Dewitt v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 22 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 4:18CV1381 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
| Parties | SAMUEL LEVI DEWITT, Plaintiff, v. GLEN JOHNSON, et al., Defendants. |
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Samuel Levi Dewitt, a federal prisoner at FCI Elkton in Lisbon, Ohio, filed this action against Head Chaplain Glen Johnson, Chaplain Randy Culp, Warden Steven Merlak, Regional Director M.D. Carvajal, Administrator of National Inmate Appeals Ian Conners, and Regional Counsel Darrin Howard.1 ECF No. 1. Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants pursuant to his rights under the United States Constitution, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), the Civil Rights Act, and the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). Id.
at PageID #: 7-8. He seeks declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Id. at PageID #: 9. Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. ECF No. 3.
For the reasons that follow, this case is dismissed. Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel is denied.
Plaintiff alleges he is a "Disciple of Akrah." Id.
at PageID #: 2. In May 2017, he filed the paperwork required by FCI Elkton to be acknowledged as a Disciple of Akrah and allowed to practice the tenets of his religious beliefs. Id. at PageID #: 4. Father Bernie Mlapah,2 resident chaplain at FCI Elkton, approved Plaintiff's paperwork. Id. On May 7, 2017, Plaintiff submitted to defendant Culp3 a New and Unfamiliar Religions Questionnaire, along with ten pages of documentation describing the religious aspects of the Disciples of Akrah. Id. Culp gave the form and documents to Defendant Johnson,4 who was to present the form and documents to the "RIC (Regional Chaplains) for approval/disapproval." Id. at PageID #: 4.
On August 7, 2017, Johnson informed Plaintiff that, while the Disciples of Akrah could not be added to the Religious Services worship schedule, Plaintiff could practice the tenets of his faith as a sole practitioner. Id.
Plaintiff is currently the only member of the Disciples of Akrah at FCI Elkton. Id. This response was satisfactory to Plaintiff.5
Plaintiff states Johnson was in the process of retiring, so he presented his religious items request, which included a braided headband and sacred scroll bag, to Culp. Id.
at PageID #: 4-5. Culp accommodated Plaintiff by purchasing sacred oil for Plaintiff, providing him with locker space, and ordering religious books. Id. at PageID #: 5. Culp additionally informed Plaintiff that, under existing policy, Plaintiff would not be permitted to possess the requested braided headband and scroll bag. Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendants denied his request on the grounds of safety and security of the institution, along with issues of staff supervision. Id. at PageID #: 6.
Plaintiff initiated pursuit of his administrative remedies on September 10, 2017. Id.
at PageID #: 5. During this process, Plaintiff stayed in touch with Culp in an attempt to "ease [his] emotional turmoil." Id. On May 11, 2018, Plaintiff filed a FTCA claim. Id. On May 22, 2018, Plaintiff's claim was denied because Plaintiff claimed mental and emotional injury but not physical injury. Id.
Plaintiff alleges he has been discriminated against for over a year as a member of a minority religion by not being allowed the sacred vestments to practice his religion. Id.
at PageID #: 5-6. Plaintiff also maintains"Defendants have disparaged the Disciples of Akrah, giving its beliefs little worth and calling it a claimed and alleged religion" and suppressed his sincere religious beliefs without adequate reason by denying the free exercise of his faith. Id. at PageID #: 6. Plaintiff states he utilized the administrative remedy procedure available at FCIElkton to grieve the denial of his request for a braided headband and scroll bag multiple times and was denied each time. Id.
Plaintiff also claims he exhausted his administrative remedies through FCI Elkton's internal grievance and appellate procedures. Id. at PageID #: 6-7.
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed by the Court. Boag v. MacDougall,
454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Nonetheless, the district court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). An action has no arguable basis in law when a defendant is immune from suit or when a plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or "wholly incredible." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199.
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). The Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009), further explains the "plausibility" requirement, stating that "a claim has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, "the plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully." Id. This determination is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
Plaintiff claims Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Eighth Amendment. He also alleges entitlement to relief under RFRA, RLUIPA, and the Civil Rights Act.
Plaintiff brings his constitutional claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, the Supreme Court created a limited private right of action for money damages against federal government officials for injuries suffered as a result of a government official's violation of an individual's constitutional rights under color of federal law. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
Plaintiff's generalized claims of wrongdoing against "Defendants" are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. His legal claims concerning alleged constitutional violates are asserted entirely against "Defendants," and make no factual allegations as to the specific conduct of each defendant in violation of his asserted constitutional rights. Such vague and conclusory allegations do not provide adequate notice to any individual defendant of the claim asserted against them. Iqbal,
Moreover, vicarious liability is not available under Bivens. In order to state a claim under Bivens, a plaintiff must allege that the individual defendant was personally involved in the alleged deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Nwaebo v. Hawk-Sawyer,
83 F. App'x 85, 86 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373-77 (1976); Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1983)); Kesterson v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 60 F. App'x 591, 592 (6th Cir. 2003); see also
Steele v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1214 (10th Cir. 2003) ().
The only factual allegations of specific conduct by any of the individual Defendants concern Johnson and Culp. But these allegations only describe the process by which Plaintiff sought approval to practice his religion and the transmission of the request and subsequent denial of Plaintiff's request. ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 4-5. The only other factual allegations in the Complaint specific to each Defendant consist of a brief summary of their purported job responsibilities. See id.
at PageID #: 2-3. A description of each Defendant's job responsibilities is insufficient to allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that each individual Defendantis liable, based upon his own actions, for the alleged denial of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678; see also
Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (); Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible Bivens claim upon which relief can be granted.
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