Detroit City Council v. Detroit Mayor
| Decision Date | 17 April 2009 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 291399.,Docket No. 291394. |
| Citation | 770 N.W.2d 117,283 Mich. App. 442 |
| Parties | DETROIT CITY COUNCIL v. MAYOR of DETROIT. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
David D. Whitaker, Marcel Hurt, and Adam Shakoor & Associates, P.C., (by Adam A. Shakoor), Detroit, for the Detroit City Council.
Krystal A. Crittendon, Corporation Counsel, and Jeffrey S. Jones and Joanne D. Stafford, Assistant Corporation Counsels, Detroit, for the Mayor of Detroit.
Barris, Sott, Denn & Driker, PLLC (by Eugene Driker, Morley Witus, and Rebecca Simkins), Detroit, for the Detroit Building Authority.
Before: TALBOT, P.J., and MURRAY and STEPHENS, JJ.
In these consolidated and expedited appeals, defendant Kenneth V. Cockrel, Jr., in his capacity as mayor of the city of Detroit, and intervening defendant Detroit Building Authority appeal by right the declaratory judgment in plaintiff's favor entered by the circuit court. Plaintiff Detroit City Council sought a declaration that the Regional Convention Facility Authority Act, MCL 141.1351 et seq., did not authorize a mayoral veto of its resolution disapproving the transfer of the Cobo Convention Center to the Detroit Regional Convention Facility Authority. The circuit court ruled that the mayoral veto was null and void under the plain language of the act. We affirm.
Cobo Convention Center (Cobo), near the center of downtown Detroit, was built more than half a century ago. In 1985, the Legislature enacted Public Act 106, the State Convention Facility Development Act, MCL 207.621 et seq., which levied a tri-county hotel tax and liquor tax to generate revenue. The development act provided a funding source for a multitude of purposes, including the improvement of convention facilities owned by local governments.1 The tax was used for security on bonds to pay for a $180 million Cobo renovation, which was completed in 1989. Under 1985 PA 106, the outstanding bonds are to be fully retired in 2015; the hotel and liquor tax distributions will also terminate at that time. MCL 207.629; MCL 207.630.
In light of that sunset date and the current condition and size of Cobo, state and tri-county officials began negotiations for legislation to improve the state's convention centers. In December 2008, the Michigan Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1630. Governor Jennifer Granholm approved the bill in January 2009. The Regional Convention Facility Authority Act, 2008 PA 554, became effective on January 20, 2009. The act provides for the creation of regional convention facility authorities2 to oversee regional convention centers, including Cobo.3 To qualify for improvement under the act, convention facilities are required to be publicly owned, have at least 600,000 square feet and be located within a qualified city, which is defined as a city with a population exceeding 700,000. MCL 141.1355(i) and (k). As written, the act currently applies only to Cobo,4 although it may be applied in the future to any qualifying convention facility in a qualifying metropolitan area in Michigan.
In enacting 2008 PA 554, the Legislature recognized that promoting tourism and convention business in Michigan is in the best interests of both the state and local governments. The Legislature found that improving existing regional convention facilities would aid in that endeavor. The Legislature noted that a regional convention facility authority would serve a public purpose. MCL 141.1353. Such an authority could be established in any area that meets the definition of a "qualified metropolitan area."5 The act created the Detroit Regional Convention Facility Authority (the Authority) as of January 20, 2009, the effective date of the act.6
The act specifies that the transfer of control over a qualified convention center would occur 90 days after an authority's creation, or in this case on April 20, 2009. MCL 141.1355(m). The transfer would only occur, however, "if the transfer is not disapproved as provided under [MCL 141.1369(1) ]." Id. MCL 141.1369(1) provides, in pertinent part:
Within 45 days of the effective date of this act ... and prior to a transfer date, the legislative body of the qualified city in which a qualified convention facility is located may disapprove the transfer of the qualified convention facility to the authority by adopting a resolution disapproving the transfer. If the transfer is not disapproved, the qualified convention facility is transferred to the authority on the ninetieth day after the effective date of this act or the date on which a convention facility becomes a qualified convention facility. [Emphasis added.]
