DeVita v. Durst
| Citation | 647 A.2d 636,167 Pa.Cmwlth. 105 |
| Parties | Donna M. DeVITA, Guardian Ad Litem for Faith LaRussa, Appellant, v. Terry Donald DURST, Three Coast Carriers, Inc., Commonwealth of Pennsylvania/Department of Transportation, Clifton Dale Pennington, David G. Reed, American Asphalt Paving Co., and S.W.S. Construction Co. |
| Decision Date | 10 March 1995 |
| Court | Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania |
Nicholas S. Mattise, for appellant.
Arthur W. Hankin, for appellee Terry Donald Durst.
Paul A. Barrett, for appellee S.W.S. Constr. Co.
Before CRAIG, President Judge, NEWMAN, J., and DELLA PORTA, Senior Judge.
Faith LaRussa appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County which denied her post-trial motions after a jury rendered a verdict in her favor against Terry Donald Durst, Three Coast Carriers Inc., Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Clifton Dale Pennington, Dale G. Reed, American Asphalt Paving Co. and S.W.S. Construction Co. (defendants) for personal injuries.
On April 25, 1988, LaRussa was a passenger in an automobile traveling on I-81 North. LaRussa's vehicle was following a tractor-trailer driven by Pennington. A truck, driven by Durst, followed a car traveling behind the LaRussa vehicle. The vehicles proceeded through a construction zone. Although intending to continue north on I-81, the vehicles passed to the right of a concrete barrier onto a single lane exit ramp.
Pennington stopped his tractor-trailer on the exit ramp. The Durst truck struck the vehicle in front of it, pushing it off to the side, and then hit the rear of the LaRussa vehicle pushing it into the rear of Pennington's tractor-trailer. LaRussa incurred injuries and was taken to Geisinger Medical Center, where she remained until April 30, 1988.
In January, 1990, LaRussa commenced an action seeking compensation for injuries arising from the motor vehicle accident. Before the start of the trial, which commenced on June 2, 1992, the defendants admitted liability to LaRussa, leaving the amount of damages as the only issue before the jury.
At the trial, LaRussa's expert witnesses testified that, as a result of the accident, she suffered soft tissue orthopedic injuries, carpal tunnel syndrome, post-traumatic stress syndrome, anxiety, depression and a closed-head injury. The most significant of these was an organic brain disorder rendering her permanently disabled. Because of the physical and psychological injuries, LaRussa argued that she has been permanently disabled since the accident. Evidence of anticipated wage loss and the cost of full-time care was presented on LaRussa's behalf. LaRussa was not present at the trial.
The defendants maintained that LaRussa suffered no brain damage as a result of the accident but that she had, for the majority of her life, suffered from severe emotional problems. The defendants argued that the pre-existing mental condition was the cause of LaRussa's current disability, not the accident of April 25, 1988.
On June 12, 1992, a jury rendered a verdict in favor of LaRussa, awarding her total damages in the amount of $125,000, which was molded by the court to $120,000 for income loss coverage under the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.
LaRussa filed post-trial motions on June 22, 1992, which the court denied on July 1, 1993. This appeal followed.
On appeal to this court, LaRussa contends that a new trial should be granted based on the inadequacy and inconsistency of the verdict. Additionally, LaRussa challenges a number of the trial court's evidentiary rulings.
As previously stated, the jury awarded damages totaling $125,000. On the special verdict slip, the jury awarded damages as follows:
QUESTION 1:
State the amount of damages sustained by the Plaintiff, Faith LaRussa, as a
result of the injuries caused by the April 25, 1988 accident:
(a) For future medical expenses $ 10,000
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(b) For past and present loss of wages $ 32,000
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(c) For future impairment of her earning capacity $ 5,500
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(d) For past and present physical pain and suffering $ 5,000
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(e) For future pain and suffering $ 0
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(f) For past and present emotional distress and mental anguish $ 40,000
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(g) For future emotional distress and mental anguish $ 25,000
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(h) For past and present loss of the pleasures and enjoyments of $ 5,000
life
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(i) For future loss of the pleasures and enjoyments of life $ 0
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(j) For scarring and disfigurement $ 2,500
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TOTAL DAMAGES FOR PLAINTIFF FAITH LARUSSA $125,000
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Where the trial court has refused to grant relief for an inadequate verdict, the appellate court will not grant a new trial without a clear abuse of discretion. Burkett v. George, 118 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 543, 545 A.2d 985 (1988). In order to support the granting of a new trial based on the inadequacy of the verdict, "the injustice of the verdict should stand forth like a beacon." Elza v. Chovan, 396 Pa. 112, 118, 152 A.2d 238, 240 (1959).
LaRussa claims that based on the evidence presented concerning her disabilities, the verdict is low and a new trial should be granted.
One principle relating to review of a small damage award is that compromise verdicts are expected and allowed. Id., at 115, 152 A.2d at 240. LaRussa contends that, because the appellees admitted liability, a compromise verdict is not permissible in this case. However, a compromise verdict may arise out of damages or negligence or the balance of evidence concerning either or both. Id. at 115, 152 A.2d at 240. In this case, the defendants contested the existence and degree of damages claimed by LaRussa as a result of the car accident.
As previously stated, evidence was presented that LaRussa suffered soft tissue injuries, scarring, carpal tunnel syndrome, post-traumatic stress syndrome, severe anxiety, depression and a closed head injury. Dr. McAndrew, a psychologist, testified that, because of organic brain disorder, depression and anxiety resulting from the car accident, LaRussa was permanently disabled and required future care. A life care planner testified that alternative future care would cost between $28,000 and $63,000 per year.
The defendants contested the existence of a closed head injury and whether any psychological injury exhibited by LaRussa resulted from the accident. Specifically, Dr. Burke testified that, according to the medical records, LaRussa did not suffer organic brain disfunction related to the car accident. Additionally, the defendants contested LaRussa's depression and anxiety by producing evidence of a pre-existing mental condition. As to LaRussa's physical condition, Dr. Sternleib testified that his examination found that LaRussa displayed voluntary muscle contraction as opposed to involuntary muscle spasms around her neck and back. Dr. Kerhli, LaRussa's family doctor prior to the accident, testified that LaRussa exhibited signs of carpal tunnel syndrome before the accident.
Unlike Hill v. Bureau of Corrections, 124 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 172, 555 A.2d 1362 (1989), cited by LaRussa, where the court held that a compromise verdict was not permissible because the defendant did not dispute liability or damages, the defendants in this case contested the existence and degree of damages claimed by LaRussa. As such, a compromise verdict is permissible.
Most recently, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of inconsistent and inadequate verdicts in Catalano v. Bujak, 537 Pa. 155, 642 A.2d 448 (1994). That case is relevant to LaRussa's claim that, because the jury failed to award her damages for future pain and suffering and for future loss of the pleasures and enjoyments of life, the verdict is inconsistent.
In Catalano, the jury awarded the plaintiff all of his medical expenses, but failed to award him money for lost wages. This court held that it was inconsistent to award the plaintiff all of his medical expenses without awarding him lost wages for those days missed due to his medical problems.
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated this court's order which had remanded the case for a new trial because of an inconsistent verdict. The Supreme Court stated that Id. at 537 Pa. 162, 642 A.2d at 451. In this case, the jury apparently did not believe that LaRussa would suffer future pain and suffering or future loss of the pleasures and enjoyments of life. As such, the verdict is not inconsistent.
LaRussa contends that the trial court erred in permitting the defendants to present testimony and evidence concerning anxiety, depression,...
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