DeWitt v. South Carolina Dept. of Highways and Public Transp.

• Decision Date: 15 January 1980
• Docket Number: No. 21120,21120
• Citation: DeWitt v. South Carolina Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 262 S.E.2d 28, 274 S.C. 184 (S.C. 1980)
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: James DeWITT, Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION, Appellant.

Page 28

262 S.E.2d 28

274 S.C. 184

James DeWITT, Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION, Appellant.

No. 21120.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Jan. 15, 1980.

Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richard D. Bybee and Staff Atty. William L. Todd, Columbia, for appellant.

Furman & Speedy, Camden, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This appeal is from an order enjoining appellant South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation from imposing against respondent James DeWitt the civil sanctions for driving under the influence of alcohol, second offense. We reverse.

Respondent was convicted on June 8, 1970, in Magistrate's Court of driving under the influence of alcohol, first offense. He did not seek appellate review of that conviction.

On May 19, 1978, respondent was tried in Chesterfield County Court of General Sessions on a charge of driving under the influence, second offense. At this trial, the judge reviewed respondent's first conviction for driving under the influence and determined that it was invalid. Thereupon, the judge ordered the first conviction be set aside. He then permitted respondent to enter a guilty plea to driving under the influence, first offense, and ordered that this conviction be treated by all law enforcement officers and all administrative agencies as a first offense and that any sanctions imposed be those of a first offense.

Despite such order, appellant requested respondent to forfeit his driver's license for one year, the statutorily mandated civil sanction for a conviction of driving under the influence, second offense. See S.C.Code of Laws, § 56-5-2990 (1976). Following appellant's request, respondent obtained an order from the Richland County Court of Common Pleas enforcing the trial judge's order and permanently enjoining appellant from imposing sanctions against respondent for driving under the influence, second offense.

Appellant now contends that the trial judge was without the authority or jurisdiction to review the legality of or set aside respondent's first conviction, and hence, the lower court was in error when it issued an injunction enforcing the trial judge's order. We agree.

A circuit court's jurisdiction over a magistrate court's judgment is appellate in nature. State v. Dickert, 260 S.C. 490, 197 S.E.2d 89 (1973); See also: Sections 18-3-10, Et seq. and 18-1-150, S.C.Code of Laws (1976). Moreover, it has been the established rule that a circuit judge cannot reverse a magistrate's judgment when the appellant has failed to serve on the magistrate the proper notice and grounds of appeal within the prescribed time limits. State v. Adkison, 264 S.C. 180, 213 S.E.2d 591 (1975). Neither does the circuit judge have the right to extend the time within which to make an appeal or move for a new trial. Dickert, supra.

Respondent contends that since the trial court had jurisdiction over the second offense, it thereby acquired jurisdiction to review the first conviction on the basis that proof of the first offense is an element required to prove the second offense.

Respondent has misapprehended the State's burden of proof. When the State is prosecuting a person for an offense that carries an enhanced penalty on a conviction of a second or subsequent...