Detroit Edison Co. v. Michigan Corp. and Securities Commission, 31
| Decision Date | 16 September 1960 |
| Docket Number | J,No. 31,31 |
| Citation | 361 Mich. 150,105 N.W.2d 110 |
| Parties | DETROIT EDISON COMPANY, a New York corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MICHIGAN CORPORATION AND SECURITIES COMMISSION, Defendant and Appellee. an. Term. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Fischer, Sprague, Franklin & Ford, Detroit, Harvey A. Fischer, Gerald C. Simon, Detroit, of counsel, for plaintiff-appellant.
Paul L. Adams, Atty. Gen., Samuel J. Torina, Sol. Gen., Lansing, T. Carl Holbrook, William D. Dexter, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.
Before the Entire Bench, except KAVANAGH, J.
Appellant filed its 1956 corporate annual report and paid the Corporation and Securities Commission the sum of $1,131,061.63 as its annual franchise fee. The commission determined that the fee was deficient in the amount of $54,848.10. A redetermination was made at appellant's request, and the deficiency was again assessed at the same amount. An appeal was taken to the corporation tax appeal board, during the pendency of which appellant paid the deficiency under protest.
When the proceedings on appeal were commenced appellant vigorously objected to a hearing before the chief assistant attorney general, the deputy State treasurer and the deputy auditor general, contending that the 3 above-named did not constitute a statutory board and, therefore, was an appeal board without jurisdiction. The objection was overruled and the hearing proceeded with exception granted. The deputies sat throughout the hearing and the board's final decision increasing the deficiency from $54,848.10 to $62,436.72 was signed by the deputies in their own names.
Appellant presents 5 questions in its statement of questions involved. The first question presented is as follows:
'Do the chief assistant attorney general, the deputy State treasurer, and the deputy auditor general have any authority to perform the quasi-judicial duty of the Appeal Board provided for in section 9 of Act 85, Public Acts of 1921, as amended, 'to recompute the liability of the taxpayer,' when that duty is imposed upon elected public officers, viz., the attorney general, the State treasurer, and the auditor general, as statutory members of this Appeal Board?'
The conclusion and the prayer for relief in appellant's brief contain the following statements:
* * *
'Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse, set aside, and hold for naught the decision of May 29, 1959, entered by the invalidly constituted appeal board with instructions that the properly elected constitutional public officers hear the cause.'
P.A.1921, No. 8, § 9, as amended (C.L.S.1956, § 450.309 [Stat.Ann.1959 Cum.Supp. § 21.210]), provides in part:
'The commission and/or the corporation may, within 30 days after notification of such decision, and not after, appeal from the decision of the appeal board to the supreme court of the state.'
The general principle that judicial or quasi-judicial duties relating to the computation of a tax cannot be delegated in the absence of express statutory authorization to so delegate, is set forth in 107 A.L.R. 1482.
There is no doubt (and appellee so admits) that the statutory duty imposed on the attorney general, the State treasurer and the auditor general in appellant's appeal was quasi-judicial in nature. Appellee states:
'In advancing the argument that the Board was properly constituted in the instant case, counsel for the appellee are not unmindful of the authorities referred to by the appellant in its brief limiting the activity of deputies to the ministerial duties of their principals but respectfully submit that the basic question here posed is one of the construction of specific statutory language pertaining to the composition of the Corporation Tax Appeal Board during the sickness or absence of the auditor general and state treasurer and by specific designation of the attorney general to have the chief assistant attorney general sit in his stead.'
The Revised Statutes of 1846, chapter 12, §§ 9 and 26, gave the treasurer and the auditor general the authority to appoint deputies:
The above-quoted sections, amended without significant change, are the law today. See C.L.1948, §§ 12.9, 13.26 (Stat.Ann. §§ 3.83, 3.130).
By P.A.1917, No. 153, the legislature granted to the attorney general the right to appoint a deputy to sit for him on boards and commissions. This act provided:
'He (deputy attorney general) may also serve in place of the Attorney General as a member of the Michigan Securities Commission, created by act forty-six of the Public Acts of nineteen hundred fifteen, and other boards and commissions of which the Attorney General now is or may hereafter be an ex-officio member.'
The attorney general's right to designate assistant attorneys general to sit on administrative boards has been granted by C.L.S.1956, § 14.35 (Stat.Ann.1952 Rev. § 3.188) which provides as follows:
The claim was made in Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. County of Oakland, 264 Mich. 673, 251 N.W. 395, that action taken by the loan board in approving the issuance of bonds was void because the deputy attorney general, instead of the attorney general, acted thereon without authority. In disposing of this claim, this Court stated (at page 685):
The attorney general is an ex officio member of the Corporation Tax Appeal Board and the deputy attorney general and assistant attorneys general were empowered by statute to act for the attorney general as a member of said board.
Appellee calls attention to the fact that the attorney general, State treasurer and auditor general are ex officio members of many State boards or commissions. Appellant answers by stating:
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Miller v. State Dept. of Treasury (Revenue Division), 34
...officer or examiner to make a determination either from evidence or the submitted information. Detroit Edison Co. v. Corporation & Securities Commission (1960), 361 Mich. 150, 105 N.W.2d 110. The statute contains no legal requirements or provisions to be applied to the facts by the Departme......
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Detroit Edison Co. v. State
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