Dexter v. State , 79S05–1106–CR–367.
| Decision Date | 12 January 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 79S05–1106–CR–367.,79S05–1106–CR–367. |
| Citation | 959 N.E.2d 235 |
| Parties | Thomas DEXTER, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
959 N.E.2d 235
Thomas DEXTER, Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 79S05–1106–CR–367.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
Jan. 12, 2012.
[959 N.E.2d 236]
Bruce W. Graham, Lafayette, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
A jury convicted the defendant of Class A felony neglect of a dependent and found him to be a habitual offender, which resulted in a 30–year sentencing enhancement. An unsigned judgment of conviction was presented by the State to prove that the defendant in fact had been convicted of one of the predicate felonies. We reverse the defendant's habitual-offender sentencing enhancement and hold that an unsigned judgment is not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the fact of a prior conviction. We also hold that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not bar the State from retrying the defendant on the habitual-offender enhancement.
The defendant, Thomas Dexter, lived in a Lafayette apartment with his girlfriend A.H. and her three daughters, including three-year-old K.S. On April 30, 2009, A.H. went to a morning appointment and left K.S. in Dexter's care, asking him to have her dressed by the time A.H. returned. Dexter proceeded to give K.S. a bath and then tossed her in the air. Dexter was unable to catch K.S., who was wet from her bath, and K.S. fell, striking both her head and her back on the tub. Dexter wrapped her in a towel and called 911. K.S. was rushed to a local hospital but soon was transferred to Riley Children's Hospital in Indianapolis due to an increase in her intracranial pressure. Sadly, K.S. died on May 5, 2009.
The State charged Dexter with one count of Class A felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death of the dependent, Ind.Code § 35–46–1–4(b)(3) (2008), and sought to have him sentenced as a habitual
[959 N.E.2d 237]
offender under Indiana Code section 35–50–2–8. A jury convicted him as charged and found him to be a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Dexter to the advisory sentence of 30 years for his Class A felony conviction and enhanced it by 30 years based on his status as a habitual offender, for a total of 60 years. Five years of the sentence were suspended to probation, yielding a total executed term of 55 years' imprisonment.
On appeal, Dexter contended (1) that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing certain expert testimony; (2) that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting Dexter's proffered jury instructions on negligent conduct; (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for Class A felony neglect of a dependent; and (4) that the evidence was insufficient to support his habitual-offender enhancement. The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed, rejecting all four of Dexter's arguments. Dexter v. State, 945 N.E.2d 220 (Ind.Ct.App.2011).
Dexter sought transfer on his claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that he is a habitual offender; the State elected not to file a response. We granted transfer to consider this issue (without ordering oral argument), Dexter v. State, 950 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind.2011) (table), thereby vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). We summarily affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals in all other respects. App. R. 58(A)(2).
The sentence of a person convicted of a felony may be enhanced by up to 30 years if he or she is a habitual offender. I.C. § 35–50–2–8(h); see, e.g., Seay v. State, 698 N.E.2d 732, 733–34 (Ind.1998) (discussing habitual-offender sentencing scheme). The habitual-offender enhancement is available where the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant previously has been convicted of two unrelated felonies. I.C. § 35–50–2–8(a), (g); e.g., Warren v. State, 769 N.E.2d 170, 171 n. 2 (Ind.2002).
The State alleged that Dexter had been convicted of felony theft in 2000 for offenses committed in 1999 and that he had been convicted of felony residential entry and felony theft in 2005 for offenses committed in 2004. To carry its burden of proving the 2000 theft conviction, the State used a copy of the order entering judgment of conviction that was not signed by the trial judge. The State also used a “rules of probation” form, the presentence investigation from the 2005 conviction, and the testimony of a probation officer. Dexter contends that this was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the 2000 theft conviction.
As a preliminary issue, the State argues that Dexter's claim is unavailable for review. It does not argue that Dexter has waived review by failing to object during the habitual-offender phase of this trial. Cf. I.C. § 35–50–2–8(g) (providing that the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt habitual-offender status); Ind. Trial Rule 50(A)(5) (providing that a claim of insufficient evidence can be raised for the first time on appeal in criminal cases). Instead, the State argues that the trial judge's failure to sign the judgment was merely an irregularity and does not void the judgment or subject it to collateral attack, and that any challenge to the sufficiency of the judgment based on the trial judge's failure to sign it must have been raised in the original court.
The State is correct that the trial judge's failure to sign the 2000 judgment
[959 N.E.2d 238]
of conviction does not render that conviction void. Newsom v. Miles, 220 Ind. 427, 429, 44 N.E.2d 297, 298 (1942); Bailer v. Dowd, 219 Ind. 624, 628–29, 40 N.E.2d 325, 326–27 (1942). Moreover, a defendant may not wage a collateral attack on the validity of a prior conviction during a habitual-offender proceeding, Gross v. State, 444 N.E.2d 296, 301 (Ind.1983), unless the court documents on their face raise a presumption that the conviction is constitutionally infirm and the apparent constitutional infirmity undermines the integrity and reliability of the guilt determination. Edwards v. State, 479 N.E.2d 541, 547–48 (Ind.1985). The lack of a judicial signature is not a constitutional infirmity and therefore is not a basis for collateral attack in a habitual-offender proceeding. Cf. Goliday v. State, 526 N.E.2d 1174, 1175–76 (Ind.1988) (defendant could not lodge collateral attack to the validity of an unsigned sentencing order during habitual-offender proceeding).
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