DeWine v. State Farm Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 23 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 20CA3903,20CA3903 |
| Parties | Matthew DEWINE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶1} Matthew Dewine appeals the trial court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of Bryan Dewine on the ground that Matthew Dewine's action is barred by the statute of limitations. Matthew argues that the trial court erred because it failed to toll the statute of limitations during the time that Bryan was absent from the state of Ohio as required by R.C. 2305.15(A).
{¶2} We find that the tolling provision in R.C. 2305.15(A) applies to Bryan's absence from Ohio. The plain language of the statute provides that the time of Bryan's absence from Ohio "shall not be computed as any part of a period within which the action must be brought." Bryan left Ohio and moved to Nevada because a woman he was dating lived there. Eventually he married her and found a job. Bryan was not engaged in commerce so as to implicate the Commerce Clause. Because the cause of action accrued on April 3, 2016, Bryan was absent from Ohio from June 18, 2016 to August 8, 2018, and the lawsuit was filed on September 11, 2018, it was filed within the two-year statute of limitations of R.C. 2305.10. We sustain Matthew Dewine's assignment of error and reverse the trial court's judgment.
{¶3} On September 11, 2018, Matthew Dewine filed a complaint against his father Bryan Dewine and State Farm Insurance Company asserting a negligence claim against Bryan and an uninsured/underinsured and medical payments benefit claim against State Farm arising from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April 3, 2016. Matthew alleged that Bryan negligently failed to maintain reasonable control of his vehicle and it ran off the roadway and collided with a guardrail, causing injuries to Matthew, a passenger in the vehicle. Matthew voluntarily dismissed his claim against State Farm and the case proceeded solely against Bryan.
{¶4} Bryan filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the two-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.10 governing personal injury claims barred Matthew's claim, which was filed approximately two years and five months after the accident. After the April 3, 2016 accident, Bryan left Ohio on June 18, 2016 and moved to Nevada, where he resided until he returned to Ohio on August 8, 2018. Bryan argued that the tolling provisions of R.C. 2305.15(A), which excludes the time period he was absent from Ohio from the statute of limitation calculation, was unconstitutional as applied to him. He argued that the United States Supreme Court examined Ohio's tolling provision in R.C. 2305.15(A) in Bendix, infra, and held that it violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution by placing an impermissible burden on out-of-state corporations. The effect of Ohio's tolling provision was to make an out-of-state corporation subject to suit in Ohio in perpetuity while an Ohio corporation is not. The Supreme Court held that to gain the protections of the statute of limitations, an out-of-state corporation would have to appoint a resident agent for service of process in Ohio and subject itself to the Ohio courts' general jurisdiction – a burden unjustified where Ohio's long-arm statute permits service on the foreign corporation. Bryan argued that the Bendix holding was extended beyond out-of-state corporations to out-of-state residents in Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde , 514 U.S. 749, 115 S.Ct. 1745, 131 L.Ed.2d 820 (1995) and was further extended to Ohio residents who leave Ohio for employment in another state by Tesar v. Hallas , 738 F.Supp. 240 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (). Bryan argued that because he moved from Ohio to Nevada to get married and find other employment, the application of R.C. 2305.15(A) to toll the statute of limitations against him is similarly unconstitutional as applied.
{¶5} Matthew opposed the motion and argued that the tolling provision in R.C. 2305.15(A) applies to Ohio residents who leave the state for non-business reasons, citing Johnson v. Rhodes , 89 Ohio St.3d 540, 733 N.E.2d 1132 (2000). Because Bryan left the state to get married – not for business reasons, Matthew argued that the tolling provision did not violate the Commerce Clause in this instance. Matthew also cited a more recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in which an Ohio doctor allegedly committed malpractice then left Ohio to retire in Florida. See Garber v. Menendez , 888 F.3d 839 (6th Cir. 2018). The Sixth Circuit held that the tolling provision of R.C. 2305.15(A) as applied to Dr. Menendez, "does not impose a cost on a traditional interstate business transaction" and "does not lead to favoritism toward in-state firms over out-of-state ones." Id. at 846. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision holding the statute unconstitutional as applied to Dr. Menendez and instead held that the tolling provision applied to the time he was absent from Ohio.
