Devers v. State

• Decision Date: 14 April 1970
• Docket Number: No. 376,376
• Citation: 9 Md.App. 366,264 A.2d 291
• Parties: Raymond G. DEVERS and Bryan D. Webster v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 366

9 Md.App. 366

264 A.2d 291

Raymond G. DEVERS and Bryan D. Webster v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 376.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

April 14, 1970.

Arthur Dale Leach, Hyattsville, for appellants.

Francis X. Pugh, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Arthur A. Marshall, Jr., State's Atty., and James E. Fannan, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., for Prince George's County respectively, on brief, for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH and THOMPSON, JJ.

ORTH, Judge.

Raymond George Devers and Bryan D. Webster were jointly tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. Devers was found guilty of subornation of perjury and Webster of perjury. We reverse each judgment because of error with respect to the denial of motions for judgment of acquittal.

When a motion for judgment of acquittal is made in a jury case it is the function of the lower court to determine whether or not the evidence before it is sufficient in law to sustain a conviction. If it determines that it is, it should deny the motion and submit the case to the jury; if it determines that it is not, it should grant the motion and the case does not reach the jury. It is the function of this Court when the question is properly before it, to determine whether the lower court erred in denying a motion for judgment of acquittal. The test to be applied is whether the evidence shows directly or supports a rational inference of the facts to be proved, from which the jury could fairly be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant's guilt of the offense charged. If there was such evidence there would be no error in denial of the motion; if there was no such evidence, denial of the motion would be reversible error. See Williams v. State, 5 Md.App. 450, 452-460, 247 A.2d 731.

However, the instant case does not reach us with regard to the denial of the motions for judgment of acquittal in the usual posture. We think it fundamental to the rights of a defendant that the lower court deny a motion for judgment of acquittal only on the basis that it has considered the evidence adduced, and recognizing that its weight and the credibility of the witnesses are matters for the jury, finds that the evidence in law was sufficient to sustain the conviction. We can only conclude that in the instant case the lower court's denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal made by each appellant at the close of all the evidence was influenced by other factors to the extent that the appellants were denied due process of law. Thus we must reverse the judgments and do so without reaching the question of the sufficiency of the evidence per se. We reach our conclusion from remarks made by the lower court. At the trial, upon the close of evidence offered by appellants, the State requested a conference in chambers concerning a witness it desired to call in rebuttal. During this conference the court said:

'* * * Now, Mr. Fannon (Assistant State's Attorney) let me say this, if this were the world's worst murder case, if this was a seriously involved case, if it were not for the fact that I sat on these other cases and had thrown the other three out-there are certain indications that have come into this trial which indicates they weren't fully and completely resolved, which they were. Now, I am just trying to say that that is the fact. Here you have got a family squabble in here and this case should never have gone to trial. If it weren't for the fact I sat on those other cases, and if it weren't for my confidence the jury is going to acquit this man, I would give him a judgment of acquittal like that, and there isn't a court attendant that doesn't feel the same way about it. I don't know what has got in your craw, but I think this is one good reason why everybody is going to go out of office, really I do. I think this case is a disgrace. And I will say this to every one of you, it is an absolute disgrace. * * * Somebody says out of the courtroom-the rumors that go all over the courthouse about what is going on here, and about some other criminal case that was involved, but I must say we are here to try this one case. And I will tell you if I hadn't sat in those others-and the people involved on the other side, there are such hard feelings by the phone company and by the people with Mrs Devers, that the jury is going to get this case come no matter what. I am just going to let the jury determine it. I am not going to do it. But if I had no determine it I would throw it out in a minute.' (emphasis supplied.)

When trial resumed the State called one witness in rebuttal. His testimony was in substance cumulative and the court noted that it was not appropriate rebuttal. It said: 'All you (the State) have done so far is to repeat exactly what you did on direct examination, only you have got one more witness, which is certainly not proper rebuttal.' This testimony closed the evidence and appellants moved for judgment of acquittal. It was denied. The court felt the evidence had 'created a question of fact which the jury must resolve, as we indicated in chambers when we were on the record. We feel that this case does present a question for the jury, a question of fact to determine whether or not the defendants are guilty as charged.'

We are constrained to conclude that the court denied the motions for judgment of acquittal because it was leaving the question of guilt to the jury 'no matter what.' That the court was confident the jury would acquit was not a proper basis for a denial of the motions. Nor could the court properly slough its responsibility to decide whether or not the case should go to the jury because it had sat in ...