Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr., Co. v. Reddy
| Decision Date | 31 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:19-cv-460 (VAB) (WIG),No. 3:19-cv-461 (VAB) (WIG),3:19-cv-460 (VAB) (WIG),3:19-cv-461 (VAB) (WIG) |
| Parties | DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST, CO., as trustee for Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-10, Plaintiff, v. WALTER REDDY, III. Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Walter Reddy, III ("Defendant"), proceeding pro se, filed a Notice of Removal on March 27, 2019, of two Summary Process actions commenced by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company ("Deutsche Bank") in the Connecticut Superior Court Housing Session of Norwalk. Both actions were removed to this Court on the same day and relate to the same property, which comprises a "Main House" and an "In-Law Unit."
For the reasons that follow, the Court adopts Judge Garfinkel's recommended ruling in both cases, GRANTING the Plaintiff's motions to proceed in forma pauperis, but DISMISSING these cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Around June 7, 2018, Deutsche Bank allegedly became the record owner of 16 Briar Oak Drive, Weston, CT 06883, as a result of a foreclosure action started under docket numbers NWH-CV18-6004196-S and NWH-CV18- 6004197-S. See Rev. State Compl. ¶ 1, Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Reddy, No. 3:19-cv-461 (VAB), ECF No. 1-1 (Mar. 27, 2019) ("Main House Action") and Rev. State Compl. ¶ 1, Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Reddy, Case No. 3:19-cv-460 (VAB) ("In-Law Unit Action"). Deutsche Bank alleges that the Defendants' right to occupy the premises, which included both the Main House and the In-Law Unit ended on November 5, 2018; that a notice to quit the premises was served; and that the date to quit the premises passed in November 2018. Compl.1 ¶ 2-6.
On February 13, 2019, Deutsche Bank brought summary process actions against Walter Reddy, III, Scott Baker, Alexandra Benderoth, Jodi Emidy, Taylor Flack and various Doe Defendants, making claims for immediate possession of both the Main House and the In-Law Unit of the Weston premises. Id.
On March 27, 2019, Walter Reddy, III, proceeding pro se, filed Notices of Removal of both actions. Notice of Removal, Main House Action, ECF No. 1 (Mar. 27, 2019); Notice of Removal, Main House Action, ECF No. 1 (Mar. 27, 2019). In all respects other than whether the filing refers to the Main House or the In-Law Unit on the Weston premises, the grounds for removal asserted by Mr. Reddy are the same.
Also on March 27, 2019, Mr. Reddy filed identical "short form" applications to proceed in forma pauperis in both cases. Mot., Main House Action, ECF No. 2, (Mar. 27, 2019); Mot., In-Law Unit Action, ECF No. 2 (Mar. 27, 2019). Judge Garfinkel denied Mr. Reddy's motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the In-Law Unit Action, without prejudice to renewing the motion with a complete financial affidavit. ECF No. 7 (Apr. 2, 2019).
On May 1, 2019, Mr. Reddy filed a new motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the In-Law Unit Action. ECF No. 8 (May 1, 2019).
On June 19, 2019, Deutsche Bank moved to remand both cases to state court. Main House Action, ECF No. 7 (June 19, 2019); In-Law Unit Action, ECF No. 10 (June 19, 2019).
On October 22, 2019, Judge William I. Garfinkel issued a Recommended Ruling in both cases, recommending that Mr. Reddy's Complaint be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Rec. Ruling, In-Law Unit Action, ECF No. 13 (Oct. 22, 2019); Rec. Ruling, Main House Action, ECF No. 13 (Oct. 22, 2019). Judge Garfinkel stated that "[a]ny objection must be filed within 14 days after service," or by November 5, 2019. Rec. Ruling.
On December 2, 2019, Mr. Reddy filed a Notice of Disability in both actions. Notice of Disability, Main House Action, ECF No. 14 (Dec. 2, 2019); Notice of Disability, In-Law Unit Action, ECF No. 14 (Dec. 2, 2019).
