Devabhaktuni v. C.P.S.
| Decision Date | 16 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:19-cv-1743-N-BT,3:19-cv-1743-N-BT |
| Parties | MANOGNA DEVABHAKTUNI, Plaintiff, v. C.P.S., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the Court are separate motions to dismiss pro se Plaintiff Manogna Devabhaktuni's live amended complaint (ECF No. 7) filed by the Frisco Police Department (Frisco PD), New York Life Insurance Company (NYL), the Children's Advocacy Center for Denton County (CACDC), the United States of America, HealthMarkets, Inc., and the Texas Department of Family Protection Services (DFPS) (ECF Nos. 28, 54, 81, 84, 88, and 91, respectively), and Plaintiff's responses thereto (ECF Nos. 47, 57, 87, 90, 99). For the following reasons, the Court should GRANT the motions to dismiss and DISMISS all of Plaintiff's claims against the Frisco PD, NYL, the CACDC, the United States, HealthMarkets, Inc., and the DFPS.
On July 22, 2019, Plaintiff initiated this civil action by filing a complaint, naming as defendants CPS, the DFPS, "Hospitals," the Arthur Murray Dance Studio, Lebanon Ridge Apartments, Primrose at Lakehill, a medium called Fiona Iam Persian, and various other individuals.1 Comp. 1 (ECF No. 3). Plaintiff claimed she lost eight or nine million dollars as a result of being "robbed," "harassed," "blackmailed," and "dumped." Id. She also claimed her children had been mistreated and "taken away" from her. Id. 2. On August 16, 2019, Plaintiff paid the required $400.00 filing fee and filed a document entitled "Amendment of Existing Case," in which she complains of a "terrorist attack on kids" and states that "CPS started killing me and separating my kids and harassing me." First Am. Comp. 1, 2 (ECF No. 7). She further alleges that she experienced sexual harassment at NYL "by two colleagues," and "the same thing happened in Concentra and HealthMarkets." Id. 2. She names several parties as defendants, including the United States, "Homeland Security," the IRS, "ICE Team," NYL, Uber, the Frisco PD, the DFPS, Concentra, HealthMarkets, Inc. (which she incorrectly names, as "North Richland Hills Health Markets"), the CACDC (which she incorrectly names the "Advocacy Center"), and "Select Medical Hospitals."
Five days later, the Court entered an order advising Plaintiff that, because she paid the required filing fee, she was responsible for serving a summons and a copy of her live complaint on each defendant, in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. Order (ECF No. 8). The Court further advised Plaintiff that she had 90 days from that order's date to serve defendants. Id.
Thereafter, Plaintiff attempted to file several subsequent amended pleadings without leave of court. See Am. Compls. (ECF Nos. 11, 17, 24). These purported pleadings named over 50 parties as defendants and referenced "a terrorist attack" allegedly carried out against her because she became a naturalized citizen of the United States and converted to the Mormon faith. See id. In one of these amended complaints, she named "Donald Trumph [sic] and all other US Presidents and other countries in the world" as defendants and demanded they surrender their presidencies and "all embassies" to her. Am. Compl. 2 (ECF No. 24). She also filed two motions seeking the Court's assistance in obtaining tickets and traveling to India. See Mots. (ECF Nos. 16, 20).
On September 18, 2019, the Court denied her motions concerning travel to India and advised Plaintiff that she used her one opportunity to amend her complaint without leave of court or the opposing parties' written consent when she filed her first amended complaint on August 16, 2019. Order 2 (ECF No. 26). The Court struck Plaintiff's subsequent amendments and notified her that Id. 2. The Court further directed Plaintiff again to Rule 4's provisions regarding service of process and warned her that, if proper service was not made within 90 days of the Court's August 21, 2019 Order, the case would be subject to dismissal. Id. 3.
The Frisco PD, NYL, the CACDC, the United States, HealthMarkets, Inc., and the DFPS filed separate motions to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against them under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6). Plaintifffiled responses to some, but not all of those motions, and implored the Court in other filings to allow her claims to proceed. The motions should be considered fully briefed and ripe for determination.
The United States and DFPS seek dismissal of Plaintiff's claims under Rule 12(b)(1). The United States and DFPS, as well as NYL and the CACDC, seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(5). Finally, all the defendants seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court addresses arguments under these rules in that order.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The Fifth Circuit distinguishes between a "facial attack" and a "factual attack" on subject-matter jurisdiction. Rodriguez v. Tex. Comm'n on the Arts, 992 F. Supp. 876, 878 (N.D. Tex. 1998). "A facial attack requires the court merely to decide if the plaintiff has correctly alleged a basis for subject matter jurisdiction" by examining the allegations in the complaint, which are presumed to be true. Id. (citation omitted). If the defendant supports the motion with evidence, however, then the attack is "factual," and "no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims." Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). Regardless of the attack, "[t]he plaintiff constantly bears the burden ofproof that jurisdiction does in fact exist." Rodriguez, 992 F. Supp. at 879 (citations omitted) ("The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction.").
When a party files a Rule 12(b)(1) motion in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the jurisdictional challenge before addressing any attack on the merits. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citation omitted). This "prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice." Id. (citation omitted). When the court dismisses for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, that dismissal "is not a determination of the merits and does not prevent the plaintiff from pursuing a claim in a court that does have proper jurisdiction." Id. (citation omitted).
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, plaintiffs cannot sue the United States without its permission. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (citations omitted). Absent a waiver of this immunity, or consent to be sued, any suit brought against the United States or any federal agency must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Truman v. United States, 26 F.3d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden of showing a waiver of sovereign immunity. Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 334 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting St. Tammany Par. v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 2009 WL 146582, at *6 (5th Cir. Jan. 22, 2009)). Here, Plaintiff has not identified any statute that authorizes her claims against the government. She has, thus, failed toidentify any waiver of sovereign immunity that would permit her suit to go forward against the United States or any federal agency, and her claims against the United States, the IRS, or the Department of Homeland Security must be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Eleventh Amendment generally bars suit against a state agency in federal court. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (citations omitted) ("It is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment."). Although a state may waive its own sovereign immunity, a state's consent to suit in federal court must "be unequivocally expressed." Id. at 99 (citations omitted). To invoke this Court's subject-matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff must identify a statute waiving the DFPS's sovereign immunity from suit in federal court for the specific claims Plaintiff seeks to bring against the DFPS. Plaintiff has failed to identify any such statute. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against the DFPS also must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The plaintiff in a civil action is responsible for having the summons and complaint timely served on all the defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1). If the plaintiff does not do so, "the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order thatservice be made within a specified time." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); accord Thrasher v. City of Amarillo, 709 F.3d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 2013). Rule 12(b)(5) permits a challenge to the plaintiff's method of service or the lack of delivery of the summons and complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5); Coleman v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 969 F. Supp. 2d 736, 745 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (citations omitted). "When service of process is challenged, the serving party bears the burden of proving its validity or good cause for failure to effect timely service." Sys. Signs Supplies v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 903 F.2d 1011, 1013 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citations omitted). "To establish good cause, a [plaintiff] must demonstrate 'at least as much...
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