Detroit Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Detroit
| Decision Date | 19 October 1983 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 65752 |
| Citation | 339 N.W.2d 230,127 Mich.App. 673 |
| Parties | DETROIT FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION and Marion English, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and Detroit Police Officers Association and Detroit Police Lieutenants and Sergeants Association, Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF DETROIT, Board of Trustees of the City of Detroit Policemen and Firemen Retirement System and Fred Murphy, Executive Secretary of Defendant Board of Trustees of the City of Detroit Policemen and Firemen Retirement System, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Marston, Sachs, Nunn, Kates, Kadushin & O'Hare, P.C. (by Theodore Sachs and George H. Kruszewski), Detroit, for Detroit Fire Fighters Ass'n and Marion English.
Gregory, VanLopik, Moore & Jeakle (by Nancy Jean Van Lopik), Detroit, for Detroit Police Officers Ass'n.
Mark R. Ulicny, Deputy Corp. Counsel, and Frank W. Jackson and Kenneth G. King and Catherine C. McLaughlin, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Detroit, for defendants-appellants.
Before T.M. BURNS, P.J., and MAHER and CYNAR, JJ.
Defendants appeal as of right from a June 18, 1982, decision granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff Marion English is the widow of August English. Mr. English was a fire fighter for the City of Detroit from 1949 until 1970. Mr. English was a "new plan" member of defendant city's retirement system for its fire fighters and police. An "old plan" member is one who began employment before 1969. A "new plan" member began employment in 1969, or after, or began his employment prior to 1969 but elected to come under the new plan. Mr. English fit into the latter category.
In 1970, Mr. English became disabled due to heart disease found to be a result of his employment. He applied for and received a disability pension of 66 2/3% of his final compensation, in accordance with Title IX, Chapter VII, Art VI, Part B, Sec. 2.1(a) of the Charter of 1918 of the City of Detroit. This pension increased two percent per year pursuant to the provisions of Art VI, Part C, Sec. 2.
Mr. English died in 1978. Mrs. English applied for death benefits under Part D of Art VI of the charter. She was found eligible by the Board of Trustees of the retirement system for benefits in the amount of five-elevenths of the maximum earnable compensation for the rank of fire fighter under Sec. 1(b) of Art VI, Part D. At this point, however, a dispute arose as to how to compute this "earnable compensation". Specifically, the dispute concerned what year was to be used in determining the earnable compensation, i.e., the year Mr. English became disabled or the year he died. Plaintiffs contend that the year of death should be used. They base this argument upon Sec. 1(g) of Art VI, Part D. Defendants contend that Sec. 1(g) is inapplicable to Mr. English because it applies only to the year of death of a "member" of the firemen's retirement system and that, because Mr. English ceased to be a "member" of the system at the time when he became disabled in 1970, the date of his disablement should be used for the determination of earnable compensation. Defendants contend that Mr. English became a "beneficiary" in 1970.
All parties moved for summary judgment, agreeing that there was no material factual dispute and that the issue was a legal one which could be disposed of by a summary judgment. The lower court ruled that the clear meaning of the language of the charter was that Mrs. English was entitled to have her benefits computed on the basis of the fiscal year of the member's death and that her husband continued to be a "member" of the retirement system until his death, even after he had become disabled. We conclude that the lower court properly granted summary judgment to plaintiffs.
When the language of a charter provision is unambiguous and specific it is controlling. In such a case, it is presumed that the framers of the charter, and the people of the city involved, intended that the provision be construed as it reads. That intent must prevail. Kelly v. Detroit, 358 Mich. 290, 295-296, 100 N.W.2d 269 (1960); Detroit Fire Fighters Ass'n Local No. 344, IAFF v. Detroit, 55 Mich.App. 276, 281, 222 N.W.2d 210 (1974), lv. den. 393 Mich. 755 (1974). If a charter provision is ambiguous it must still be interpreted in a manner consistent with reason and with the goal of determining the purpose and intent of the framers and public. See White v. Ann Arbor, 406 Mich. 554, 562, 281 N.W.2d 283 (1979); Aikens v. Dep't of Conservation, 387 Mich. 495, 499, 198 N.W.2d 304 (1972); Stover v. Retirement Board of St. Clair Shores Firemen & Police Pension System, 78 Mich.App. 409, 260 N.W.2d 112 (1977), lv. den. 402 Mich. 879 (1978). In all three cases, the Court is referring to the interpretation of statutes, but we believe the same rules would apply to charter provisions.
If the Board of Trustees of the retirement system, which is in charge of the administration of the pension program, has reasonably interpreted the charter in light of the objects and purposes sought to be accomplished, this Court should not overturn that interpretation. Lansing Fire Fighters Ass'n Local 421 v. Board of Trustees of Lansing Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement System, 90 Mich.App. 441, 445, 282 N.W.2d 346 (1979), lv. den. 407 Mich. 957 (1980); Sterling Secret Service, Inc. v. Dep't of State Police, 20 Mich.App. 502, 514, 174 N.W.2d 298 (1969). The board may not, however, change the terms of the police and fire fighters' retirement plan. Such changes are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Detroit, 391 Mich. 44, 63, 214 N.W.2d 803 (1974); Mt. Clemens Fire Fighters Union, Local 838, IAFF v. Mt. Clemens, 58 Mich.App. 635, 642-643, 228 N.W.2d 500 (1975).
In this case, the Board of Trustees interpreted the language of Art VI, Part D, Sec. 1(g) to mean that Mrs. English is entitled to survivor's benefits to be budgeted according to the date of her husband's death, rather than the date of his retirement. After reviewing the language of various provisions of the charter, we conclude that the decision of the board was reasonable and correct and should not be disturbed by this Court.
The language in question comes from Art VI, Part D, Sec. 1 of the charter. 1 Defendants argue, citing several portions of the charter, that Sec. 1(g) does not apply to Mrs. English because it is only applicable to benefits of "members" who die and Mr. English ceased to be a member of the retirement system at the time of his disability retirement. Defendants conclude that only Sec. 1(b) applies to Mrs. English and that, therefore, her benefits should be computed as of the date of her husband's retirement and not the date of his death.
At first glance, defendants' arguments appear valid. Art II, Sec. 4 provides:
"
Art. IV, Sec. 3(a) provides:
"Should a member die or become a beneficiary or be separated from service by resignation, dismissal, or disability, he shall thereupon cease to be a member."
Art. II, Sec. 11 provides:
" 'Beneficiary' shall mean any person in receipt of a pension, an annuity, a retirement allowance, or other benefit provided by the system."
Viewing these sections by the strict meaning of their language, it would appear that Mr. English ceased to be a "member" at the time of his retirement and that he then became a "beneficiary who was a member". Mrs. English would, therefore, be a "beneficiary of a beneficiary who was a member" after her husband's death.
Although defendants conclude that Art. VI, Part D, Sec. 1(g) is made inapplicable to Mrs. English by the above-quoted sections, we disagree.
Article VI, Part D, Sec. 1 refers generally to a "member, or a beneficiary who was a member" who is killed or dies. That language at the beginning of the section, however, is the only reference to a differentiation being made between members and beneficiaries who were members. Throughout the remainder of Part D, the language refers only to "his", "he", "deceased member", "death of a member" or "beneficiaries of members". We conclude that this language is ambiguous and must be construed with reason and with the intent of providing survivors benefits to widows of both members and beneficiaries who were members. Because the framers neglected to refer to "beneficiaries who were members" in any but the opening sentence of Part D, Sec. 1, we agree with plaintiffs that the framers intended that the subsequent subsections of Part D refer to both members and beneficiaries who were...
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