Dewey v. University of New Hampshire, 82-1486
Decision Date | 26 November 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 82-1486,82-1486 |
Citation | 694 F.2d 1 |
Parties | 30 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 799, 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,166, 7 Ed. Law Rep. 796 Richard DEWEY, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. The UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al., Defendants, Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Mark S. Gearreald, Exeter, N.H., with whom Shute, Engel & Morse, P.A., Exeter, N.H., was on brief, for plaintiff, appellant.
Joseph A. Millimet, Manchester, N.H., with whom Devine, Millimet, Stahl & Branch, Manchester, N.H., was on brief, for defendants, appellees.
Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, TIMBERS, * Senior Circuit Judge, and BREYER, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Richard Dewey appeals from the dismissal of his civil rights complaint by the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. We agree with the district court that Count One of the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that the remaining counts were time barred. 1
Plaintiff was, from 1958 to 1978, a tenured professor at the University of New Hampshire. In 1978 he retired, pursuant to a directive invoking a University policy requiring retirement at age 65. After receiving notice of his mandatory retirement, plaintiff sought unsuccessfully to appeal the decision through informal University channels. That failing, on July 29, 1981, he brought suit, under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, against the University and several of its administrators, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages for violation of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In Count I of the complaint, plaintiff alleged that the enforcement of the retirement policy in his case was in retaliation for past exercise of his First Amendment rights. Count II alleged that, even if the retirement was based on the University's policy, the decision was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, because it relied on an age classification not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Count III asserted the lack of procedural safeguards that should have attended his dismissal. Count IV alleged the deprivation of a liberty interest in the deletion of his name from University publications. Count V alleged a denial of Equal Protection in that other individuals were more favorably treated regarding post-retirement employment. Count VI alleged a denial of Due Process and Equal Protection in connection with plaintiff's salary from 1967 forward.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and/or for summary judgment. After a hearing, the receipt of memoranda of law from the parties and two amendments to plaintiff's complaint, the court dismissed the complaint. It dismissed Counts I and IV for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and Counts II, III, V and VI as time barred.
Count I
The pertinent allegations of Count I were that plaintiff, who had taught at the University from 1958, aware that he would turn 65 on November 1, 1977, began in the fall term of 1977 to discuss with his colleagues "their views on ageism"; that "[i]n keeping with the country-wide momentum to abolish age as a job criterion, [he] found widespread support from his retention among the University community" except for defendant Spitz, the Dean of the College of Liberal Arts; that during all of the years of Spitz's deanship, from 1971 to 1980, plaintiff "both publicly and to defendant Spitz in person ... voiced views on University matters of public concern 2 that were contrary to those of defendant Spitz"; that Spitz issued a decision that plaintiff would have to retire at the end of the 1977-78 academic year because of University policy; that this reason was a mere pretext, concealing that "[a] substantial factor in his decision was plaintiff's past exercise of his right of freedom of speech"; that in the three and one-half years since this decision plaintiff has appealed to the Acting Dean of the College of Liberal Arts, the Vice President for Academic Affairs, the former president of the University, the present President, and the Personnel Committee of the Board of Trustees, all of whom rejected his appeals despite "expressions of support for plaintiff's retention from all sectors of the University community".
There must be added to these allegations the University's retirement policy, contained in the University Faculty Handbook, which the magistrate, without objection, recommended be considered by the court along with the pleadings in ruling on defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. The Handbook contained the details of the University's retirement policy alluded to in the complaint, namely, that "[u]nder rare and unusual circumstances and at the discretion and on the initiative of the University, employment of a member of the faculty may be extended beyond the retirement age ...." The complaint alleged that two other 65 year old professors were retained in the 1977-78 and 1978-79 academic years, plaintiff being the only 65 year old mandatorily retired in those years.
What we have before us, therefore, is a complaint that makes three statements: (1) that plaintiff would likely have met the "rare and unusual" circumstances test because he had widespread support among the University community and two other tenured professors of his age were kept on; (2) that because he had voiced disagreement with defendant Spitz on University matters of public concern from 1971 to 1980, Spitz had made the key decision that the University should not exercise its discretion and determine that plaintiff had met the "rare and unusual" circumstances test; and (3) that top officials of the University backed up the initial decision.
The district court dismissed Count I of the complaint on the ground that it did not state a claim for which relief could be granted. This is a dubious practice in a closed case, particularly one involving a First Amendment claim. Summary judgment allows a broader basis for decision, and a hearing of evidence an even broader basis. Dismissal of a claim requires the most close analysis by an appellate court, balancing the overall liberal thrust of the simplified civil rules on the one hand, see generally 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Secs. 1216, 1357, against the repeated demands by our and other courts that there be more than conclusory allegations, even in civil rights cases.
Our standard for such a review as this has crystallized over the past few years in a number of cases. We require more than conclusions or subjective characterizations. We have insisted on at least the allegation of a minimal factual setting. It is not enough to allege a general scenario which could be dominated by unpleaded facts, O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 n. 3 (1st Cir.1976); nor merely to allege without specification that defendants used their powers generally with respect to various governmental bodies to plaintiff's prejudice, Kadar Corp. v. Milbury, 549 F.2d 230 (1st Cir.1977); nor to allege in general terms termination of a job because of plaintiff's refusal of romantic advances made by a superior, Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663 (1st Cir.1979); nor to allege simply that plaintiff suffered an adverse prison decision because he had filed a complaint on unspecified matters in court, Leonardo v. Moran, 611 F.2d 397 (1st Cir.1979); nor, finally, to allege that one's constitutional rights had been violated by some undescribed surveillance, Glaros v. Perse, 628 F.2d 679 (1st Cir.1980).
We recognize the great utility of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 as an instrument of justice in the hands of the weak against the mighty, but we also are aware of the impact of its misuse. Therefore, although we must ask whether the "claim" put forward in the complaint is capable of being supported by any conceivable set of facts, we insist that the claim at least set forth minimal facts, not subjective characterizations, as to who did what to whom and why. In so requiring, we are not alone. At least four other circuits keep us company: United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir.1980); Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology, 581 F.2d 658 (7th Cir.1978); Anderson v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 521 F.2d 420 (8th Cir.1975); Albany Welfare Rights Organization Day Care Center, Inc. v. Schreck, 463 F.2d 620 (2d Cir.1972).
In the instant case the complaint alleges that plaintiff, over a period of six years prior to the critical decision in the fall of 1977, spoke on a number of issues of public interest involving the University, disagreeing with defendant Spitz. Despite the fact that nearly eight months elapsed from the filing of the complaint (July 29, 1981) to the filing of a second motion to amend it (March 12, 1982), during which time the lack of specificity in the complaint had been vigorously challenged, there was no effort to fill in the gaps as to the nature of the issues discussed, the particular occasions, their recentness or remoteness, the position of the University, the importance of the controversy, the prominence or lack of prominence of plaintiff's comments. Instead, the allegations described what we assume would be true of any thinking and reasonably articulate faculty member during the decade of the seventies.
If such a skeletal set of bland allegations were held to state a cause of action, any employee could put a defendant to its proof or at least force it to affidavits simply by saying: Such a...
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