DeSpirito v. Bristol County Water Co.

• Decision Date: 31 March 1967
• Docket Number: No. 56,56
• Citation: 102 R.I. 50,227 A.2d 782
• Parties: , 34 A.L.R.3d 809 Antonio DeSPIRITO v. BRISTOL COUNTY WATER COMPANY.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 782

227 A.2d 782

102 R.I. 50, 34 A.L.R.3d 809

Antonio DeSPIRITO v. BRISTOL COUNTY WATER COMPANY.

No. 56.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 31, 1967.

Thomas Santamaria, Providence, for plaintiff-appellee

Gunning & LaFazia, Raymond A. LaFazia, John F. McDonough, Providence, for defendant-appellant.

OPINION

JOSLIN, Justice.

This action of trespass on the case for negligence was tried to a justice of the superior court sitting without a jury and resulted in a judgment ¹ of $576.50 plus costs for the plaintiff. It is here on the defendant's appeal.

The facts are that plaintiff's cellar was flooded with water to a depth of about eighteen inches following a break in the drainpipe which ran from the foundation of his residence to the street and which, until damaged, drew off any ground or surface water which might have accumulated in the surrounding area. Immediately following the break and continuing until the drainpipe was repaired ten days thereafter, water seeped into the cellar damaging the residence as well as certain of plaintiff's household goods and personal effects. It was to recover for the costs and expenses incurred in remedying those damages that plaintiff brought this action.

Although the trial justice found that the seepage into the cellar 'occurred as a result of the flowage of water from the pipes under the control of the defendant,' his conclusion lacks an evidentiary foundation. The record discloses that the source of the seepage was the ground water which following the break, instead of running off through the drainpipe, saturated the area surrounding plaintiff's residence and then entered his cellar. It contains nothing indicating that it came from a pipe owned, maintained or otherwise controlled by defendant. That the trial justice misconceived or overlooked the evidence on the question of what caused the flooding does not necessarily mean that he erred in placing the responsibility for the resulting damage upon defendant. The evidence on that issue is uncontradicted and unimpeached. When we consider such evidence together with the inferences fairly and reasonably deducible therefrom, Matteson v. Wm. S. Sweet & Son, Inc., 58 R.I. 411, 417, 193 A. 171, 114 A.L.R. 293, it shows that the break in the pipe was solely attributable to the failure of defendant's employees, notwithstanding plaintiff's warning, to exercise due care in excavating in and about the area where the drainpipe was laid. In the light of such a record a decision for plaintiff was neither clearly wrong nor did it fail to do substantial justice between the parties.

While defendant challenges the decision of the trial justice on the question of liability, its principal objection goes to his rulings on the admissibility of certain evidence on the question of damages. Although it does not dispute either the amount of or the necessity for these expenditures, it does contend that the evidence adduced thereon was irrelevant to the amount which could permissibly be recovered. On that question, it argues that the full measure of damages for the destruction of or injury to personal property is the difference between its fair market value just before destruction or injury and its fair market value immediately thereafter.

The general rule is, of course, as defendant suggests, and in proving his damages for an injury to or loss of items of personal property a party usually is restricted to testimony which evidences the difference between the before and after fair market values. Jackson v. Choquette & Co., 78 R.I. 164, 80 A.2d 172. There is, however, a distinctive rule for proving damages for the loss of or the injury to more or less worn wearing apparel in use and to household goods and effects owned and kept for personal use. That exception is predicated upon the principle that the law is always concerned that an injured party shall be fully compensated for whatever injury he may have sustained. Working from that premise the courts have long recognized that property of these kinds cannot in any real sense be said to have a fair market value, unless it be in the secondhand market where such goods are sold. And in such a market it must, of course, be conceded that full and fair market value cannot generally be obtained and that sales are usually at a sacrifice. Accordingly in such cases, instead of adhering to the before and after market values as the rule of damages, the courts, giving due consideration to the attendant circumstances and conditions, permit recovery of the actual value to the owner of the thing lost or damaged, excluding, of course, any fanciful or sentimental value that might be placed upon it....