Devine v. Middletown Twp., CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-1072

• Decision Date: 01 August 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-1072
• Parties: DIANE DEVINE, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Michael F. Devine, Jr., deceased Plaintiff, v. MIDDLETOWN TOWNSHIP; MIDDLETOWN TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT; JOSEPH SCHUCK; JOSEPH BUCKLEY; and MARK LEONHAUSER Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

DIANE DEVINE, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Michael F. Devine, Jr., deceased Plaintiff, v. MIDDLETOWN TOWNSHIP; MIDDLETOWN TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT;

JOSEPH SCHUCK; JOSEPH BUCKLEY; and MARK LEONHAUSER Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-1072

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

August 1, 2016

MEMORANDUM

Jones, II J.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Diane Devine—Decedent Michael Devine's wife and the administrator of his estate—commenced this action against Defendants alleging various civil rights and common law violations regarding the shooting death of Mr. Devine. In particular, Plaintiff claims the police failed to utilize specialized training to deal with emotionally disturbed individuals, thereby resulting in the unreasonable use of excessive force. Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which is now ripe for this Court's review. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants' Motion shall be granted.

II. Factual Background

The undisputed facts¹ establish that on February 23, 2012 at approximately 3:37 a.m., Michael Devine placed a 9-1-1 call to report two burglars in the basement of a residence located at 1637 West Lincoln Highway, Langhorne, Pennsylvania. (SUF ¶ 2) Mr. Devine told dispatch he would be waiting for police outside the house in a green Volkswagen Passat. (SUF ¶ 3) In response, officers from the Middletown Township Police Department were dispatched, with Officer Joseph Schuck being the first to arrive on the scene. (SUF ¶¶ 4-5.) Officer Schuck reported that he drove his marked police vehicle up to a male wearing a dark sweatshirt with the hood pulled tightly around his face. (SUF ¶¶ 5-6.) The officer lowered his window to speak with the man, at which time the man revealed himself to have a knife and told Officer Schuck he was going to kill him. (SUF ¶¶ 7, 9.) Officer Schuck drove 30 to 40 feet forward to the end of the street and exited his vehicle. (SUF ¶¶ 8, 10.) Upon doing so, the officer drew his weapon and ordered the man to stop and drop the knife. (SUF ¶ 10.) Ignoring the officer's directives, theman began to approach in a shuffling "zombie walk" manner, somewhere between walking and running. (RSUF ¶ 10.) Officer Schuck repeatedly ordered the man to stop and drop the knife but the individual continued to approach with the knife raised, repeating that he was going to kill the officer. (SUF ¶¶ 11-12.) Officer Schuck began stepping back to create space between himself and the man, eventually reaching a grassy incline. (SUF ¶¶ 11, 13; RSUF ¶ 13.) At this point, Officer Schuck feared for his safety and mentally prepared to discharge his weapon. (SUF ¶ 14.) While this was occurring, Officer Daniel Buckley arrived on the scene and witnessed Officer Schuck retreating up the grassy slope with the man wielding the knife from approximately 10 feet away. (SUF ¶¶ 15-16.) In response to these events, Officer Buckley shouted orders for the individual to stop and drop the knife, however the man instead turned and began to approach Officer Buckley. (SUF ¶¶ 16-17, 19.) Despite Office Buckley's repeated commands to stop and drop the knife, the man transferred the weapon from his right to left hand, told Officer Buckley he was going to kill him, and took another step towards the officer. (SUF ¶¶ 18-19.) The man continued towards Officer Buckley, at which time the officer again ordered he stop and drop the knife. (SUF ¶¶ 19-20-21.) The man took yet another step towards Officers Buckley, at which time Officer Buckley discharged his firearm. (SUF ¶¶ 19, 21.) This shot caused the man to fall to the ground, where he was disarmed by the third officer to arrive at the scene, Officer Mark Leonhauser. (SUF ¶¶ 23-24.) Officer Leonhauser, accompanied by Sergeant Feeney and Officer Webb, then entered the residence at 1637 West Lincoln Highway to see if they could locate the second person originally reported to have been burglarizing the house but found no one inside and the premises appeared undisturbed. (SUF ¶ 25; Defs.' Mot. Summ J. Ex. 5 at 2.) Meanwhile, another officer (Stum) administered first aid to the man, subsequently identified asMichael Devine. (SUF ¶ 26; RSUF ¶ 26.) An ambulance transported Mr. Devine to the hospital, where he later died. (SUF ¶ 27.)

III. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a court shall grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must establish that the disputes are both (1) material, meaning concerning facts that will affect the outcome of the issue under substantive law; and (2) genuine, meaning the evidence must be such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "Although the initial burden is on the summary judgment movant to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, 'the burden on the moving party may be discharged by "showing"--that is, pointing out to the district court--that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case' when the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of proof." Singletary v. Pa. Dep't of Corr, 266 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). "[A] nonmoving party must adduce more than a mere scintilla of evidence in its favor and cannot simply reassert factually unsupported allegations contained in its pleadings[.]" Williams v. West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). Accordingly,summary judgment is mandated "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

IV. Discussion

A. Excessive Force

i. Officer Buckley

In order to sustain an excessive force claim brought under to 42 U.S.C. §1983, "a plaintiff [must] show that a seizure occurred and that it was unreasonable." Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 288 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (holding that seizures and excessive force claims against law enforcement should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness standard"). The court must determine "objective reasonableness" through a thorough analysis of the totality of the circumstances "as viewed from the perspective of the officer on scene." Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776-777 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-397). The circumstances must also be viewed "without regard to [the officer's] underlying intent or motivations." Phong Duong v. Telford Borough, 186 F. App'x 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.) In doing so, the court considers, among other things, "(1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect poses an imminent threat to the safety of the police or others in the vicinity, and (3) whether the suspect attempts to resist arrest or flee the scene." Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d at 417 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). "The 'objective reasonableness' test of an officer's actions is meant to give 'deference to the judgment of reasonable officers on the scene,' and we are 'cautioned against the 20/20 vision of hindsight.'" Phong, 186 F. App'x at 217 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001)).

Where the principal witness—here, the decedent—is unable to testify, "a court should avoid simply accepting 'what may be a selfserving account by the officerf[s]. It must also look at the circumstantial evidence that, if believed, would tend to discredit the police officer[s'] story, and consider whether this evidence could convince a rational fact finder that the officer[s] acted unreasonably.'" Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 182 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994)).² However,

This is not to say that the summary judgment standard should be applied with extra rigor in deadly-force cases. Rule 56 contains no separate provision governing summary judgment in such cases. Cf. Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997). Just as in a run-of-the-mill civil action, the party opposing summary judgment in a deadly-force case must point to evidence—whether direct or circumstantial—that creates a genuine issue of material fact, 'and may not rely simply on the assertion that a reasonable jury could discredit the opponent[s'] account.' Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 514 (3d Cir. 2003).

Lamont, 637 at 182.

While "reasonableness" is more commonly a question for the jury, a defendant can prevail on summary judgment if "after resolving all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff, the record demonstrates that the officer's use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances." Kopec, 361 F.3d at 772 (quoting Scott, 39 F.3d at 915). "In assessing the reasonableness of the officers' actions, we account for the fact that they must make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary." Kubicki v. Whitemarsh Twp., 270 F. App'x 127, 129 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and internal citations omitted).

In this case, there is no dispute that the officers...