Also on December 2, 2019, Mr. Reddy filed an objection to the recommended ruling in both cases. Obj. to Rec. Ruling, Main House Action, ECF No. 15 (Dec. 2, 2019); Obj. to Rec. Ruling, In-Law Unit Action, ECF No. 15 (Dec. 2, 2019).
Now before the Court are Mr. Reddy's motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §19152 and Deutsche Bank's motions to remand.
There is a two-step process for reviewing motions to proceed in forma pauperis. See Bey v. Syracuse Univ., 155 F.R.D. 413, 413 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) ().
First, a court must determine whether the litigant qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis based upon economic status. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1). (A court "may authorize the commencement . . . of any suit . . . without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets . . . .").
Second, a court must determine whether the cause of action is frivolous, malicious, or without merit. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). A court "shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." Id. (emphasis added). The term "frivolous" is not intended to be insulting or demeaning; it is a term of art that has a precise meaning. A claim is said to be frivolous if it does not have an arguable basis in law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. U.S. Const., Art. III. In order for this Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction, either (1) the plaintiff must set forth a colorable claim arising under the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute, thus invoking this Court's federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or (2) there must be complete diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff and the defendant and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000 under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See DaSilva v. Kinsho Int'l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 2000) (). "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (emphasis added). Thus, where jurisdiction is lacking, dismissal is mandatory. Lydonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700-01 (2d Cir. 2000); Manway Constr. Co. v. Hous. Auth. of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1983).
For the following reasons, the Court does not have jurisdiction over Mr. Reddy's claims.
"When removing a state case with multiple defendants, each defendant must independently consent to removal to federal court." Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. White, No.3:18-cv-1606 (VAB), 2019 WL 2006003, at *2 (D. Conn. May 7, 2019) ). The "[f]ailure of any defendant to provide its written consent within the applicable thirty-day period renders the petition for removal untimely." Edelman v. Page, 535 F. Supp. 2d 290, 293 (D. Conn. 2010).
"Because this rule is strictly interpreted and enforced, 'most courts have required some form of unambiguous written evidence of consent to the court in timely fashion.'" Id. ). Additionally, "[t]he removing defendants bear the burden of establishing that removal is proper." Drayton v. Riverbay Corp., No. 17-cv-5455 (JPO), 2017 WL 4857601, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2017).
In addition to Mr. Reddy, the other Defendants in the state court action are Scott Baker, Alexandra Benderoth, Jodi Emidy, Taylor Flack, John Doe I, John Doe II, Jane Doe I and Jane Doe II. The Doe defendants do not have to consent to removal here because "the general rule that all defendants must join in a notice of removal may be disregarded where . . . the non-joining defendants are unknown." Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Soliman v. Philip Morris, Inc., 311 F.3d 966, 971 (9th Cir. 2002) (). None of the additional named Defendants, however, have joined in the removal of this case to federal court, or filed consent to removal; nor has Mr. Reddy offered unambiguous or written evidence that the other named Defendants consent to this action.
Based on the original state actions and the notices of removal, Judge Garfinkel recommended that these cases be dismissed and remanded because their removal is not in compliance with the unanimity rule. See Edelman, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 292-93 (); Nat'l Waste Assocs., LLC v. TD Bank, N.A., No. 3:10-cv-289 (CSH), 2010 WL 1931031, at *2-3 (D. Conn. May 12, 2010) (same).
Mr. Reddy argues that the other Defendants are not properly named as defendants in these actions because they allegedly either have already left the premises or have been subject to harassment by agents of the Defendant or Defendant's counsel in an attempt to expel them from the premises. Obj. to Rec. Ruling at 3 ( ).
District courts have broad discretion to dismiss parties or claims from a lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, either on motion or sua sponte. See Costello v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 258, 263 (D. Conn. 2012) ...
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