Di Vona v. Haverhill Shoe Novelty Co., 2503

Decision Date12 December 1956
Docket NumberNo. 2503,2503
Citation127 A.2d 503,85 R.I. 122
PartiesCarmella DI VONA v. HAVERHILL SHOE NOVELTY CO., Inc. Eq.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

Frank C. Cambio, Providence, for petitioner.

Francis V. Reynolds, Richard P. McMahon, Providence, for respondent.

ROBERTS, Justice.

This is an employee's petition brought under the workmen's compensation act, general laws 1938, chapter 300, as amended by public laws 1954, chapter 3297, to review a preliminary agreement for compensation on the ground of an alleged decrease in her earning capacity, and for the allowance of certain medical fees.

During a hearing before a single commissioner of the workmen's compensation commission the employee introduced evidence to show that certain psychical effects had developed from the injury set out in the preliminary agreement of May 8, 1951, and the single commissioner entered a decree finding partial incapacity from July 29, 1954. On appeals therefrom by petitioner and respondent, the full commission affirmed the decree of the single commissioner. Both the employer and the employee have appealed from the decree of the commission.

It appears that petitioner had sustained an injury to her left index finger on February 19, 1951 arising out of and in the course of her employment and that a preliminary agreement for compensation was entered into by the parties on March 9, 1951. This agreement was suspended by an approved compensation agreement and settlement receipt stating that the employee had returned to work on April 30, 1951. The employee shortly thereafter again became incapacitated and a new preliminary agreement was entered into dated May 8, 1951 wherein the injury was described as 'Left index finger, distal phalanx, severe contusion and extensive loss of tissue from palmar surface.' This agreement, which was approved, further provided for payment of compensation for the duration of total incapacity starting May 3, 1951.

The employer subsequently filed a petition to review the preliminary agreement of May 8, 1951. After a hearing in the superior court, the petition was granted and by a decree entered September 11, 1953 further payments of compensation were ordered suspended. The employee appealed to this court which affirmed the decree of the superior court suspending payments of compensation. Haverhill Shoe Novelty Co. v. Di Vona, 82 R.I. 254, 107 A.2d 305. The decree thus affirmed contained the following finding of fact: 'That the incapacity of the employee resulting from the injury of February 19, 1951, has ended insofar as that incapacity results from the injury, the nature and location of which are set forth in the preliminary agreement.' Thereafter on March 7, 1955, the employee filed the instant petition.

The respondent employer now urges that this claim for compensation is barred by the doctrine of res adjudicata, contending that the same issues were heard and decided in Haverhill Shoe Novelty Co. v. Di Vona, supra, and that the condition which she claims is now incapacitating existed at the time of the previous trial. The controlling question therefore is the extent to which the doctrine of res adjudicata is to be applied in cases arising under the workmen's compensation act.

In the case of Card v. Lloyd Mfg. Co., 82 R.I. 182, 107 A.2d 297, we held that the doctrine of res adjudicata is applicable in cases arising under the compensation act. The pertinent question here is whether the doctrine is to be applied in these cases with the same rigidity as it is applied in other areas of the law. We are of the opinion that when the subject matter is a petition by either an employer or an employee to review a decree or preliminary agreement for compensation, the application of such doctrine should be limited.

In Coates v. Coleman, 72 R.I. 304, at page 312, 51 A.2d 81, at page...

To continue reading

Request your trial
17 cases
  • Martinez v. Bar-Tan Mfg.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
    • February 24, 1987
    ... ... In Ottone v. Franklin Process Co., 76 R.I. 431, 437, 71 A.2d 780, 783 (1950), this ... Cf. DiVona v. Haverhill Shoe Novelty Co., 85 R.I. 122, 126, 127 ... ...
  • Denisewich v. Abbott Glass Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
    • May 15, 1964
    ...doctrine of collateral estoppel and cites Capaldo v. Public Utility Hearing Board, 77 R.I. 378, 75 A.2d 302, and DiVona v. Haverhill Shoe Novelty Co., 85 R.I. 122, 127 A.2d 503. Neither of these cases, however, is authority for the proposition for which they are cited in the instant cause. ......
  • Woods v. Safeway System, Inc.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
    • July 18, 1967
    ...the court's business, Blais v. Franklin, 31 R.I. 95, 77 A. 172.' In our opinion the rationale of the court in DiVona v. Haverhill Shoe Novelty Co., 85 R.I. 122, 127 A.2d 503, applies to the case at bar. In DiVona the employer sought a credit for partial payments made to the employee during ......
  • D'Iorio v. U.S. Rubber Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
    • February 26, 1959
    ...the second proviso of § 28-33-18. That issue has not been adjudicated by the decree of January 27, 1958. See Di Vona v. Haverhill Shoe Novelty Co., R.I., 127 A.2d 503, 505, 506. In our judgment there is legal evidence to support the findings of the commission that the petitioner made a bona......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT