Detroit Coil Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Lodge No. 82
| Decision Date | 21 March 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-1144,77-1144 |
| Parties | 100 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3138, 85 Lab.Cas. P 11,217 DETROIT COIL COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS & AEROSPACE WORKERS, LODGE # 82, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
R. Ian Hunter, C. John Holmquist, Jr., Bloomfield Hills, Mich., for plaintiff-appellant.
Jerome G. Quinn, Smith & Quinn, Detroit, Mich., for defendant-appellee.
Before WEICK, Circuit Judge, PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge, and GREEN, Senior District Judge. *
Detroit Coil Company (the Company) appeals from an order of the district court denying the Company's application for vacation of an arbitration award.
During the course of processing an employee grievance through the various steps of the contractual grievance procedure, a dispute arose between the Company and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Lodge # 82 (the Union). The dispute concerned the Union's compliance with a notification requirement contained in Article V, the grievance procedure section of the collective bargaining agreement between the Company and the Union (the Agreement). The parties agreed to submit to arbitration the question whether that procedural requirement of the Agreement had been satisfied. The arbitrator held in favor of the Union, finding that the notification requirement of Article V had been waived by the past practices of the Company and the Union.
The Company brought this action under 29 U.S.C. § 185 and 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) to vacate the arbitrator's award on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority under the Agreement by ignoring its express terms in his determination. The district court denied the Company's application to vacate the arbitrator's award, finding that the arbitrator had made factual determinations concerning the scope of a past practice. The district court held that the correctness of the arbitrator's decision was not subject to review, so long as the decision was based upon a construction of the contract and the manner in which the contract had been interpreted and applied by the parties in the past.
We reverse.
The Company and Union were parties to a collective bargaining agreement that ran from October 1, 1975, to October 1, 1978, Article V of the Agreement set forth a procedure for the adjustment and resolution of any grievances that arose from the day-to-day administration of the Agreement. Article V provided, in pertinent part:
Grievance Procedure
1. The procedure for the adjustment of grievances shall be as follows:
(a) The employee shall endeavor to adjust his grievance with the foreman and steward. If no satisfactory settlement is reached within 24 hours, the grievance shall be placed in writing and referred to:
(b) Chief Steward and Plant Manager. If still unsettled within 48 hours, the matter shall be referred to:
(c) 1. Committee of the Union, Union officials and officials of the Company. Should the grievance not then be settled satisfactorily, the case shall be referred to the American Arbitration Association for the selection of an impartial arbitrator. Matters properly referred shall be decided by the arbitrator and shall be binding upon both parties to this Agreement. The fees and expenses of the arbitrator shall be borne equally by both parties. It is mutually agreed that whenever possible, the AAA Expidited Arbitration procedure shall be used to process grievances.
(c) 2. The committee, as referred to above, shall consist of the Chief Steward, the Departmental Steward and an authorized representative of the Union, the Plant Manager and a representative of top management. This paragraph shall not preclude either party from calling in witnesses at the proper steps during the grievance procedure.
(d) Unless the American Arbitration Association and the Company is notified within eight (8) working days from the date which last the Local Lodge meets to select an impartial arbitrator, the grievance or grievances shall be considered settled.
(e) Discharged employees must, if aggrieved, file a grievance relating to the discharge within three (3) working days.
An employee, Douglas Caughron, filed a grievance, the merits of which are immaterial to the present appeal. The Company and Union were unable to resolve the grievance under Sections 1(a), (b) or (c) of the grievance procedure. On April 6, 1976, during the course of a Local Lodge meeting, the Union decided to refer the Caughron grievance to the American Arbitration Association (the AAA) for binding arbitration, in accordance with Section 1(c) of the grievance procedure.
On April 30, 1976, the Company received a letter from James D. Leslie, Business Representative of Lodge # 82, informing it that the Union had appealed the Caughron grievance to the AAA for final resolution. Leslie's letter was dated April 15, 1976. Leonard Jennings, Labor Relations Director of the Company, wrote Leslie in response and stated that the Company regarded the grievance as settled because the Union had failed to notify the Company within the time requirement specified by Article V, Section 1(d) of the Agreement. Jennings pointed out that, pursuant to Section 1(d) of the grievance procedure, the Union was required to notify both the Company and the AAA of the Union's election to pursue a grievance to arbitration within eight working days from the date of the last Lodge meeting, which, Jennings claimed, the Union had failed to do with the Caughron grievance.
In a letter to Jennings dated May 5, 1976, Leslie apologized for the fact that his April 15 letter was late. However, Leslie reiterated that the Union intended to pursue the Caughron grievance to arbitration, stating that both the Company and Union had been "late in administering the steps of the grievance procedure" in the past, but that neither party had used this as an excuse to deny a grievance.
On May 8, 1976, the Company was notified by the AAA that it had received, on April 29, 1976, a letter from the Union requesting arbitration of the Caughron grievance. The AAA indicated that it intended to proceed with an arbitration of the grievance on its merits. Jennings telephoned the AAA and stated that the Company considered the Union's request for arbitration to be untimely. In a subsequent letter to the AAA Jennings noted the specific time requirement of Article V, Section 1(d) and stated that the Union had failed to comply with that notification provision. Jennings calculated that the Company and AAA should have received the Union's request for arbitration no later than April 16, 1976.
On May 17, 1976, the tribunal administrator of the AAA, Mark Sholander, wrote a letter to both the Company and the Union. Sholander stated that, after reviewing the contentions of the parties concerning the timeliness of the Union's request for arbitration of the Caughron grievance, the AAA had determined "that an issue as to arbitrability exists which could be determined by an Arbitrator." Thereafter, the Company and the Union agreed to submit to arbitration the question whether the Union's request for arbitration was timely, in light of the procedural time requirement of Article V, Section 1(d).
The arbitrator issued his opinion and award on July 20, 1976, finding that Caughron's grievance should be heard on the merits. The arbitrator based his decision upon the following conclusions:
In view of the testimony and exhibits presented at this hearing, it is the opinion of this Arbitrator that although the Company did not receive the notification that the Union was taking the Caughron grievance to arbitration until April 30, 1976, the Caughron grievance should be heard on its merits. The letter from the Union to the Company containing the notification is dated April 15, 1976, which falls within the eight (8) working days as required by Article V, Section 1, paragraph (d). No evidence was presented to indicate that it was the intent of the Union to consider the Caughron grievance settled.
In reaching this decision, the Arbitrator takes note that the parties have not used in the past the excuse of time limits to deny a grievance. Union testimony indicated that it did not insist that the Plant Manager respond to grievances within the 48 hour contractual requirement. It moreover waived the time requirements in the Caughron grievance at Step 3 in order to give the owner of the Company, who was out of the city, the opportunity to make his input to the Company response dated March 8, 1976.
The Arbitrator in reaching his decision takes note of the testimony given by the Plant Manager in which he stated that relations between the Company and the Union are good. To deny the arbitrability of the Caughron grievance because the Company did not receive the April 15, 1976, notification letter until April 30, 1976, would, in the view of this Arbitrator, result in a deterioration of the good Company-Union relationship.
We conclude that the award of the arbitrator was contrary to the explicit terms of the Agreement and was beyond the scope of his authority.
It is well settled that arbitration as a means of resolving labor disputes is favored and that the courts refrain from reviewing the merits of an arbitration award. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960); Amanda Bent Bolt Co. v. UAW, Local 1549, 451 F.2d 1277 (6th Cir. 1971). However, a corollary principle bearing equally on labor arbitration was articulated by the Supreme Court in Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597, 80 S.Ct. at 1361:
(A)n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it...
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