Dewey v. Wentland

Decision Date10 January 2002
Docket Number No. 00-245., No. 00-93, No. 00-179, No. 00-244, No. 00-178
Citation38 P.3d 402
PartiesJohn C. DEWEY and Elizabeth A. Dewey, Appellants (Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs), v. Richard D. WENTLAND and Doris J. Wentland, Appellees (Plaintiffs), and Harry Barnett, d/b/a Hub Real Estate, Appellee (Third-Party Defendant). Richard D. Wentland and Doris J. Wentland, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. Dewey Family Trust, and John C. Dewey and Elizabeth A. Dewey, Co-trustees; and John C. Dewey and Elizabeth A. Dewey, as individuals, Appellees (Defendants). John C. Dewey and Elizabeth A. Dewey, Appellants (Third-Party Plaintiffs), v. Harry Barnett, d/b/a Hub Real Estate, Appellee (Third-Party Defendant). Richard D. Wentland and Doris J. Wentland, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. Dewey Family Trust, John C. Dewey and Elizabeth A. Dewey, Co-trustees; and John C. Dewey and Elizabeth A. Dewey, as individuals, Appellees (Defendants). John C. Dewey and Elizabeth A. Dewey, as individuals, Appellants (Defendants Third-Party Plaintiffs), v. Richard D. Wentland and Doris J. Wentland, Appellees (Plaintiffs), and Harry Barnett, d/b/a Hub Real Estate, Appellee (Third-Party Defendant).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

Randy L. Royal, Greybull, WY, Representing the Wentlands.

James P. Castberg, Sheridan, WY, Representing the Deweys.

Timothy M. Stubson of Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Casper, WY, Representing Harry Barnett.

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] John and Elizabeth Dewey (the buyers) entered into a lease purchase agreement with Richard and Doris Wentland (the sellers) regarding the sellers' ranch. A dispute arose over the sellers' obligation to provide hay during the first winter for certain cattle. The buyers ultimately withdrew from the agreement and made numerous claims against the sellers and their real estate agent, Harry Barnett (the agent), including misrepresentation and breach of contract. The sellers countered with a breach-of-contract claim and requested specific performance of the agreement. The buyers seek review of the trial court's dismissal of numerous claims at various stages of the proceedings on issues of law, and the sellers challenge the trial court's denial of specific performance and the jury's verdict which awarded less damages than they deemed appropriate. We conclude the trial court properly applied the law and the jury's verdict was consistent and supported by legally sufficient evidence.

FACTS

[¶ 2] On June 22, 1994, the sellers entered into an Exclusive Right to Sell Listing Contract with the agent. After inspecting the property on three occasions, the buyers submitted an offer to buy the sellers' property for $450,000 on October 1, 1994. The buyers signed a form entitled "Offer, Acceptance and Receipt Specific Performance Contract (Farm & Ranch & Vacant Land)" as well as a form entitled "Addendum to Contract." In the addendum, the offer was made contingent upon the buyers' obtaining financing and selling their Sheridan property before March 1995. The addendum further provided that, if the Sheridan property was not sold by the designated date, the buyers would lease the sellers' ranch until their property sold with the lease cost to be applied to the purchase price of the sellers' property. Finally, the addendum added personal agreements regarding the buyers' leasing the sellers' cattle.

[¶ 3] In response to the offer, the sellers presented a counteroffer which was accepted by the buyers. The counteroffer incorporated all the provisions in the offer and addendum but added terms regarding the leased cattle. Thereafter, the parties prepared and executed a lease purchase agreement for a one-year lease term which incorporated the offer, addendum, and counteroffer.

[¶ 4] After the buyers took possession of the premises, problems arose which resulted in multiple claims.1 The buyers assert the sellers and their agent made several misrepresentations regarding the sellers' property. In addition, the buyers claim the sellers failed to leave sufficient first-cutting hay to winter the leased cattle. As a result, the buyers filed a lien statement in the amount of $10,430 with the Big Horn County Clerk. Subsequently, the sellers filed a Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and Permanent Injunction in the District Court for the Fifth Judicial District in Big Horn County, thus initiating this litigation. On the hearing date, the parties stipulated that the buyers would not proceed with the lien foreclosure action, and in return the sellers agreed the court would hold $10,430 as a bond for satisfaction of the lien. Meanwhile, the buyers gave the sellers notice that they would not exercise their option to purchase the property and would leave the premises by November 1, 1995. The buyers did in fact vacate the premises on or about November 11 or 12, 1995.

