Detroit Auto. Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Commissioner of Ins., INTER-INSURANCE
Decision Date | 03 December 1982 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 60097,INTER-INSURANCE |
Citation | 119 Mich.App. 113,326 N.W.2d 444 |
Parties | , 33 A.L.R.4th 517 DETROIT AUTOMOBILEEXCHANGE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE, Respondent-Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
William H. Morman, Dearborn, for petitioner-appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., and Harry G. Iwasko, Jr. and Louis J. Porter, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent-appellee.
Before HOLBROOK, P.J., and T.M. BURNS and McDONALD, * JJ.
On September 9, 1981, the circuit court upheld an order issued by respondent, Commissioner of Insurance, finding that petitioner, Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, had violated M.C.L. § 500.2027(a)(ii); M.S.A. § 24.12027(a)(ii). Petitioner appeals as of right.
When this suit began, petitioner sold no-fault automobile insurance to people under age 21 only if they happened to reside with a parent or guardian who at the time of application was either already insured or about to become insured with petitioner. On December 12, 1978, respondent issued Insurance Bureau Bulletin 78-27 which stated that a very similar underwriting policy constitutes an unfair trade practice under the above statute. Six months later, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner. On September 18, 1980, respondent issued a final order determining that petitioner's underwriting practice violated the statute, ordering petitioner to cease and desist, and imposing a $2,500 fine for wilful violation of the statute. The circuit court judge affirmed respondent's determination in an opinion dated May 6, 1981. Even though he found that respondent had erred in determining that petitioner had wilfully violated the section, he upheld the $2,500 fine stating that the petitioner knew or reasonably should have known that its underwriting practice violated the statute.
M.C.L. § 500.2027; M.S.A. § 24.12027 states in part:
During the proceedings, respondent relied on three standards in determining that petitioner's practice violated the statute:
Petitioner first argues that neither the circuit court nor respondent could lawfully use these three standards because they were (at that time) nonpromulgated rules.
True, respondent has the power and duty to promulgate rules enforcing the statute and carrying out its provisions. M.C.L. § 500.210; M.S.A. § 24.1210. However, an administrative agency need not always promulgate rules to cover every conceivable situation before enforcing a statute. Specifically, an administrative agency may announce new principles through adjudicative proceedings in addition to rule-making proceedings. The United States Supreme Court stated in Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1580, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947):
Furthermore, petitioner was not charged with violating the standards but was charged with violating the statute itself. The three standards were merely used to support respondent's position. In its opinion, the trial court stated: "Additionally, the Commissioner did not hold petitioner only to the standards advanced by the Insurance Bureau in order to justify refusal to insure individuals under twenty-one".
Petitioner next argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. However, we addressed this question in American Way Service Corp. v. Comm'r of Ins., 113 Mich.App. 423, 436, 317 N.W.2d 870 (1982):
In the present case, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague because petitioner was in fact put on notice that its conduct violated the statute. Bulletin 78-27, which petitioner was aware of, provided that notice.
Petitioner next...
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