Detroit Graphite Co. v. Hoover
Decision Date | 05 June 1930 |
Docket Number | 2425.,No. 2424,2424 |
Citation | 41 F.2d 490 |
Parties | DETROIT GRAPHITE CO. v. HOOVER et al. (two cases). |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
John M. Raymond, of Boston, Mass., and James V. Oxtoby, of Detroit, Mich. (Lawrence
E. Brown, of Detroit, Mich., on the brief), for appellant.
Henry B. Cabot, Jr., and John G. Palfrey, both of Boston, Mass. (Charles C. Cabot, and Warner, Stackpole, Bradlee & Cabot, all of Boston, Mass., on the brief), for appellees.
Before BINGHAM, ANDERSON, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
These cross-suits arise out of a contract of employment of Hoover by the Detroit Graphite Company, for five years from March 31, 1923. Hoover contends that the contract was broken by the Detroit Company in March, 1926; the Detroit Company contends that it was then ended by mutual agreement; that Hoover then owed the company $11,770.59 for advances made to him under the contract; it brought suit therefor. The jury found for Hoover, in both suits, and assessed his damages for breach of contract at $50,000.
The main questions arise from the company's contentions that the court erred in leaving the construction of the correspondence leading to the termination, to the jury, as a question of fact, and in denying the company's motions for directed verdicts in both suits. Other questions presented arise out of the rulings as to damages.
Hoover is a graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1913. Shortly after he entered the employ of the Detroit Company, a large manufacturer and distributor of paint in Boston and in New York; in 1919 he went, under a written contract, to the Pacific Coast to introduce its business in that section. On March 31, 1923, he made another written contract, out of which this controversy arises.
The contract covered, as Hoover's territory, California, Oregon, Washington, and Alaska. The contract proceeds:
Under the course of business under the contract, the company paid, on vouchers approved by Hoover, commissions to subagents, freight and storage, cartage charges on the Coast, and his drawing account of $1,000 a month — as a minimum — or, until the fall of 1925, $1,250 a month. Hoover paid from his drawing account his personal, traveling, office and incidental expenses; but the other expenses incurred by him in establishing the company's business on the Pacific Coast were paid by the company and charged up as against his commissions and overages. When in 1925 these charges exceeded the amount of his earned commissions, his drawing account was reduced from $1,250 to $1,000 a month. Hoover agreed that this was the company's right under the contract. At one time the company loaned him $1,000, which was repaid by deducting $100 a month from his drawing account. Business on the Coast was good in 1923 and most of 1924, but fell off in 1925; it improved in 1926, and was excellent during the next two years. This temporary slump in business was the primary cause of dissension and the rupture of the long-term association between the parties.
The crux of this case is whether the contract between the parties was broken by the company, or was terminated by mutual agreement. The court left this question to the jury, instructing them also that, if the company broke the contract, it could not recover in its suit for the advances made on Hoover's account. These rulings are attacked as error. We may start our consideration of the correspondence (relied upon by the company as a cancellation by agreement) between Davis, the company's president, and Hoover, by Davis' letter on March 12, 1926, received by Hoover on March 17 in Los Angeles.
After reference to earlier letters and telegrams, pertaining to the unsatisfactory status of relations under the contract, Davis said:
"I would add here that any disbursements made on your account from March 1 will be charged against your drawing account allowance for this month."
This was plainly inconsistent with the company's obligation under the contract; Hoover might have treated it as a breach, for he was entitled to a minimum drawing account of $1,000 a month, whatever the status of the commission account and whether or not he was ultimately liable for the advances made by the company to his subagents and for other expenses. To this Hoover replied by telegram March 17:
Construing this telegram in the light of the surrounding circumstances, it is not perfectly clear, in at least two particulars: (1) Hoover takes his position on the theory that Davis is forcing his resignation. (2) The phrase "I agree mutual cancellation," etc., is, at least in the light of the conflicting views as to his personal liability for advances, doubtful. The doubt becomes greater when we consider the subsequent telegrams. Davis replied March 18:
The $500 was sent, but Davis added — to what otherwise might be construed as a flat acceptance of an offer from Hoover to cancel — the following:
"You are of course to reimburse us for debit balance which your account shows either cash or in some manner to be agreed upon."
If Hoover's "mutual cancellation" on...
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