Devante K. v. Saul, Civ. No. 20-423 (BRT)
| Decision Date | 25 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 20-423 (BRT) |
| Parties | Devante D. K., Plaintiff, v. Andrew Saul, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Karl E. Osterhout, Esq., Osterhout Disability Law, LLC, and Edward C. Olson, Esq., Attorney at Law, counsel for Plaintiff.
Tracey Wirmani, Esq., Social Security Administration, counsel for Defendant.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner") denying his application for disability insurance benefits. This matter is before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, in accordance with D. Minn. LR 72.1(c). (Doc. Nos. 16, 19.) Because substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the Administrative Law Judge's ("the ALJ's") finding that Plaintiff is not disabled, and for the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's motion is denied and Defendant's motion is granted.
Plaintiff filed claims for both Title II and Title XVI benefits in December 2, 2016, alleging a disability onset date of November 20, 2016. (Tr. 209, 211, 233.)1 His claim was initially denied on May 17, 2017, and then denied again on reconsideration on August 9, 2017. (Tr. 137-41, 144-49.) He requested a hearing before an ALJ, which was held via video conference on April 10, 2019. (Tr. 49-73.) The ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim on April 26, 2019, and the Appeals Council denied his request for review on December 27, 2019, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1, 12-35.) Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) on January 31, 2020, seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner. (Doc. No. 1, Compl.)
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to the Local Rules. (Doc. Nos. 16, 19.) Plaintiff requests that the Court reverse and remand the Commissioner's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred by failing to properly evaluate the opinions of Plaintiff's treating psychiatrists and therapist. (Doc. No. 17, Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ("Pl.'s Mem.") 3, 32.) Plaintiff asserts that if the psychiatrist and therapist opinions were properly weighed, additional limitations would have been included in the RFC, and that when doing so, Plaintiff should have been found "disabled" under the Act. (Id. at 9.) Defendant requests that the Court affirm the Commissioner's decision as "legally sound and supported by substantial evidence." (Doc. No. 20, Def.'s Mem. Supp.Mot. Summ. J. ("Def's Mem.") 25.) Defendant contends the ALJ properly evaluated the opinion evidence, and that his credibility findings were properly supported by the objective medical evidence on record. (Id. at 6-11.) Defendant also asserts the ALJ properly found the state agency psychological experts' opinions supported by the record, incorporated the appropriate work-related limitations, and even added additional limitations in his RFC finding. (Id. at 22-23.)
Plaintiff was twenty-two years old at the time of his alleged disability onset date - November 20, 2016. (Tr. 76.) He lives with his mother and father. (Tr. 55.) Plaintiff finished the 10th grade but did not graduate from high school. (Tr. 56-57.) He later attended GED classes. (Id.)
Plaintiff held three jobs before his alleged disability onset date, but only one of them lasted more than a few months. (Tr. 234.) First he worked part-time as a detail associate at Park Lake Carwash during the summer of 2011. (Id.) Plaintiff reports that he was fired from this job because he could not get along with others. (Tr. 246.) Next, he worked part-time as a dishwasher for a restaurant from early 2012 until the end of 2012. (Tr. 248-50.) Then, he worked part-time as a dishwasher at Arby's from 2013 until 2016. (Id.)
Plaintiff's severe impairment at issue on appeal is his schizoaffective disorder. (Tr. 18.) Plaintiff reported he started hearing voices when he was approximately 8-years-old. (Tr. 704.) His psychiatric treatment history started when he first saw a therapist in sixth grade for suicidal ideation. (Tr. 318.) When Plaintiff was 12-years-old, he attemptedsuicide and told his grandmother he was hearing voices. (Id.) Plaintiff's school referred him to a therapist in 2010. (Tr. 693.) In December 2015, Plaintiff was treated for addiction related issues at Nuway House Inc. (Tr. 685-713.) The record then shows that he was treated on September 30, 2016, prior to his alleged onset date. (Id.) At that time, Plaintiff reported various symptoms including depressed mood, anxiety, paranoia, and auditory and visual hallucinations. (Tr. 342.) The provider diagnosed him with psychosis, unspecified psychosis type, hallucinations, depression unspecified depression type, paranoia, cough, and as a marijuana smoker. (Tr. 345.)
