Deweese v. Munyan
| Decision Date | 24 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:20-cv-00818-LPR |
| Parties | KIM DEWEESE, Special Administrator of the Estate of Joshua Deweese, Deceased PLAINTIFF v. KAREN MUNYAN, Special Administrator to the Estate of Monte Munyan for the Claims herein in his Individual Capacity LINZEE WHITAKER, Official Capacity JOHN DOES 1-10, Each in their Individual and Official Capacities DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
Before the Court is Defendants Karen Munyan's and Linzee Whitaker's Partial Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 The Motion requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.2 The Motion also asks that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims to the extent they rely on violations of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.3 The Court will grant the Partial Motion to Dismiss for the reasons explained below.
The Plaintiff in this case is Kim Deweese, in her capacity as the Special Administratrix of the Estate of Joshua Deweese. On March 21, 2017, Ms. Deweese's son, Joshua Deweese, was arrested and taken to the "Faulkner County Detention Center" (the "jail").4 Ms. Deweese allegesthat the jail knew about Joshua's history of gastrointestinal issues.5 In particular, she alleges that the jail was aware of a surgery that Joshua had in 2004, which involved a "partial removal of his colon, and a resection of the remainder."6 Joshua also "suffered from a hernia and diabetes and was substantially limited in his ability to eat and drink."7 After two weeks of incarceration, Joshua had not yet had a bowel movement.8 And he was having problems with his hernia.9 "During his incarceration in April of [2017], Joshua continually complained" about his medical issues.10
At some point during Joshua's incarceration, Ms. Deweese brought documents to the jail "for an appointment with a gastroenterologist."11 Although the Complaint does not expressly state whether these documents related to a past appointment or a future appointment, it is reasonable to infer that these documents related to a future appointment with a private physician outside of the jail context. Mr. Monte Munyan, the jail's LPN, told Ms. Deweese that Joshua would be seen by the jail's "own [doctor]."12 But Mr. Munyan did not contact a physician.13 And Joshua never saw a doctor.14 Eight days after Ms. Deweese brought the documents to the jail, Joshua vomited "a brown substance" and died.15 His cause of death was "dehydration because he was unable to drink or eat and was vomiting."16
The Complaint states that the Faulkner County Sherriff allowed Mr. Munyan to exercise his nursing judgment without physician supervision.17 The Complaint states that Mr. Munyan "ignored Joshua's complaints inappropriately" and that Joshua was never given "any appropriate care under the supervision of a physician."18 The Complaint states that Mr. Munyan exercised medical judgment outside his scope of practice, which exacerbated Joshua's health conditions and produced severe mental, emotional, and physical distress.19 According to the Complaint, Joshua would not have died had Mr. Munyan ordered Joshua to be transported to a hospital.20 The Complaint also alleges that the jail failed to train its personnel.21
On April 13, 2020, Ms. Deweese filed a Complaint in the Faulkner County Circuit Court.22 She sued Mr. Munyan both in his individual capacity and in his "official capacity as an employee of the Faulkner County Sheriff."23 The Complaint also names ten unidentified "John Does" as Defendants.24 They are described as "individuals, employees, contractors or agents of the Faulkner County Sheriff" that knew about Joshua's medical condition from April 15, 2017 until Joshua's death.25 On July 9, 2020, Mr. Munyan removed the case to the Eastern District of Arkansas andfiled the instant Partial Motion to Dismiss.26
On October 7, 2020, Mr. Munyan died.27 On October 26, 2020, the Court held a hearing to determine the status of the case and the parties.28 On December 4, 2020, Ms. Deweese filed a Motion to Substitute and for Revivor.29 The parties agreed that Karen Munyan, Mr. Munyan's spouse, should be substituted for Mr. Munyan as the "Special Administrator to the Estate of Monte Munyan for the claims herein in his individual capacity."30 The parties also agreed that Linzee Whitaker—the individual who currently holds Mr. Munyan's former position with the county—should be substituted for Mr. Munyan for the claims against him in his official capacity.31 On December 9, 2020, the Court entered an Order granting the requested substitutions and reviving the case.32
Ms. Deweese's Complaint now asserts claims against Ms. Munyan (as the Special Administratrix to the Estate of Monte Munyan for the claims against him in his individual capacity), Linzee Whitaker (in her official capacity), and John Does 1-10 (each in their individual and official capacities). Although the instant Motion to Dismiss was filed while Mr. Munyan was still alive, it applies to claims asserted against him in both his individual and official capacities. The Court therefore substitutes Mr. Munyan with Ms. Munyan and Ms. Whitaker ("Defendants")and considers the Motion to Dismiss.33
For purposes of this Motion, the Court accepts all of the factual allegations in the Complaint as true and views them (and reasonable inferences therefrom) in the light most favorable to Ms. Deweese.34 "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"35 A claim is facially plausible if the alleged facts allow the Court to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."36 In other words, the factual allegations must be enough to raise the right to relief "above the speculative level."37 This requires more than "labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."38
Defendants argue that Ms. Deweese's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims should be dismissed because "medical treatment decisions cannot form the basis of claims under the ADA or Rehab Act."39 Defendants contend that Ms. Deweese's § 1983 claims should also be dismissed to the extent that they rely on violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.40 Defendants alternatively argue that the Court should, at the very least, dismiss the individual capacity claimsasserted against Ms. Munyan under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.41
Ms. Deweese agrees that the Court should dismiss the individual capacity claims against Ms. Munyan. But she contends—in one sentence of her brief, without any supporting argument or caselaw—that the dismissal should be without prejudice.42 The Court disagrees. The Eighth Circuit has plainly stated that defendants "cannot be sued in their individual capacities under the ADA or the RA" as a matter of law.43 Accordingly, the individual capacity claims advanced under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act will be dismissed with prejudice.44
With respect to the official capacity claims, Ms. Deweese asserts that these claims should not be dismissed. She contends that she has pleaded sufficient facts to state official capacity claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.45
"Discrimination under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act encompasses both disparate treatment because of a disability and failure to provide reasonable accommodations to a qualified individual's known disability."46 Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are similar in substance, and cases interpreting either are applicable and interchangeable for analytical purposes.47 To state a claim for relief for a Title II ADA violation, "a qualified individual with adisability must be excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity's services, programs, or activities, or be otherwise discriminated against by the entity, by reason of the individual's disability."48 To state a claim for relief for a § 504 violation under the Rehabilitation Act, "a qualified individual with a disability must be denied, on the basis of the individual's disability, the benefits of a program or activity of a public entity receiving federal funds."49 The question in this case is whether Joshua Deweese was denied the benefit of a public entity's "services, or programs, or activities" when he allegedly was denied competent and effective medical care.
In Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, the Supreme Court explained that "[m]odern prisons provide inmates with many recreational 'activities,' medical 'services,' and educational and vocational 'programs,' all of which at least theoretically 'benefit' the prisoners (and any of which disabled prisoners could be 'excluded from participation in')."50 The take away for purposes of this case is that medical services (medical care) is one of the "services, programs, or activities" covered under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. But courts have differentiated between claims based on negligent medical care and those based on discriminatory conduct (including failure to provide reasonable accommodations). Simply put, purely medical decisions do not fall within the scope of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. Neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act provide a federal remedy for medical malpractice.
The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held that claims under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act cannot be based on "medical treatment decisions."51 For example, in A.H. v. St. Louis Cty., Mo., the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of "[i]mproper medical treatment claims" under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.52 On appeal, the plaintiffs in A.H. argued that the complaint should not have been dismissed because the complaint alleged discrimination "based on social,...
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