Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.

Decision Date06 June 1969
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 5889.
Citation300 F. Supp. 709
PartiesRobert Kenneth DEWEY, Plaintiff, v. REYNOLDS METALS CO., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

VanderVeen, Freihofer & Cook, Grand Rapids, Mich., for plaintiff; Donald F. Oosterhouse, Grand Rapids, Mich., of counsel.

Cross, Wrock, Miller & Vieson, William A. Coughlin, Jr., Detroit, Mich., Fred R. Edney, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Richmond, Va., for defendant.

OPINION

FOX, District Judge.

This is an action arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, which provides, among other things, for relief against religious discrimination in employment. The parties have stipulated to the facts, the most pertinent of which are set forth below.

Plaintiff, Robert Dewey, was employed by defendant at its Wyoming, Michigan, plant on June 14, 1951, and held various jobs until he became a die repairman, which is the job he held at the time of his discharge on September 12, 1966.

Defendant's Wyoming facility is a "job type" plant which produces aluminum extrusions and billets on an order basis. Before 1964 the plant operated on a five-day weekly schedule. Because of increased business, during 1964 and 1965 the plant operated on a "five plus" days weekly schedule. This increased to "six plus" days by 1966, with numerous Sunday work schedules.

Plaintiff was a member in good standing of the U.A.W. Union, Local 277, which represents the production and maintenance employees of defendant's plant.

Before the 1960 Labor Agreement, overtime at the plant was performed on a voluntary basis, and under such circumstances scheduling of production was made impossible on certain overtime days. In 1960, and to the present time, the agreements have included a section giving defendant the right to set overtime schedules and make it compulsory for the employees to work such schedules unless they have a substantial and justifiable reason for not doing so. This section in the 1965 Labor Agreement is Article IX, Section 3:

"All employees shall be obligated to perform all straight time and overtime work required of them by the COMPANY except when an employee has a substantial and justifiable reason for not working; provided, however, that no employee shall be required to work more than twelve (12) continuous hours without his consent."

The agreement also provides, in Article IX, Section 4, that overtime work shall be divided as equally as possible. If fewer than all qualified employees are needed, the number required is to be scheduled with the overtime chart, and if more employees are needed, they are assigned in the inverse order of their seniority.

In response to a Union objection to the compulsory overtime clause, defendant on September 20, 1965, issued an interpretation of the Labor Agreement which said in effect that any employee assigned to overtime could be relieved from that assignment by arranging for another qualified employee to replace him. This system has been utilized extensively.

Since December of 1961, plaintiff has been a member of the Faith Reformed Church, affiliated with the Reformed Church of America. After joining this church plaintiff never volunteered for Sunday overtime work, although he did volunteer for other days.

Plaintiff was scheduled to work overtime on Sunday, November 21, 1965, pursuant to the compulsory overtime provisions of the Labor Agreement. He refused to work because of his religious beliefs; he was given a verbal warning; and he was advised of the necessity of a seven-day operation and that a repetition of his conduct would lead to a disciplinary action under Plant Rule II. This rule prohibits "absence from work without reasonable cause," and provides a three-offense progression of punishment, with discharge for the third offense.

On the next five Sundays which plaintiff was required to work, between January and August 1966, he instead obtained qualified replacements in the manner described, supra. But on August 28, 1966, when again required to work on Sunday, plaintiff refused to work because of his religious beliefs and refused because of his religious beliefs to obtain a replacement. He told Jake Zagman, a fellow employee who had been serving as his replacement, that he would no longer ask Jake to replace him. Plaintiff was given a written warning of violation of Plant Rule 11.

There is no dispute that these religious beliefs of plaintiff are sincere. These beliefs were expressed by plaintiff to the defendant before the first time he refused to obtain a qualified replacement. Plaintiff honestly believes, as a part of his religion, that he should not work on Sunday, and that he also should not induce anyone else to work on Sunday.

Consequently, on the next Sunday which plaintiff was required to work, September 4, 1966, he refused to work or to obtain a replacement. He was given a written warning and a disciplinary layoff of three days. Plaintiff again refused to work on Sunday, September 11, 1966, and was discharged for violation of Plant Rule 11.

On all the above-mentioned Sundays there were several qualified die repairmen available to work, although defendant states that two of these men could not be compelled to accept such an overtime assignment, since it was outside their job classification.

Before plaintiff's discharge, defendant had taken disciplinary action as to a number of other employees who refused overtime work assignments on Sunday because of their religious beliefs, as well as disciplinary action against employees who refused overtime on days other than Sunday.

Plaintiff filed a grievance upon his discharge, but his grievance was denied at every step of the procedure, including arbitration. The arbitrator considered only the contract, and neither the Civil Rights Act nor the Constitution was before him. Plaintiff then proceeded to the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, which denied his complaint due to insufficient grounds. Plaintiff then filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which issued a letter to defendant stating that the Commission had determined that there was reasonable cause to believe that defendant had engaged in unlawful employment practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

This action was brought upon failure of conciliation efforts. In November of 1968, this court denied defendant's motion to dismiss, 291 F.Supp. 786.

These are the facts that have been established. Before stating the law and applying it to these facts, it is well to note the facts which have not been brought before the court. There is no evidence that defendant would suffer any hardship should plaintiff prevail in this case. There is no evidence concerning what the effects would be of an accommodation by defendant to the religious beliefs of plaintiff. Could defendant continue to operate on Sunday? Would production be affected? These questions, and others like them, remain unanswered even though the parties have been given ample opportunity to present evidence concerning facts which were not possible to stipulate.

Because an application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, will permit the court to decide the case, it is not necessary to reach the question of whether plaintiff's constitutional rights have been violated.

Section 703(a) (1) of the Act, 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-2(a) (1), provides:

"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer —
(1) to * * * discharge any individual * * * because of such individual's * * * religion * * *."

The Act makes exception to this rule only in those instances where religion is a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). That exception has not been alleged, and clearly does not apply to the manufacture of aluminum extrusions.

To further the purposes of the Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was formed. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4. The Commission was given power not only to aid the enforcement of the Act, but also to promulgate regulations consistent with the provisions and purposes of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a). Regulation Section 1605.1 is directly applicable to this case:

"Section 1605.1 Observance of Sabbath and other religious holidays. (a) Several complaints filed with the Commission have raised the question whether it is discrimination on account of religion to discharge or refuse to hire employees who regularly observe Friday evening and Saturday, or some other day of the week, as the Sabbath or who observe certain special religious holidays during the year and, as a consequence, do not work on such days.
"(b) The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds, required by section 703(a) (1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes an obligation on the part of the employer to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of employees and prospective employees where such accommodations can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business. Such undue hardship, for example, may exist where the employee's needed work cannot be performed by another employee of substantially similar qualifications during the period of absence of the Sabbath observer.
"(c) Because of the particularly sensitive nature of discharging or refusing to hire an employee or applicant on account of his religious beliefs, the employer has the burden of proving that an undue hardship renders the required accommodations to the religious needs of the employee unreasonable.
"(d) The Commission will review each case on an individual basis in an effort to seek an equitable application of these guidelines to the variety of situations which arise due to the varied religious practices of the American people."

Great weight should be given to this regulation, as the Supreme Court emphasized in Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85...

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