{¶6} Here, the trial court reviewed the case law and found three general scenarios: (1) the defendant is not an Ohio resident at the time the cause accrued and left the state – in these cases the statute is not tolled; (2) the defendant is an Ohio resident at the time the cause accrued and then leaves the state indefinitely to take employment – in these cases the statute is not tolled; and (3) the defendant is an Ohio resident at the time the cause accrued and temporarily leaves the state – in these cases the statute is tolled for the time the resident is absent from the state. The trial court found that the key issue in each scenario is intent, "where a person leaves and has no intent to return, Ohio law says tolling does not apply." Because Bryan left Ohio and went to Nevada to marry, live, work, obtain a driver's license, and become a Nevada resident, the trial court found that there was no evidence that he had the intention of returning to Ohio. Therefore, the trial court held that the tolling provisions of R.C. 2305.15(A) were inapplicable to Bryan, granted him summary judgment, and dismissed Matthew's complaint as barred by the statute of limitations.
{¶7} Matthew assigns the following error for our review:
The Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee Bryan Dewine because it failed to adhere to Section 2305.15 of the Ohio Revised Code.
{¶8} Matthew contends that the trial court erred when it failed to apply the tolling provision of R.C. 2305.15(A) to the time Bryan was absent from Ohio. He argues that the plain language of the statute is unambiguous and provides, "if the person departs from the state * * * the time of the person's absence or concealment shall not be computed as any part of a period within which the action must be brought." Matthew argues that the trial court did not address the Sixth Circuit's decision in Garber, supra , which is the highest federal authority on the matter. Matthew also argues that the trial court improperly added "intent" as an element to R.C. 2305.15 even though there is no distinction in the statute between absences "intended" to be permanent and those "intended" to be temporary.
{¶9} Bryan takes a cautiously critical view of the Sixth Circuit's analysis in Garber, pointing to the Court's failure to include Reynoldsville Casket, supra , in its analysis and urges us to affirm the trial court's judgment under federal law as set forth in Bendix, Reynoldsville Casket, and Tesar.
{¶10} We review the trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo. Smith v. McBride , 130 Ohio St.3d 51, 2011-Ohio-4674, 955 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 12. Accordingly, we afford no deference to the trial court's decision and independently review the record and the inferences that can be drawn from it to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Harter v. Chillicothe Long–Term Care, Inc. , 4th Dist. Ross No. 11CA3277, 2012-Ohio-2464, 2012 WL 1997821, ¶ 12 ; Grimes v. Grimes , 4th Dist. Washington No. 08CA35, 2009-Ohio-3126, 2009 WL 1830761, ¶ 16.
{¶11} Summary judgment is appropriate only when the following have been established: (1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party. Civ.R. 56(C) ; DIRECTV, Inc. v. Levin , 128 Ohio St.3d 68, 2010-Ohio-6279, 941 N.E.2d 1187, ¶ 15. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the record and all inferences therefrom in the nonmoving party's favor. Civ.R. 56(C). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden to demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that they are entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292–293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). To meet its burden, the moving party must specifically refer to "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action," that affirmatively demonstrate that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support the nonmoving party's claims. Civ.R. 56(C) ; Dresher at 293, 662 N.E.2d 264. Moreover, the trial court may consider evidence not expressly mentioned in Civ.R. 56(C) if such evidence is incorporated by reference in a properly framed affidavit pursuant to Civ.R. 56(E). Discover Bank v. Combs , 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 11CA25, 2012-Ohio-3150, 2012 WL 2832550, ¶ 17 ; Wagner v. Young...
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