[¶ 5] In response to the sellers' complaint, the buyers counterclaimed alleging intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, failure to disclose, breach of good faith and fair dealing, conversion, and breach of contract, and they requested a remedy of declaratory judgment. In addition, the buyers filed an amended complaint to include claims of negligent misrepresentation, failure to disclose, and conversion against the real estate agent as a third-party defendant. The sellers also filed an amended complaint seeking initial injunctive relief, specific performance, and damages for breach of contract. The sellers intimated that, because the buyers no longer wanted to purchase the property, they were asserting essentially frivolous claims to elude performance.

[¶ 6] Following a summary judgment hearing on motions filed by all parties, the trial court, in a thorough and lengthy decision letter, dismissed several of the claims against the sellers and the agent. The only surviving claims against the sellers were breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation regarding the number of acres included in the state lease. The only surviving claim against the agent was negligent misrepresentation on the same issue.

[¶ 7] The remaining claims proceeded to a jury trial. At the conclusion of trial, the trial court granted the sellers' motion for a judgment as a matter of law pursuant to W.R.C.P. 50 on the claims of negligent and intentional misrepresentations. The jury subsequently returned a verdict which essentially found the real estate transaction was a lease with an option to buy rather than a contract for purchase. According to the verdict form, unless the jury found the parties entered into a contract to purchase the ranch, damages could not be awarded to the sellers. The jury informed the trial court: "We do not think that the lease purchase agreement was a contract to purchase the property. It was a lease for one year. [The sellers] do deserve to be compensated for some expenses. Are we allowed to award them some damages[?]" The court instructed the jury to answer the question regarding damages regardless of its answer to the initial question. The jury then determined the sellers incurred $32,497.29 in damages for certain payments that should have been made under the lease. Additionally, the jury awarded the buyers $10,430 in compensation for hay they had to purchase. Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 50 and the lack of sufficient evidence, the trial court struck the $10,430 damage award to the buyers. After trial, the court denied the sellers' complaint for specific performance but awarded them the earnest money deposit and the lease payments with accrued interest. The buyers filed three appeals, the sellers filed two appeals, and this court consolidated all the appeals for appellate review.

DISCUSSION
A. Whether the Trial Court Committed Error in the Entry of Partial Summary Judgment
1. Negligent Misrepresentation and Intentional Misrepresentation

[¶ 8] Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Eklund v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶ 10, 25 P.3d 511, ¶ 10 (Wyo. 2001); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense which has been asserted by the parties. Williams Gas Processing—Wamsutter Company v. Union Pacific Resources Company, 2001 WY 57, ¶ 11, 25 P.3d 1064, ¶ 11 (Wyo.2001). We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record. Id. We evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and by using the same materials as were employed and used by the lower court. Scherer Construction, LLC v. Hedquist Construction, Inc., 2001 WY 23, ¶ 15, 18 P.3d 645, ¶ 15 (Wyo.2001). We do not accord any deference to the district court's decisions on issues of law. Id.

[¶ 9] For purposes of efficiency, we will conjunctively examine the propriety of the grant of partial summary judgment to the agent and the sellers. The same facts are alleged to support the claims for both intentional misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation, although we reiterate the claim against the agent is only for negligent misrepresentation.2 The buyers based the alleged misrepresentations upon statements contained in the information sheet provided to them and several alleged oral statements made while they inspected the property with the agent. The trial court based its decision on the parties' depositions, affidavits, and briefs. We note, because the parties designated only a limited portion of the record, our review is necessarily constrained.

(a) MISREPRESENTATIONS MADE IN THE INFORMATION SHEET

[¶ 10] Intentional misrepresentation and...

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