O'Diah v. Artus, 10–CV–6705L.
Decision Date | 24 August 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 10–CV–6705L.,10–CV–6705L. |
Citation | 887 F.Supp.2d 497 |
Parties | Aror Ark O'DIAH, Plaintiff, v. D. ARTUS, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Aror Ark O'Diah, Albion, NY, pro se.
Benjamin A. Bruce, New York State Office of the Attorney General Rochester, NY, for Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Aror Ark O'Diah, appearing pro se, has filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), has sued twenty-two defendants, alleging a variety of claims arising out of events that occurred over a period of several months during 2010, while plaintiff was confined at Gowanda Correctional Facility. Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff has cross-moved for summary judgment, and has filed two motions seeking leave to amend the complaint to add a total of seven more defendants.
A. General Principles
On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court's task is to determine whether, “accept[ing] the allegations contained in the complaint as true, and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant,” the plaintiff has stated a facially valid claim. Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir.1994). In making that determination, the court must keep in mind that Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Thus, where a plaintiff “ha [s] not nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [his] complaint must be dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
“[T]his plausibility standard governs claims brought even by pro se litigants.” Nevarez v. Hunt, 770 F.Supp.2d 565, 567 (W.D.N.Y.2011) (internal quotes and citations omitted). At the same time, however, the Court is mindful that even after Twombly, a “document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir.2008). Nevertheless, all pleadings, pro se or otherwise, must contain enough factual allegations to “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007)) (additional internal quotes omitted).
Applying these standards here, I conclude that plaintiff's claims must be dismissed. Though plaintiff has asserted a wide array of claims, they are all facially meritless.
For instance, while plaintiff asserts a due process claim arising out of his disciplinary hearings, the complaint and the exhibits attached to the complaint show that the most severe sanction that plaintiff received was thirty days in keeplock. See Complaint ¶¶ 76, 78; Exs. 27, 28. Absent allegations that the conditions of plaintiff's confinement during that period were unusually harsh or that plaintiff suffered any severe or atypical hardship in connection with the sentences he received, these events did not implicate any constitutionally protected liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995); Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F.3d 649, 654–55 (2d Cir.2004); Rivera v. Lempke, 810 F.Supp.2d 572, 575 (W.D.N.Y.2011).
In that regard, plaintiff does allege that he has been subjected to “mental cruelty, deprivation of movement, Human Liberty and Human rights,” “physical, emotional, mental anguish, and psychological attacks,” and similar torments. Plaintiff's broad, unspecific allegations are not supported by the alleged facts, however, and are more in the nature of legal conclusions than facts. See Toms v. Pizzo, 4 F.Supp.2d 178, 183 (W.D.N.Y.) () (quoting Gomes v. Avco Corp., 964 F.2d 1330, 1335 (2d Cir.1992)), aff'd,172 F.3d 38 (2d Cir.1998). Furthermore, plaintiff fails to connect these events with any particular defendants, so there is no basis in his allegations for a claim against any individual defendant.
Plaintiff has also asserted a due process claim against Grievance Supervisor Janish for allegedly failing to follow state administrative rules concerning the grievance process. See Complaint ¶¶ 16, 17. The law is clear, however, that a violation of state laws or regulations does not in itself give rise to a due process claim. See Bolden v. Alston, 810 F.2d 353, 358 (2d Cir.1987); Eleby v. Selsky, 682 F.Supp.2d 289, 293 (W.D.N.Y.2010) ( ). Plaintiff's conclusory allegations about Janish fail even to show a violation of state rules, much less a federal constitutional violation.
Another due process claim is based on the alleged loss of some of plaintiff s property. “The Second Circuit has held that New York provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy in the Court of Claims with respect to property claims by prison inmates.” Nash v. McGinnis, 585 F.Supp.2d 455, 461 (W.D.N.Y.2008) ( ). See also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 534, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) ( ). The allegations concerning the loss of plaintiff's property thus fail to state a due process claim.
Plaintiff has also asserted claims based on the issuance of allegedly false misbehavior reports. “The Second Circuit has held that the issuance of false misbehavior reports against an inmate by corrections officers is insufficient on its own to establish a denial of due process....” Colantuono v. Hockeborn, 801 F.Supp.2d 110, 116 (W.D.N.Y.2011) (citing Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 952 (2d Cir.1986)) (internal quote omitted). There is no indication that any unconstitutional motives underlay the issuance of the reports, and in fact, the complaint and exhibits tend to show that there was a factual basis for the reports. These claims must therefore be dismissed as well.
Plaintiff also alleges that on July 29, 2010, he was assaulted by another inmate, and that defendants “set up” the assault and failed to protect him from his assailant. See Complaint ¶¶ 88–91. While the Court will assume the truth of plaintiff's allegation that he was assaulted, the complaint is devoid of allegations making it plausible that any defendant was involved, or that any defendant was in a position to prevent the assault from occurring. In short, plaintiff's factual allegations simply do not support this claim.
Plaintiff has also sued several defendants from the medical staff at Gowanda, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs on certain occasions. At most, plaintiff's allegations show that he disagreed or was dissatisfied with the treatment that he was given. He alleges, for instance, that on one occasion he should have been given an MRI in addition to the x-ray that he was given. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir.1998) ) .
Plaintiff also alleges that certain nurses did not give him Tylenol or eye drops for several days following the assault by the other inmate. The facts alleged, however, do not suggest that defendants acted out of deliberate indifference to any serious medical need on plaintiff's part, or that the failure to provide plaintiff with Tylenol or eye drops during this period created an excessive risk to his health or caused him to suffer undue pain. See Mason v. Peters, 346 F.Supp.2d 396, 398 (W.D.N.Y.2004) ( ).
Plaintiff alleges that he was denied access to the courts because the prison law library copier was temporarily shut down and because some of his legal mail was misdelivered to a different correctional facility. To succeed on a claim of denial of access to the courts, however, “a prisoner must first demonstrate that an actual injury was suffered in order to have standing.” Melendez v. Haase, No. 04 Civ. 00073, 2010 WL 5248627, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2010) (citing Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 185 (2d Cir.2001)), aff'd,477 Fed.Appx. 801 (2d Cir.2012). “A plaintiff can demonstrate that a defendant caused actual injury by showing that the defendant ‘took or was responsible for actions that hindered a plaintiff's efforts to pursue a legal claim.’ ” Id. (quoting Montanez v. Cuoco, 361 Fed.Appx. 291, 294 (2d Cir.2010)). See also Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 184 (...
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