Detroit Edison Co. v. Knowles, 9998.
| Decision Date | 13 December 1945 |
| Docket Number | No. 9998.,9998. |
| Citation | 152 F.2d 422 |
| Parties | DETROIT EDISON CO. v. KNOWLES. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Richard Ford, of Detroit, Mich. (Harvey A. Fischer, Richard Ford, Hull, Brown & Fischer, Leon R. Jones, Norman R. Barnard, and Frederick C. Vieson, all of Detroit, Mich., on the brief), for appellant.
Hugh K. Davidson, of Detroit, Mich. (Hugh K. Davidson and Edgar A. Beauchamp, both of Detroit, Mich., and Roy A. McGinty, of Melvindale, Mich., on the brief), for appellee.
Before HICKS and MARTIN, Circuit Judges, and RAYMOND, District Judge.
Plaintiff's husband, John Knowles, was electrocuted on June 6, 1943, in consequence of contact with a high tension transmission cable which dropped from a pole owned and maintained by defendant, upon an automobile driven by plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleges that as she was driving south on Telegraph Road near Detroit, she was forced to turn off the highway by what appeared to be a ball of fire descending onto the right hand side of the pavement, and that in so doing, she struck one of defendant's poles, and that the death of her husband occurred shortly thereafter. Plaintiff urges:
(1) "That the arcing of the defendant's wires, the plaintiff having shown causes for weakening of the wires, unexplained by the defendant by showing inspection, the wires being under the exclusive control of the defendant, was sufficient from which an inference of negligence could be drawn."
(2) "The defendant, having exclusive possession and right to control its electrical system, handling 24,000 volts of electricity, owed the duty of equipping the system with automatic fuses, circuit breakers, and other safety devices, which should have shut off the current the instant a broken wire of the system touched the ground, or touched another wire of the system, and that, since the current remained on the wires for more than two hours following the accident, it was indicated that no circuit breakers, fuses or other safety devices were installed, or if installed, that they failed to operate * *."
From the judgment of $10,000 entered upon a verdict for plaintiff, defendant appeals, contending that plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case, that plaintiff failed to establish that defendant was guilty of any negligence that caused its electric transmission lines to break, that plaintiff and decedent were chargeable with contributory negligence as a matter of law, and that the trial court erred in instructing the jury in substance that plaintiff could recover on the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
Because there was reversible error in the charge of the court in its reference to the res ipsa loquitur rule, extended discussion of other alleged errors is unnecessary. Under the rule firmly established by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487, and in view of the numerous determinations by the Supreme Court of Michigan that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is repudiated in that state, no sufficient reason appears for presenting that doctrine and its limitations to the jury. The Michigan Supreme Court has consistently and emphatically denied the existence of the rule. It has stressed the rule that mere occurrence of an accident does not in any circumstances raise a presumption of negligence, and that proof of accident and ensuing injury does not cast the burden of proving freedom from negligence upon the defendant, or place upon defendant the burden of going forward with the evidence so that a directed verdict would ensue were not the presumption rebutted. See Mitchell v. Stroh Brewery Co., 309 Mich. 231, 15 N.W.2d 144; In re Estate of Miller, 300 Mich. 703, 2 N.W. 2d 888; Poundstone v. Niles Creamery, 293 Mich. 455, 292 N.W. 367; Ionia School District v. Dadd, 308 Mich. 220, 13 N.W.2d 268; Grand Trunk W. R. Co. v. Lovejoy, 304 Mich. 35, 7 N.W.2d 212; McLeod v. Savoy Hotel Co., 267 Mich. 352, 255 N.W. 308; Eaton v. Consumers Power Co., 256 Mich. 549, 240 N.W. 24; Laxton v. Hatzel & Buehler, 6 Cir., 142 F.2d 913; Kenower v. Hotels Statler Co., 6 Cir., 124 F.2d 658.
The fact that the Michigan Supreme Court has recognized that in many cases circumstantial evidence of the cause of an accident is sufficiently strong to warrant an inference or deduction of negligence, and that results are reached which are not different from those which would ensue in similar cases in jurisdictions which apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, in no way weakens the repudiation of the doctrine itself. It is clear that the Michigan Supreme Court has not approved a rule which casts upon defendant the burden of proving freedom from negligence. Whatever may be our views with reference to the wisdom or logic forming the basis for the Michigan rule, the federal courts in Michigan are bound by it, and a defendant against whom negligence is alleged is entitled to a clear and unqualified statement in the charge to the jury that the plaintiff carries the burden of proving negligence throughout the case, and that at no time does the burden of proving freedom from negligence or the burden of going forward with the evidence, rest upon defendant.
We believe that the court was in error in stating to the jury that:
"It is unfortunate that we really do not know much about this case — why those wires broke, and what the ordinary customs of the business were as to inspection and care.
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