Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Cos. v. Leo (In re Karr)

Docket Number23-11040
Decision Date26 May 2023
PartiesIn re: IRVIN RANDAL KARR, Debtor. v. ROCCO J. LEO, as Trustee of the Bankruptcy Estate of Irvin Randal Karr, Defendant-Appellee. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANIES, as Trustee under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Plaintiff-Appellant,
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

DO NOT PUBLISH

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00787-AMM

Before WILSON, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM

Upon our review of the record and the parties' responses to the jurisdictional questions, this appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

Appellant seeks review of the district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's March 7, 2022 grant of partial summary judgment to Appellee. In that order, the bankruptcy court determined that Appellant had no right to Debtor's interest in the property in which he resides, and the bankruptcy estate was entitled to a one-half interest in that property. The bankruptcy court did not resolve Appellee's claims requesting a judgment allowing for sale of the property and an order requiring turnover of the property to the estate, nor did it address Appellant's counterclaim for sale of the property and distribution of proceeds.

We conclude that the bankruptcy court did not properly certify its order, which did not resolve all claims and counterclaims in the adversary proceedings, for immediate review under Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7054(a). See Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7054(a) (providing that Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) applies in adversary bankruptcy proceedings); Dzibowski v. Boomer's Sports &Recreation Ctr Inc. (In re Boca Arena, Inc.), 184 F.3d 1285, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that a bankruptcy court order disposing of fewer than all claims in an adversary proceeding is not immediately appealable absent Rule 7054 certification). Specifically, the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in determining that there was "no just reason for delay." See Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 483 F.3d 773, 777 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that to certify a case under Rule 54(b), a court must determine, inter alia, that there is "no just reason for delay" in permitting an immediate appeal).

As an initial matter, the bankruptcy court did not provide any reasoning or explanation for its certification decision. It simply stated, summarily, that there was no just reason for delay. Accordingly, we accord no deference to the bankruptcy court's certification. See Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 114 F.3d 162, 16667 (11th Cir. 1997).

Here the "special circumstances" we have identified as warranting departure from the historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals are not present. See Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th 714, 722-23 (11th Cir. 2021); Peden v. Stephens, 50 F.4th 972, 978-79 (11th Cir. 2022). The Rule 54(b) certification did not occur at an early stage of the litigation but after two years of litigation including a related removal and remand of a state court action. There are not a large number of defendants, and it does not appear that substantial discovery still awaits. Ne...

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