DeVincentis v. Maryland Cas. Co.

• Decision Date: 16 September 1974
• Citation: 325 A.2d 610
• Parties: Richard DeVINCENTIS and Lois J. DeVincentis, his wife, Plaintiffs, v. MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Defendant. Richard DeVINCENTIS and Lois J. DeVincentis, his wife, Plaintiffs, v. Lawrence C. CLOUD and RCA Corporation, a Delaware corporation, Defendants.
• Court: Delaware Superior Court

Page 610

325 A.2d 610

Richard DeVINCENTIS and Lois J. DeVincentis, his wife, Plaintiffs, v.MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Defendant.

Richard DeVINCENTIS and Lois J. DeVincentis, his wife, Plaintiffs, v.Lawrence C. CLOUD and RCA Corporation, a Delaware

corporation, Defendants.

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County.

Sept. 16, 1974.

William H. Bennethum, and James P. D'Angelo, Wilmington, for plaintiffs.

F. Alton Tybout, Wilmington, for defendant Maryland Cas. Co.

Warren B. Burt, Wilmington, for defendants Cloud and RCA Corp.

OPINION ON MOTION TO SEVER

TAYLOR, Judge.

Defendants in Civil Action 281, 1973 have moved to sever the previously consolidated trial of that case from that in Civil Action 734, 1972.The plaintiffs in both actions are the same.The defendant in Civil Action 734, 1972 is the plaintiffs' own insurance carrier in that action.Plaintiffs seek no-fault benefits and other claims relating to two automobile accidents which plaintiffs suffered.Civil Action 281, 1973 is brought against the driver and his employer involving the second of the two automobile accidents which are the basis of Civil Action 734.Plaintiffs and defendant in Civil Action 734, 1972 oppose the motion.

For purposes of this Opinion, the designation 'plaintiffs' and 'defendants' will refer to the respective parties in Civil Action 281, 1973.Because serious contentions involving the effect of the statute and public policy were raised, which had not been previously considered, the Court agreed to consider the matter notwithstanding the prior consolidation order.

Defendants' first contention is that a consolidated trial is barred by the provisions of 21 Del.C. § 2118(g) of the 'nofault' insurance statute.¹

Section 2118(g) provides:

'any person eligible for benefits described in subsections (a)(2) or (a)(3), other than an insurer in an action brought pursuant to subsection (f), is precluded from pleading or introducing into evidence in an action for damages against a tort-feasor those damages for which compensation is available under subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) without regard to any elective reductions in such coverage and whether or not such benefits are actually recoverable.'

From this language, defendants argue that the legislative policy was to sever the trial of general damages from the trial of special damages.²The contention is that since the injured party is barred from pleading or introducing evidence of his special damages, this establishes a public policy that the jury which considers the injured party's claim for general damages may not also consider the claim involving the right to recover such special damages.Defendants argue that one of the purposes of the severance is to avoid having the jury award general damages upon a factor relationship to the special damages, which defendants argue is an artificial factor which should not be considered in arriving at general damages.

Section 2118(g) is precisely drawn, and by its terms the disability against claim or proof of special damages is made applicable only to a party eligible for benefits under the no-fault insurance provision other than a subrogated insurer.Perhaps the legislative objective was to assure that the injured party could not recover greater general damages resulting from possible confusion of the jury by presenting figures showing special damages for which he was not entitled to recover under the statute.However, the section specifically recognizes that there may be an action by a subrogated insurer against the tort-feasor.Since the recovery of special damages has been separated from that of general damages and the jury would be called upon to render separate verdicts involving separate claimants, the jury, upon proper instruction, would not fall into the error discussed above.

One of the primary objectives of the no-fault insurance law was to assure prompt payment to an injured party for medical expenses and lost earnings and property damage.Thus, the injured party gained the economic benefit of immediate payment without awaiting protracted litigation.

Since the law provided that the injured party could collect for medical expenses, lost earnings and property damage from his insurer, he was precluded from suing the tort-feasor for these items of damage of from putting in evidence concerning them.Correspondingly, the law specifically provides that the insurer who has paid special damages would be subrogated to the insured's right to recover against the tort-feasor.21 Del.C. § 2118(f).To the extent that this involves separate recoveries, the law has split the cause of action, as it was viewed at common law.CompareCatalfano v. Higgins, Del.Supr., 188 A.2d 357(1962).However, the so-called splitting of causes of action was an incidental result and not an objective of the no-fault insurance law.Hence, I do not find a legislative purpose to require severance of the causes of action to the extent that they would require separate trials.Nothing in the statute indicates a legislative intent that the ordinary rules relating to joinder of causes of action would not be available to these so-called split causes of action.Cf. Superior Court Civil Rule 20,Del.C.Ann.

Defendants' next contention is that to permit the consolidation of these trials would 'inject...