Devers v. Devers

Decision Date11 April 2022
Docket NumberDOCKET NO. A-4481-19
Parties Christine Ann DEVERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jeffrey Eric DEVERS, Defendant-Respondent.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

471 N.J.Super. 466
273 A.3d 978

Christine Ann DEVERS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Jeffrey Eric DEVERS, Defendant-Respondent.

DOCKET NO. A-4481-19

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued March 29, 2022
Decided April 11, 2022


Jeffrey S. Mandel, Millburn, argued the cause for appellant.

Jeffrey P. Weinstein argued the cause for respondent (Weinstein Family Law, attorneys; Jeffrey P. Weinstein, of counsel and on the brief; Erika P. Handler, on the brief).

Before Judges Fisher, Currier and Berdote Byrne.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

FISHER, P.J.A.D.

273 A.3d 980
471 N.J.Super. 468

In this matrimonial appeal, plaintiff Christine Ann Devers contends the trial judge erroneously found a lack of subject matter jurisdiction over her claim that an account held by a limited liability company controlled by defendant Jeffrey E. Devers is a marital asset. A handful of procedural circumstances have been offered as obstacles to our reaching that jurisdictional issue. We find, however, those unique circumstances inessential to our examination of the merits and conclude the trial judge's jurisdictional holding was erroneous.

In 2009, Christine commenced this action to dissolve her nearly twenty-three-year marriage to Jeffrey. Of relevance here, the record reveals Jeffrey managed a hedge fund, which included several investment groups located throughout the United States and the Cayman Islands. The hedge fund began winding up its affairs in 2002 and certain funds (approximately $1,500,000) were

471 N.J.Super. 469

transferred into an account in the United States held by Gauss LLC, of which Jeffrey is the sole member.

In May 2017, after a thirty-four-day trial spanning three calendar years,1 the parties entered into a settlement agreement, which resolved, as it expressly stated, "all issues remaining and shall be binding and enforceable upon each party" with one exception: Christine's claim to the Gauss account. The trial judge ordered a plenary hearing to take up Christine's argument that the Gauss account is a marital asset and Jeffrey's argument that the account is not a marital asset but consists of funds belonging to investors.

After the hearing was scheduled but before it occurred, Christine moved for summary judgment seeking to vindicate her view of the Gauss account. Jeffrey cross-moved for the appointment of a fiduciary manager for Gauss LLC. Notwithstanding Christine's argument that the issue could be decided as a matter of law,2 the judge conducted a plenary hearing over three days in the spring and summer of 2019. Once the hearing was concluded, the judge did not resolve the factual dispute about the Gauss account or any other issues raised about the evidence or sufficiency of expert testimony except one: she found the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine the true nature of the Gauss account. Both the judge's January 16, 2020 opinion and the memorializing order denied the claim "without prejudice," the latter stating Christine's summary judgment motion3

is hereby denied, without prejudice, as this [c]ourt lacks subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether the $1,512,224.97 held by Gauss LLC, are
273 A.3d 981
marital assets of [d]efendant or investor proceeds.

[Emphasis added.]
471 N.J.Super. 470

The parties then engaged in litigation about other matters4 and Christine did not move for reconsideration of the January 16, 2020 order until three months after its entry. The judge denied the reconsideration motion by way of an order and written opinion entered on July 16, 2020, by concluding that the January 16, 2020 order was a final order and Christine's reconsideration motion was untimely. See R. 4:49-2 (declaring that motions to alter or amend final orders and final judgments must be filed within twenty days).

Christine filed a notice of appeal on August 14, 2020, seeking review of the January 16, 2020 order and the July 16, 2020 order that denied reconsideration.5 Questions about the proper scope of the appeal were raised early in these proceedings, causing Christine to move for leave to file her appeal of the January 16, 2020 order out of time. A judge of this court entered an October 8, 2020 order that limited the scope of our review in this appeal to the July 16, 2020 order denying reconsideration.6 When Christine filed her merits brief, she nevertheless included arguments challenging the January 16, 2020 order, causing Jeffrey to move to strike the

471 N.J.Super. 471

brief. We denied that motion but again confirmed the appeal was limited to our consideration of the July 16, 2020 order denying reconsideration.

The appeal was then placed on a plenary calendar. Before hearing oral argument, however, we asked the parties to brief whether this panel may reconsider the two orders issued by this court that limited the scope of the appeal and, if we are not bound, whether we should take a different view of the appeal's scope. In addition, we asked the parties to describe what they believe the scope of the appeal should be if we provide relief from our prior interlocutory orders. And we invited Jeffrey to respond to Christine's arguments about the legitimacy of the January 16, 2020 order and all other issues Christine raised in her merits brief that Jeffrey had not briefed because of our interlocutory rulings about the appeal's scope. The parties accepted our invitation and filed supplemental briefs.

In considering all this, we turn first to the binding effect – if any – of the prior one-judge interlocutory orders entered by this court. If we are bound at all, it would be by the law of the case doctrine, which exists to "prevent relitigation of a previously resolved issue" in the same case. Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 538, 25 A.3d 1080 (2011) (quoting In re Estate of Stockdale, 196 N.J. 275, 311, 953 A.2d 454 (2008) ). This doctrine requires a weighing of "the value of judicial deference

273 A.3d 982

for the rulings of a coordinate [court] against those ‘factors that bear on the pursuit of justice and, particularly, the search for truth.’ " Id. at 538-39, 25 A.3d 1080 (quoting Hart v. City of Jersey City, 308 N.J. Super. 487, 498, 706 A.2d 256 (App. Div. 1998) ). Despite our respect for the prior interlocutory rulings on motions in this appeal, we are satisfied that a perpetuation of the limitations placed on the appeal by those orders would cause an injustice. In the final analysis, courts need not "slavishly follow an erroneous or uncertain interlocutory ruling," Gonzalez v. Ideal Tile Importing Co., 371 N.J. Super. 349, 356, 853 A.2d 298 (App. Div. 2004), aff'd, 184 N.J. 415, 877 A.2d 1247 (2005), but are instead entitled to

471 N.J.Super. 472

reconsider and set aside prior interlocutory orders and rulings in the interest of justice up until the entry of final judgment, R. 4:42-2 ; Lombardi, 207 N.J. at 539, 25 A.3d 1080.

What we underappreciated or undervalued when ruling on Christine's motion to file an appeal of the January 16, 2020 order out of time and Jeffrey's cross-motion to dismiss the appeal is how a convoluted...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT