Detroit Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Detroit, Docket No. 96430

• Citation: 537 N.W.2d 436,449 Mich. 629
• Decision Date: 15 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. 7,Docket No. 96430,7
• Parties: DETROIT FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION; Mark Lafferty; Albert Richardson; Daniel McNamara; and Frank English, Plaintiff-Appellants, v. CITY OF DETROIT; Dennis W. Archer, Mayor of Detroit; Ed Hannen, Budget Director of Detroit; and Harold D. Watkins, Sr., Detroit Fire Commissioner, Defendants-Appellees. Calendar
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 436

537 N.W.2d 436

449 Mich. 629

DETROIT FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION; Mark Lafferty; Albert Richardson; Daniel McNamara; and Frank English Plaintiff-Appellants, v. CITY OF DETROIT; Dennis W. Archer, Mayor of Detroit; Ed Hannen, Budget Director of Detroit; and Harold D Watkins, Sr., Detroit Fire Commissioner Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 96430.

Calendar No. 7.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued May 2, 1995.

Decided Aug. 15, 1995.

Sachs, Waldman, O'Hare, Helveston, Hodges & Barnes, P.C. by Theodore Sachs, Mark Brewer, and Reginald M. Turner, Jr., Detroit, for plaintiffs

City of Detroit Law Dept. by Phyllis A. James, Corp. Counsel, and Joanne D. Stafford, Supervising Asst. Corp. Counsel, and Terri L. Renshaw, Detroit, for defendants.

OPINION

WEAVER, Justice.

We are asked to determine first, whether plaintiff Detroit Fire Fighters Association and its named member-officers have standing to challenge an alleged violation of the Detroit City Charter and, second, whether the executive branch of Detroit city government may unilaterally impound budget monies. We would hold that the collective bargaining unit of fire fighters does not have a sufficiently real and adverse interest separate from the general public to confer standing in this action. On the basis of our finding of lack of standing, we would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals regarding the second issue, and affirm with respect to the standing issue.

I

In 1989, Mayor Coleman Young submitted a written budget proposal to the Detroit City Council. The city council amended the budget to include $750,000 for a new fire department squad, whose purpose was to provide reserve manpower and to engage in certain specialized functions, such as rescue, extrication, and transport. The city council passed the amended budget, but the mayor vetoed $500,000 of the $750,000 appropriated. By a vote of eight to one the council overrode the mayoral veto, reinstating the original $750,000 appropriation. The mayor never authorized the use of the appropriation.

A number of demands were made by plaintiffs that the appropriated funds be spent, but the demands were ignored. Plaintiffs filed suit in circuit court, originally seeking injunctive relief, but later requesting a writ of mandamus to compel defendants to spend the money. During the parties' hearing on cross motions for summary disposition, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs had standing, but that the defendants were entitled to summary disposition because the mayor was not required to consult with the city council before deciding not to spend appropriated funds. ¹

Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court on the issue of standing, finding that plaintiffs did not assert particularized injuries to distinguish them from the general public to such a degree that standing would be conferred against a public body and public officials. 199 Mich.App. 129, 501 N.W.2d 202 (1993). The Court of Appeals then addressed the substantive issues, stating in a footnote that "although they are now moot, ... they are of public significance and are likely to reoccur," id. at 131, n. 1, 501 N.W.2d 202, affirming the trial court ruling that the mayor was "not required to spend the money appropriated for hiring additional fire fighters." Id. at 133, 501 N.W.2d 202. We then granted leave to appeal. ²

II

Standing is a legal concept that focuses on whether the litigant's interest will ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy. Simply demonstrating an ability to vigorously advocate does not confer standing. Rather, demonstration that a substantial interest of the litigant will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the public at large must be shown. Alexander v. Norton Shores, 106 Mich.App. 287, 288, 307 N.W.2d 476 (1981). Standing does not address the ultimate merits of the substantive claims of the parties. ³

There appears no quarrel that plaintiffs would have vigorously and sincerely advocated their cause, and the record would support that position. Where the parties disagree is on plaintiffs' claim of standing based on membership in the fire fighters union, and in plaintiffs' reliance on the ruling in Muskegon Bldg. & Construction Trades v. Muskegon Area Intermediate School Dist., 130 Mich.App. 420, 343 N.W.2d 579 (1983).

