Detroit Int'l Bridge Co. v. Gov't of Canada

• Decision Date: 13 February 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 10-476 (RMC)
• Parties: DETROIT INTERNATIONAL BRIDGE COMPANY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

DETROIT INTERNATIONAL BRIDGE COMPANY, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 10-476 (RMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

February 13, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Request for a Rule 54(b) Judgment on the Dismissal of Count IV of the Third Amended Complaint. See Notification [Dkt. 194]. Plaintiffs request entry of final judgment on Count IV, which the Court dismissed and with respect to which the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. Federal Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that such an action would add procedural uncertainty to this complex litigation. For the reasons stated below, the Court "expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay," Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), and will grant Plaintiffs' motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This case concerns the Ambassador Bridge, which spans the Detroit River between Detroit, Michigan and Windsor, Ontario and carries more than one-quarter of the total commercial traffic between the United States and Canada. The Bridge is privately owned by the Detroit International Bridge Company (DIBC) and its wholly-owned subsidiary, the Canadian Transit Company, which collect toll revenue for Bridge maintenance and profit. However, the Ambassador Bridge is more than eighty years old. Its owners want to use private money to construct a Twin Span immediately adjacent to the existing Bridge to service customers while

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maintenance work is performed on the Ambassador Bridge. However, a cross-border partnership of government entities has proposed the construction of a new publicly-owned bridge, the NITC/DRIC,¹ which would compete with the Ambassador Bridge and possibly destroy the financial basis for the Twin Span.

In its campaign to build a Twin Span, DIBC has sued in the United States and in Canada. The Court refers the reader to its earlier opinions² and will not belabor this case's history here. As relevant to this Order, the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss Count IV,³ Dkt. 92, entered judgment in favor of the United States Coast Guard on Count IV of the Third Amended Complaint, and denied Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on Count IV, Dkt. 96. See Op. [Dkt. 162]; Order [Dkt. 163]. The Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. See Order [Dkt. 193]. Plaintiffs now move for an order entering final judgment on Count IV under Rule 54(b).⁴

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that "[w]hen an action presents more than one claim for relief," the district court "may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims . . . only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Absent an express determination that the District Court has entered final judgment because there is no reason for delay, the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to review an Order the decides fewer than all the claims for relief. Blackman v. District of Columbia, 456 F.3d 167, 175-76 (D.C. 2006). "The purpose of Rule 54(b) is to 'mediate between the sometimes antagonistic goals of avoiding piecemeal appeals and giving parties timely justice.'" Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 221 F.R.D. 255, 257-58 (D.D.C. 2004) (internal alterations omitted) (quoting Taylor v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 132 F.3d 753, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Whether an order qualifies for Rule 54(b) final judgment is a decision made in the discretion of the district court, which is "most likely to be familiar with the case and with any justifiable reasons for delay," Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of Superior Calif. v. Babbitt, 161 F.3d 740, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Petties v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 469, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("[T]he district court functions as a dispatcher, determining in its sound discretion when a claim should proceed on to appellate resolution and when it should await its fellows." (internal alterations and quotations omitted)).

A district court must follow certain steps in making this determination. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1980) (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956)). "A district court must first determine that it is dealing with a 'final judgment,'" id., that is, "an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action." Sears, 351 U.S. at 436. Next, the district court must decide

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"whether there is any just reason for delay." Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8. The Supreme Court notes that "[n]ot all final judgments on individual claims should be immediately appealable, even if they are in some sense separable from the remaining unresolved claims." Id. In exercising its discretion, "a district court must take into account judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved" and should consider whether it is likely an "appellate court would have to decide the same issues...