff's claims against any later named defendants would be timely.” [R. 8, p. 10 n. 2] Plaintiff filed an untimely motion to add the names of the 24 SWAT Defendants to the docket. [R. 48] Despite the delay, the Court granted the motion on July 17, 2015, finding good cause for Plaintiff's failure to provide the names within 120 days. [R. 52, p. 2] The SWAT Defendants and Henzley now move to dismiss the claims against them.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations, ” yet must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.
In addition, “[a] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). The duty to be less stringent with pro se complainants, however, does not require the Court to “abrogate basic pleading essentials, ” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989), nor to create a claim for a pro se plaintiff, Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975).
The statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions is governed by the limitations period for personal injury cases in the state in which the cause of action arose. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275-280 (1985). In Kentucky, § 1983 actions are limited by the one-year statute of limitations found in KRS § 413.140(1)(a). Collard v. Kentucky Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir. 1990). “Although state law establishes the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions, federal law controls on the issue of when the statute of limitations begins to run.” Elkins v. Kentucky State Police, No. 3:08CV-P157-S, 2008 WL 2597554, at *2 (W.D. Ky. June 26, 2008) (citing Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984)). Federal law “establishes that the § 1983 statute of limitations accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury that forms the basis of the claim alleged in the complaint.” Elkins, 2008 WL 2597554, at *2 (citing Ruff v. Runyon, 258 F.3d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2001)).
Here, the alleged excessive force incident and denial of medical care occurred on September 18, 2013. The statute of limitations therefore ran one year later on September 18, 2014. Thus, with respect to the SWAT Defendants, the first issue is whether Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, mailed on June 1, 2015 and filed on June 11, 2015, relates back to his original Complaint under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Patton v. Louisville Jefferson County Metro Gov't, No. 3:18-CV-00346-RGJ, 2021 WL 741780, at *4-5 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 25, 2021) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(C)).
In the Court's view, Plaintiff satisfied the first three requirements of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) given in part to the Rule 4(m) extension of time provided to Plaintiff. [R. 52, p. 2] However, Plaintiff cannot meet the fourth requirement, “which requires that the officer's [sic] knew or should have known that [Plaintiff's] suit would have been brought against them but for a mistake about the proper party's identity.” Patton, 2021 WL 741780, at *5. Replacing the unknown SWAT Team Members listed in the original Complaint with named defendants does not constitute a mistaken identity. “Substituting a named defendant for a ‘John Doe' defendant is considered a change in parties, not a mere substitution of parties.” Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996) (“unnamed police officers” of the City of Louisville and Kentucky State Police) that the amended complaint naming specific police officers did not relate back to the original complaint, which listed . Here, Plaintiff “did not make a mistake about the identity of the parties he intended to sue; he did not know who they were and apparently did not find out within the . . . limitations period.” Smith v. City of Akron, 476 Fed.Appx. 67, 69 (6th Cir. 2012). As recognized in the Sixth Circuit, “an absence of knowledge is not a mistake, as required by Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii)” to permit an amendment to relate back. Brown v. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 517 Fed.Appx. 431, 433-434 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); see also Wiggins v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 641 Fed.Appx. 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2016) ( ). “The relation-back protections of Rule 15(c) were not designed to correct that kind of problem.” Smith, 476 Fed.Appx. at 69. Because Plaintiff's amendment to substitute these individual defendants does not relate back to the filing of the original Complaint, Plaintiff's claims against these defendants are time-barred.
The second issue is whether Plaint...
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