DeWeese v. State
Decision Date | 06 August 2021 |
Docket Number | 121,922 |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Parties | Dane Cory DeWeese, Appellant, v. State of Kansas, Appellee. |
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appeal from Saline District Court; Jared B. Johnson, judge.
Elizabeth Seale Cateforis, of Paul E. Wilson Project for Innocence and Post-Conviction Remedies, University of Kansas School of Law, for appellant.
Ellen Mitchell, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before Green, P.J., Schroeder, J., and Walker, S.J.
In April 2014, a jury convicted Dane Cory DeWeese of the first-degree murder of Kristen Tyler as well as conspiracy to commit the first-degree murder of Tyler. DeWeese appealed his convictions to our Supreme Court, arguing that the State had failed to disclose certain evidence that he could have used to discredit the testimony of Joel Heil-his accomplice who also testified on behalf of the State at his jury trial-in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). But in January 2017, our Supreme Court affirmed DeWeese's convictions, rejecting his Brady violation argument because there was no reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different verdict had the State timely disclosed the evidence in question. State v. DeWeese, 305 Kan. 699, 700 387 P.3d 809 (2017).
A little less than a year after our Supreme Court issued its mandate, however, DeWeese moved under K.S.A. 60-1507 in the Saline County District Court, alleging that he was in custody unlawfully because Heil had recently recanted his incriminating testimony against him involving Tyler's murder. According to Heil's written and oral statements to DeWeese's private investigator, he had lied about DeWeese's involvement in Tyler's murder because he was coerced to do so by the district attorney who prosecuted his case and by Tyler's ex-husband. Nevertheless, before the trial court considered the merits of DeWeese's K.S.A 60-1507 motion, Heil committed suicide.
Because of Heil's sudden unavailability, the State challenged the admissibility of Heil's recantation statements at any future evidentiary hearing in DeWeese's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. The trial court agreed with the State's argument ruling that Heil's recantation statements constituted inadmissible hearsay. Yet, after the trial court made this inadmissibility ruling, DeWeese moved to voluntarily dismiss his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion without prejudice. Although not entirely clear, it seems that DeWeese moved to voluntarily dismiss his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion without prejudice because he believed that doing so would allow him to immediately appeal the trial court's inadmissibility ruling to this court. In any case, once the trial court granted his motion to voluntarily dismiss his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion without prejudice, DeWeese filed an appeal with this court.
Now, on appeal, DeWeese argues that the trial court erred by ruling that Heil's recantation statements were inadmissible hearsay. DeWeese specifically contends that Heil's recantation statements are admissible for two reasons: (1) because Heil's recantation statements comply with K.S.A. 60-460(j)'s declaration against interest hearsay exception and (2) because Heil's recantation statements are admissible under the limited hearsay exception addressed in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). In its brief, the State argues that we lack jurisdiction over DeWeese's appeal because plaintiffs cannot appeal orders granting their motions to voluntarily dismiss their civil actions without prejudice under the Kansas statutes governing appellate jurisdiction. Notwithstanding this jurisdictional argument, the State also argues that the trial court's inadmissibility ruling was proper because Heil's recantation statements lack substantial assurances of trustworthiness, preventing their admission under K.S.A. 60-460(j)'s declaration against interest hearsay exception or under Chambers' limited hearsay exception.
Although DeWeese responds in his reply brief that we have jurisdiction over his appeal based on three distinct reasons, we reject his jurisdiction arguments. Simply put, a review and application of the law on voluntary dismissals without prejudice as well as the law on jurisdiction shows that Kansas has no statutory right allowing plaintiffs to appeal orders granting their motions to voluntarily dismiss their civil actions without prejudice. As a result, we dismiss DeWeese's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
In his direct appeal, our Supreme Court summarized the factual and procedural background of DeWeese's criminal case as follows:
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