The act defines a "legislative body" as "the elected body of a local government possessing the legislative power of the local government." MCL 141.1355(f). In this case, the legislative body at issue is plaintiff Detroit City Council, which had a deadline of March 6, 2009, to disapprove the transfer of Cobo to the Authority. The transfer to the Authority would occur by operation of law on the ninetieth day after the effective date of the act, April 20, 2009, unless the transfer was disapproved.
On February 24, 2009, the city council passed a resolution to disapprove the transfer. On March 4, 2009, the mayor vetoed the resolution. The city council did not override the veto.7
The city council filed a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief.8 The city council maintained that it had the exclusive power to disapprove the transfer, arguing that the act's grant of exclusive power to it superseded the executive veto power provided to the mayor under the Detroit City Charter. Additionally, the city council stated that subjecting the disapproval resolution to mayoral veto would nullify the Legislature's intent to grant the power to disapprove exclusively to the city council.
The mayor answered that the Legislature did not intend to preclude the exercise of the mayoral veto power because it did not expressly do so. The mayor also relied on MCL 141.1359 of the act, where the Legislature expressly precluded the local legislative body from interfering with the local chief executive officer's power to appoint a board member to the Authority, to support his argument that the Legislature did not intend to preclude his exercise of a veto. The mayor argued that the legislative intent to allow a mayoral veto accords with the city's powers under the Home Rule City Act, MCL 117.1 et seq.
The circuit court granted the motion to intervene filed by the Detroit Building Authority, which owns substantial portions of Cobo. The Detroit Building Authority argued in part that the city council's disapproval resolution never became effective because of the mayor's veto and the city council's failure to override the veto.
After failed attempts to facilitate settlement between the parties, the circuit court issued a declaratory judgment that the mayor's veto was null and void. The circuit court ruled that, under the plain language of the act, if the city council rejects by resolution the transfer of authority, then the transfer does not occur. The circuit court relied on the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or inclusion by specific mention excludes what is not mentioned. The court noted that the act mentioned certain powers of the local chief executive, but did not mention the veto power. The court concluded:
Thus, applying this maxim to the Act leads to the conclusion that the Legislature did not mean to provide the chief executive officer with the veto power over disapproval resolutions since, while the Act delineates several duties or powers of the chief executive officer, none of these include the power to veto a disapproval resolution, and the Act expressly confers on the legislative body alone the power to disapprove the transfer.
In Docket No. 291394, the mayor argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in construing the Legislature's silence as negating the existence of the mayoral veto power. The Legislature clearly stated that existing local government powers should be undisturbed and thus did not intend to disrupt the balance of existing legislative/executive branch powers. The circuit court should have liberally construed the act with a view toward harmonizing its provisions.
In Docket No. 291399, the Detroit Building Authority (DBA) contends that where the statute has no express provision to counter the mayoral veto power, the Legislature intended to preserve that power. The DBA argues that when the Legislature wanted to exclude a process of local government in the act it did so explicitly. Therefore, the DBA asserts that the resolution was nullified by the mayoral veto, which was never overridden, and further argues that the act reflects the public policy of the state to promote tourism to the benefit of the state's residents.
The city council has filed a single response in both cases, asserting that the plain language of the act grants the city council exclusive power to disapprove the transfer. The act preempts local law, including the mayor's veto power.
Whether the act grants a local chief executive officer the power to veto the disapproval by a legislative body is a question of law. This Court reviews statutory interpretation issues, which are questions of law, under a de novo standard. New Properties Inc. v. George D Newpower Jr., Inc., 282 Mich.App. 120, 138, 762 N.W.2d 178 (2009). Further, we review de novo questions of law arising from a declaratory judgment action. Guardian Environmental Services Inc. v. Bureau of Constr. Codes & Fire Safety, 279 Mich. App. 1, 5-6, 755 N.W.2d 556 (2008).
In interpreting statutes, courts give effect to the intent of the Legislature by reviewing the plain language of the statute itself. In re MCI Telecom. Complaint, 460 Mich. 396, 411, 596 N.W.2d 164 (1999). When...
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