Plaintiff reported he is unable to care for himself, although he also reported performing some household chores including washing half of the dishes, taking out the trash, doing laundry, shoveling snow, and vacuuming. (Tr. 61, 63, 242.) In addition, he stated that he bathes when he is reminded to do so, and he is able to shop in stores if he is accompanied; he does not have a driver's license so he typically walks for transportation or receives rides from his friends or family. (Tr. 56, 242-44.) He can make change and count money, but reported he cannot handle his own finances. (Tr. 243.) He also stated he has difficulty sleeping. (Tr. 241.) Plaintiff has a seven-year-old daughter who he sees every other weekend. (Tr. 648.) And Plaintiff reported that he cares for his brother on a fulltime basis. (Tr. 849-66.) Plaintiff's hobbies include playing video games, writing poetry, making music, and going to the movies with his friends. (Tr. 62, 244, 849-66.)
According to Plaintiff's most recent medical treatment report dated March 14, 2019, Plaintiff sees a therapist twice monthly and a psychiatrist every two months, both located at NorthPoint Health & Wellness Center. (Tr. 305.) Additionally, Plaintiffreportedly works with a social worker in Adult Rehabilitative Mental Health Services ("ARMHS") twice monthly, at Nystrom & Associates and Family Support Services. (Id.) As of March 14, 2019, Plaintiff is prescribed the following medications by Dr. Peoples: Olanzapine, Aripirazole, and Bupropion for bipolar, suicidal thoughts, and depression. (Tr. 306.) Plaintiff acknowledged his symptoms are managed when he takes his medication. (Tr. 323.)
IV. The ALJ's Findings and Decision
On April 26, 2019, the ALJ found Plaintiff "not disabled," as defined in the Social Security Act, from November 20, 2016, through the date of the decision. (Tr. 29.) To arrive at his decision, the ALJ followed the five-step procedure for determining whether a person is disabled outlined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).2
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had "not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 20, 2016, the alleged onset date."3 (Tr. 17.) At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from schizoaffective disorder. (Tr. 18.) He considered this ailment to be severe because it had more than a minimal effect on Plaintiff's ability to perform basic work activities as required by SSR 85-28. (Id.); see20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). However, the ALJ noted that although the impairment is severe, "it is not work preclusive." (Id.)
At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's impairment does not meet or medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments. (Tr. 18.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff has a moderate limitation in his ability to understand, remember, or apply information; moderate limitation interacting with others; moderate limitation with regard to concentration, persistence, or pace; and moderate limitation adapting or managing himself; thus, the "paragraph B" criteria were not satisfied. (Tr. 18-19.) The ALJ also found no evidence of any decompensation in the record, no evidence of "such marginal adjustment that even a minimal increase in mental demands or change in [Plaintiff's] environment" could cause him to decompensate, and no evidence of an "inability to function outside a highly supportive living arrangement" at any point. (Tr. 19.) Thus, he found that the "paragraph C" criteria were likewise not satisfied. (Id.) Consequently, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment that met the severity standard. (Id.)
(Tr. 19-20.) Although Plaintiff testified that he cannot "work due to difficulty interacting/communicating with other persons and meeting new people," the ALJ found Plaintiff's own testimony regarding his impairment only partially credible, because his statements "are inconsistent because the alleged level of impairment is unsupported by the objective medical evidence." (Tr. 20-21.) The ALJ concluded that the objective evidence suggested Plaintiff's symptoms improved when he is medicated, and the evidence showed Plaintiff acknowledged the improvement, yet continued to be inconsistent with his compliance. (Tr. 25.)
In addition, the ALJ weighed all the medical opinions in the record. The ALJ discounted the opinion of Dr. Lusha Liu because he found her opinion to...
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