The five individually named plaintiffs also claim residency in the City of Detroit, in addition to their union membership and status as employees of the city. However, plaintiffs' status as city employees or Detroit residents provides them with no greater interest in these proceedings than the thousands of other city employees or millions of city residents. It is well settled that all disgruntled citizens do not automatically have standing to sue a public body. "Traditionally, a private citizen has no standing to vindicate a public wrong or enforce a public right where he is not hurt in any manner differently than the citizenry at large." Waterford School Dist. v. State Bd. of Ed., 98 Mich.App. 658, 662, 296 N.W.2d 328 (1980).

Likewise, plaintiffs' membership in the fire fighters union does not singularly anoint them with standing to sue the defendant. Obviously the fire fighters union would like to see additional members added to their rosters, as undoubtedly would the police union, the clerical union, and maintenance workers union, but this is not a sufficient interest to confer standing. In Saginaw Fire Fighters Ass'n v. Police & Fire Dep't Civil Service Comm, 71 Mich.App. 240, 247 N.W.2d 365 (1976), the Saginaw fire fighters union and the union president filed suit against the Saginaw Police and Fire Department Civil Service Commission seeking an injunction, preventing the commission from exercising a waiver-of-residency requirement for new recruits that would have given nonresidents an equal chance for the limited job opportunities. The Court held that the union demonstrated no special injury to its current membership and could not claim standing on the basis of speculative harm to future members. Id. at 244. In this case, none of the current Detroit fire fighters members lost their jobs as a result of the budget impoundment.

Plaintiff Detroit Fire Fighters Association alleged an increased risk of injury, emotional distress, and loss of morale and efficiency as a direct result of defendants' impoundment of budgeted monies. These allegations were supported by expert testimony offered by plaintiffs in an arbitration hearing, and offered as an appendix to plaintiffs' pleadings in these various proceedings. ⁴ It is these general, "inter alia" allegations on which plaintiffs rely to demonstrate that they will be detrimentally harmed in a manner different from the citizenry at large. ⁵ These general allegations of harm, coupled with their membership in a trade organization, cause plaintiffs to believe they are entitled to standing under Muskegon Bldg & Construction Trades v. Muskegon Area Intermediate School Dist, supra. Plaintiffs' belief is misplaced.

In Muskegon Trades, the plaintiffs were an association of trade organizations who filed suit to prevent the defendant school district from receiving bids or awarding contracts that did not require payment in conformity with the prevailing wage act. The plaintiffs argued that although their members did not have a right to be awarded the bids or contracts, substantial numbers of these workers would be affected differently than the general public in that many would receive jobs on the school project, and would be paid at less than prevailing wages. The defendant school district impliedly conceded that the plaintiffs would be harmed in a manner different from the general public when it did not raise the argument as an issue to standing. ⁶ Instead, the school district raised three other arguments against plaintiffs having standing: that as an association of trade organizations plaintiffs were incapable of being employed, ⁷ that the associations' statements of corporate purpose did not indicate they were formed to act as class representatives in litigation, ⁸ and that none of the individual members of the organizations had a right to a job on the defendant's project. ⁹ The Court in Muskegon found none of the school district's arguments persuasive, and held that the trade organization did demonstrate an adverse effect, separate from the general public, specifically, if the prevailing wage act was upheld, substantial numbers of the association's members would receive jobs on the school district building project. This was distinctly and wholly separate from any interest of the general public.

Defendants, on the other hand, believe the appellate decision in Rayford v. Detroit, 132 Mich.App. 248, 347 N.W.2d 210 (1984) is controlling. In Rayford, plaintiff police officers attempted to bring suit under the UBAA after they lost their jobs as a result of a budget cutback instituted by the mayor without prior city council approval. The Court held that the purpose of the UBAA was "to promote uniform budgets and avoid deficit spending, not to afford security of employment," id. at 257, 347 N.W.2d 210, and found that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under the UBAA. Though this reasoning is persuasive, it is not controlling. Factually the cases are dissimilar in that the instant case involves the Detroit City Charter, not the UBAA. Where the UBAA was designed exclusively to aid municipalities in their accounting, the Detroit City Charter is a very broad document, favoring a "strong mayor" form of government, and encompassing the "comprehensive home rule power conferred upon it by the Michigan Constitution...." Detroit Charter, art 1, § 1-102. The potential areas of conflict that could arise under the charter, and that could conceivably injure a private individual in a manner different from the general public are not so remote as to be easily disposed of by this Court. The key inquiry should be whether the...